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Ronald Inglehart's work marks a new era in the history of the social sciences. He is one 
among the few scholars who have literally revolutionized cross-cultural research. While a 
growing body of cross-national data on many a sociologically relevant issue has been 
available to researchers since the late 19th century, this meant mostly aggregate data. It was 
several decades after the introduction of representative surveys that researchers have started to 
have access to cross-cultural data at the individual level. Inglehart's interest in the socio-
cultural transformation that had started in the West following World War II was an impetus in 
this evolution. What came to be known as the World Values Survey (WVS) ― undertaken at 
Inglehart's initiative ― has evolved into a global enterprise and has surveyed, at regular 
intervals, more than 100 nations by the beginning of the 21st century. Other programs have 
followed, but the WVS is still unparalleled in scope and depth, and thus remains the major 
source in cross-cultural research. 
In addition, Inglehart has authored many papers and several monographs that represent 
the cutting edge of inquiry into socio-cultural change. Thanks to the development of 
information technology, the data collected within the scope of his research have been made 
accessible to a wider public. While this has contributed to the engagement with Inglehart's 
work, it has also elevated his measures to the status of near currencies. As with measures in 
general, these have both strengths and weaknesses ― and what they mismeasure is probably 
as relevant to the inquiry as what they measure well. Accordingly, the debates on Inglehart's 
theses typically include a debate on his measures. While a consistent thread in these debates 
points to issues with Inglehart's theory on socio-economic change, his methods have 
undergone only slight adjustments. Over time, the Inglehart school has matured into a 
research tradition with prominent scholars like Christian Welzel expanding on the original 
theses and producing new, refined indicators to track socio-cultural change. Considering that 
both the theoretical core and the school’s methods have remained constant, concerns with 
them are similar. 
The study presented in this thesis is a critical assessment of two important chapters in 
Inglehart's work. One is the postmaterialism thesis, which originates in his studies conducted 
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during the late 1960s. This theory of economic growth-induced value change had later 
developed into a detraditionalization, and more recently a civic emancipation thesis. The other 
is an inquiry into the "opposite" causal direction: the cultural origins of economic growth. 
Although the former thesis is more influential, the latter is no less significant because it stems 
from an attempt at building a bridge between mainstream economics and the social sciences. 
The recurring debates on the necessity to "operationalize" culture in macroeconomic models 
have much to rely on this part of Inglehart's work. 
Given this specific focus, this thesis is not a monograph on Inglehart's scholarship. 
Instead, my purpose is to reexamine the two selected theses and conduct an empirical study 
by relying on the debates around them. The scope of such an inquiry is narrower than it would 
be in the case of a monograph: in order to drill deeper, this is a requirement. Accordingly, 
such important chapters of Inglehart's output as his studies on the transformation of political 
conflicts, the process of democratization or the evolution of gender roles are not addressed in 
this study. 
In Chapter 1, I argue that Inglehart's three most influential instruments measuring 
cultural values: the Postmaterialism Index, the self-expression-survival, and the secular-
traditional measures obfuscate the complexity of the value space. To overcome the limitations 
of these instruments, I present an alternative method in the form of multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA), a geometric approach to data analysis. This separates out those axes of 
cultural values: religiosity, authoritarianism, and materialism that Inglehart's scales treat as 
part of broader cultural dimensions. This chapter addresses another important issue: construct 
equivalence. A long-standing criticism of Inglehart's methods has been related to uncertainty 
regarding the comparability of his instruments derived from cross-national multivariate 
analyses. The tests of invariance corroborate these concerns. Regarding the measures 
proposed as alternatives to Inglehart's instruments, the cross-national comparisons include 
only countries where the equivalence of constructs could be established. These comparisons 
show that national values and trajectories of change challenge Inglehart's 
postmaterialism/detraditionalization thesis on several counts. 
Chapter 2 examines the linkages between cultural values and economic growth with 
reference to the update to the endogenous growth model proposed by Inglehart and his 
collaborators. Their formulation suggests that cultural values have an independent impact on 
economic growth via savings and technological innovation. Since this approach maintains the 
basic neoclassical assumptions it intends to improve on, the discussion focuses on the cultural 
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variable introduced in the model by reviewing heterodox approaches to economic growth. 
This chapter also includes regressions specified with reference to Inglehart's growth model 
and using the value constructs developed in Chapter 1. It should be emphasized that the 
argument presented in Chapter 2 merely examines Inglehart's augmented endogenous growth 
model with reference to currents outside mainstream economics, and as such, it does not 
purport to propose an alternative model of growth. 
Chapter 3 revisits the issues with Inglehart's two theses from the perspective of field 
theory, a relational approach to the study of social phenomena. I argue that much of the 
concerns with Inglehart's theses stem from the substantialist paradigm. The latter treats 
theoretical constructs like the economy or culture as objectively delimited counterparts 
(substances), an assumption that field theory rejects. The argument expands on the symbolic 
and material aspects of agency by relying on Weber's concept of elective affinity and 
Bourdieu's studies on symbolic power. While Bourdieu is an obvious reference for a 
sociological argument applying field analysis, Weber might look somewhat out of place. This 
is because his Protestant ethic thesis has been canonized as a substantialist theory of economic 
development ― an interpretation that can be refuted on closer scrutiny. By reexamining this 
thesis, I argue that its actual propositions can be accommodated in field theory and moreover 
point out the flaws in the substantialist school using it as a reference. 
Compared with Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 1 includes a more "technical" discussion. If 
one is to address the issues with Inglehart's empirical apparatus, this is inevitable. 
Nonetheless, because this is not a text on methodology, the statistical formalization is kept at 
a minimum. The insights from this part resurface in the closing chapter where they are 
discussed as challenges specific to a field analysis of values. 
While the core argument builds up across the three chapters, each chapter is written in 
an article format, having its own introduction and a section with conclusions. Chapter 3 sums 
up the implications of the first two chapters by developing into a reflection on the empirical 






1. Traditional values and the Inglehart constructs 
The text included in sections 1.1 to 1.3 of this chapter and the related notes (A1.1 in 
Appendix 1) is published under the same title in Volume 79, Issue S1 of Public Opinion 
Quarterly (Lakatos 2015), available online starting with April, 2015. Copyright for this part 
is held by Oxford University Press. Reproduced here by permission. 
1.1. The postmaterialism index and its offshoots 
Inglehart's postmaterialism thesis presented in his early writings (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 
1981) comprise two complementary hypotheses. The scarcity thesis, borrowed from Maslow's 
needs theory (1970) posits that since people value anything that is in short supply, so long as 
their physical survival and material security are not taken for granted, they will be driven by 
materialistic aspirations. Increasing affluence leads to a de-emphasis of not only material 
gains but also of religion and unquestioned authority in favor of secular, libertarian values, 
and political emancipation. The socialization thesis conceives of value orientations acquired 
during one's formative years as stable over adulthood. 
Of Inglehart's three most influential measures, the Postmaterialism Index is an indicator 
of this cultural shift. Central to the empirical evidence behind the Postmaterialism Index is a 
factor analysis of responses to questions on national priorities (Table 1). Critics have argued 
that since most of these questions address policy preferences rather than values, the 
relationship posited by Inglehart between the private and the public domain is problematic. 
Flanagan (1982a, 1982b; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) has suggested that the Postmaterialism 
Index is an inadequate measure of two separate dimensions of political conflicts in Western 
societies: on one hand, the relative importance of economic versus non-economic issues, and, 
on the other hand, the preference for libertarian versus authoritarian policies. The problematic 
inference of values from answers to questions on public policy alone is also discussed in 
Marsh (1975), Lafferty and Knutsen (1985), Trump (1991), Haller (2002), and Majima and 
Savage (2007). Other concerns have to do with the evolution of the Postmaterialism Index, 
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which does not follow the trajectory posited by the theory. Growing portions of materialists 
among the young in a number of European countries (Böltken and Jagodzinski 1985), the 
absence of significant effect of formative economic experiences on the postmaterialism score 
in adulthood (Clarke and Dutt 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993, 1994; De Graaf and Evans 1996; 
Clarke, Dutt, and Rapkin 1997a, 1997b), and high instability, attributed specifically to 
random distribution of responses and non-attitudes (Van Deth 1983; Davis and Davenport 
1999; Davis, Dowley, and Silver 1999) are documented. Inglehart's response to these 
challenges has been the reaffirmation of his original theses by pointing out differences 
between his and his critics' methods, arguing that general trends should be tracked at the 
ecological rather than at the individual level, stressing that the meaning of the left and right 
has been changing in line with his theses, and that the overall trend in the West has been an 
increase in the portion of postmaterialists, even after controlling for inflation (Inglehart 1982, 
1983, 1985a, 1985b; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Abramson and Inglehart 1994; Abramson, 
Ellis, and Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1999). 
 
 
Materialist Measures  Postmaterialist Measures 
A) Maintaining order in the nation* 
 
 
B) Giving people more say in decisions on the 
government* 
C) Fighting rising prices*  D) Protecting freedom of speech* 
E) Maintaining a high rate of economic 
growth 
 
G) Giving people more say in how things are 
decided at work and in their community 
F) Making sure the country has strong defense 
forces 
 
H) Trying to make our cities and countryside 
more beautiful 
I) Maintaining a stable economy 
 
 
K) Moving towards a friendlier, less 
impersonal society 
J) Fighting against crime 
 
 
L) Moving towards s society where ideas 
count more than money 
Table 1 Inglehart's 12-item battery of materialist versus postmaterialist measures 
Note: Reproduced from Inglehart (1997: 355). The Postmaterialism Index is calculated using a 4- or 12-item battery pertaining to 
national priorities and policy preferences as perceived by the respondent. The 4-item index is constructed as follows: for the 
questions on the first and the second most important national priorities, respondents selecting both "maintaining order in the nation" 
(A) and "fighting rising prices" (C) are classified as materialists, while those selecting both "giving people more say in decisions on 
the government" (B) and "protecting freedom of speech" (D) are classified as postmaterialists. Those selecting both a "materialist" 
and a "postmaterialist" item are classified as mixed. This 3-point scale is available for most WVS country surveys, whereas the 12-
item index (on a 6-point scale, constructed from questions A to L) is available only for a limited number of countries and waves. 
*Items used for the 4-item Postmaterialism Index. 
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An assessment of the postmaterialism thesis should notice that Inglehart's approach to 
value measurement originates in the mind and mood among a specific sector of Western 
intelligentsia in the late 1960s. "Postmaterialism" might be relevant for the description of the 
political upheaval in a number of Western societies related to the decline of class-based 
political parties (Inglehart and Rabier 1986; Inglehart and Siemieńska 1988; Inglehart 1988). 
The rise of a New Left emphasizing non-economic concerns, exemplified by the Socialist 
Party in France (by opposition to the industrial worker-based Communist Party) is a 
phenomenon characteristic of that era. (The 1968 Paris revolt is an important reference in The 
Silent Revolution (1977).) However, past the late sixties turmoil, class has not lost its 
relevance to the political conflicts of late capitalism (G. Evans 1993; G. Evans 2000; G. 
Evans and Whitefield 2006; Szelényi, Fodor, and Hanley 1996; Green and Huey 2005; van 
Der Waal, Achterberg, and Houtman 2007). Moreover, non-materialist concerns, which, 
especially in Inglehart's early writings are associated with the New Left have been found 
relevant to the rise of new rightwing parties in a number of Western societies (Achterberg 
2006; Achterberg and Houtman 2006; de Koster, Achterberg, and van der Waal 2012), 
corroborating Flanagan's hypothesis that an emphasis on non-economic concerns and anti-
authoritarianism are unrelated.1 Finally, the distinction between "economic" versus "cultural" 
concerns can be questioned on empirical grounds: this aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 
3. 
With the expansion of the World Values Survey’s geographical coverage, Inglehart has 
refined his thesis of value change, reinterpreting the postmaterialist shift as part of a broader 
transformation toward self-expression (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Abramson and 
Inglehart 1995). To account for this phenomenon, he constructed two more comprehensive 
indicators that he claims to account for much of the value change taking place across societies 
with different cultural traditions (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000)2. The secular-
                     
1 The questions making up the full battery used to calculate the Postmaterialism Index are relevant to the 
specific problems of "30 Glorious Years" following the end of World War II when high growth rates, near full 
employment, and rapidly decreasing social inequalities were the characteristics of most Western economies. 
Hence the omission of a question on unemployment among the items making up the Postmaterialism Index 
might have been justified during that period but not starting from the late 1970s, when rising unemployment and 
stagnating and even declining living standards became reality for an increasing part of Western publics (Clarke 
et al. (1997a, 1997b). 
2 This study references the analysis presented in Inglehart and Baker (2000) because it is based on a more 
parsimonious model than Inglehart's 1997 book titled "Modernization and Postmodernization". A 2005 text 
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traditional and the self-expression-survival scales (Table 2, p. 15) define a two-dimensional 
value space in which societies form clusters that appear to represent historical-cultural entities 
in a "Global Cultural Map" (Figure 10, page 47).3 These scales are prominently used in later 
studies proposing a reformulation of the postmaterialism thesis within the scope of a more 
comprehensive theory of individual resources-driven human development, supported by a 
complex methodological apparatus (Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 2005). While the pool of 
variables on which these newer instruments are based is different from the items used in the 
Postmaterialism Index, the weaknesses of the latter apply to them as well. First, while 
Inglehart argues that secularism versus tradition and self-expression are relevant at the 
individual level, the two scales were derived from correlations at the ecological and 
pancultural levels without verifying their validity within the countries whose scores are 
compared.4 Second, both constructs are too heterogeneous to be considered value orientations 
(Datler, Jagodzinski, and Schmidt 2013). The secular-traditional dimension combines items 
tapping religiosity with indicators of authoritarianism and achievement values, as if these 
formed one underlying dimension. Of the variables from which the self-expression-survival 
dimension was originally extracted, two ("happiness" and "trust in people") are not values,5 
while a third item associated with this dimension ("priority to economic and physical security 
over self-expression and quality of life") is the Postmaterialism Index, whose construction is 
problematic for the reasons reviewed. 
  
                                                                
revisiting the issue, co-written with Welzel as a chapter of their "The Human Development Sequence" (2005) 
does not depart from the argument presented in the 2000 study. 
3 This map is included in the fourth section where the analysis will focus on country locations in the space 
of values. 
4 The initial configuration using 43 items was found at the ecological level (Inglehart 1997: 82). A later 
version stemming from a reduced 10-item battery (Inglehart and Baker 2000) extends the analysis to the 
individual level, but ignoring the country of origin. A similar configuration found at these two levels is no 
evidence of universally valid dimensions of culture at the individual level ― see the discussion of this point in 
the second part of this chapter. 
5 In Inglehart's earlier study (1997), these dimensions were labeled "secular/rational versus traditional" 
and "well-being versus survival" values respectively. The above labels refer to the later formulation (Inglehart 




Secular-traditional-Rational Valuesa  Self-expression-survival Valuesc 
TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE 
FOLLOWING: 
 
SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE 
FOLLOWING: 
God is very important in respondent’s life  
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical 
security over self-expression and quality-of-lifed 
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and 
religious faith than independence and determinationb 
 Respondent describes self as not very happy 
Abortion is never justifiable  
Respondent has not signed and would not sign a 
petition 
Respondent has strong sense of national pride  Homosexuality is never justifiable 
Respondent favors more respect for authority  You have to be very careful about trusting people 
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE 
THE OPPOSITE) 
 
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE 
OPPOSITE) 
Table 2 Inglehart and Baker's secular-traditional and self-expression-survival scales 
Note: 10-Item nattery, reproduced from Inglehart and Baker (2000: 24) without the factor loadings presented in the original table. 
Nation-level and individual-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990-91 and 1995-98 World Values Surveys. Compared 
with the study presented in Inglehart 1997, this is a reduced battery. 
a Explains 44 percent of cross-national variation and 26 percent of individual variation 
b Autonomy index 
c Explains 26 percent of cross-national variation and 13 percent of individual variation 
d Measured by the four-item materialist/postmaterialist values index. 
In an effort to overcome the limitations of these measures, recognized also within the 
Inglehart school, Christian Welzel has proposed two new indicators (Welzel 2013). 
Nevertheless, the improvement has been a refinement of, rather than a departure from the 
earlier apparatus. This is already apparent at the stage of scale construction: Welzel abandons 
the dimensional logic in favor of compository logic, in which various indicators are combined 
not because they form empirically coherent clusters but because they "complement each 
other" (2013: 58) conceptually. The non-values and the items measuring (post)materialism are 
no longer part of the sets, but the new secular and emancipative values scales are, if anything, 
more comprehensive than Inglehart’s instruments. The former brings together items related to 
religiosity, respect of authority, relativism, and skepticism. The latter is more coherent, 




Because multivariate analysis is not used in the construction of the scales but presented 
descriptively, Welzel's secular and emancipative values measures are correlated. Welzel 
emphasizes this property as part of the rationale, arguing that in dimensional logic, items with 
lower loadings are downgraded (their unique variance parts being treated as measurement 
error), and that standardized scores resulting from separate multivariate analyses, (e.g., 
different country samples) ignore absolute therefore "real and meaningful" individual 
positions. Most importantly, his theoretical argument, the human empowerment theory (HET) 
proposes that "by dissociating people from sacred authority, secular values are a likely 
precursor of the internalization of authority that comes with emancipative values" (2013: 62). 
In the following, I argue that this is an oversimplification, and the conflation of religiosity 
with authoritarianism leads to a misplaced perspective on cultural shifts. 
1.2. Exploring the space of values with multiple correspondence analysis 
A sensible alternative to Inglehart's instruments has to build on items that tap actual 
values, avoid ambiguity in the resulting constructs, and focus on the individual level. In 
addition, it should restrict cross-cultural comparisons to cases achieving at least construct 
equivalence. To address these requirements, this study uses multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA). Before turning to the discussion of the results obtained with this technique, I review 
the considerations in favor of MCA with reference to Benzécri (1992), Le Roux and Rouanet 
(2006, 2010), and Blasius and Greenacre (2006). 
Correspondence analysis, a method to analyze two-way contingency tables and multiple 
correspondence analysis, its variant extended to a subjects versus categories table are 
subclasses of geometric data analysis (GDA). In very broad terms, MCA is said to be 
"suitable" for studying categorical data, as opposed to principal component analysis (PCA) 
and related methods, appropriate for continuous variables. However, this description barely 
scratches the surface. In conventional multivariate methods such as PCA and factor analysis, 
the focus of the study is the variables: On one hand, the input variables, on the other hand, the 
constructs that the procedure seeks to establish as giving the best description of those items. 
In the case of PCA, this is done by computing linear combinations, whereas factor analysis 
searches for underlying dimensions using regressions. 
In contrast, the focus in multiple correspondence analysis is the space of subjects 
(individuals in our case). This means that unlike the above methods, MCA and other variants 
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of GDA do not "search" for meta-variables that best capture the information contained in the 
input variables. While a space of latent variables is also constructed in GDA, this is done by 
calculating relative distances in a Euclidean space between subjects based solely on their 
properties (the categories of the input variables).6 The common method to describe these 
relationships is the chi-square statistics. 
In GDA, the latent structure emerges from the data, rather than being "imposed" on 
them. Unlike multivariate analysis using probabilistic modeling, MCA is a technique where 
"(t)he model should follow the data and not the inverse" (Blasius and Greenacre 2006: 6). The 
underlying research philosophy stems from a theoretical framework which "identifies reality 
not with substances but with relations" (Bourdieu 1987: 150, emphasis added) ― a 
perspective that will be explored in Chapter 3. As applications of MCA demonstrate, the 
model can be also used in an explanatory framework. The most common method is the 
superposition of supplementary variables on the cloud of individuals, that is, variables which 
do not participate in the construction of the structure but help the interpretation. 
Apparent similarities (notably in visual displays) between PCA/factor analysis and 
GDA disguise this fundamental difference in their respective approaches. For example, while 
it is technically possible to visualize a cloud of individuals from the scores produced by 
PCA/factor analysis, it will not be the same "kind" of space as that constructed in MCA. 
Whereas in the in the former, subject vectors are computed with reference to linear 
combinations/explanatory variables, individual coordinates reflect no such "fitted" variables 
in MCA.7 Given the different roles assigned to subjects and variables, adaptations of factor 
analysis to ordinal variables (Jöreskog and Moustaki 2001) and variants of GDA do not take 
the same approach. Likewise, principal component analysis recast as geometric data analysis 
is a method related to multiple correspondence analysis, not "conventional" PCA: it 
investigates not only associations between continuous variables but also proximities between 
subjects (Le Roux and Rouanet 2006: 129).8 
                     
6 In GDA terminology, these are called the cloud of subjects and the cloud of categories (see Figure 5, p. 
31). 
7 "Geometric figures, when disconnected from their structural rationale, are little more than pictorial 
illustrations […]. Blurred structures hinder understanding of procedures." (Le Roux and Rouanet 2006: 9) 
8  Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), while also operating on the basis of proximities differs from 
correspondence analysis in that the status of the associations (similarity or dissimilarity) must be specified by the 




Having established these differences, it becomes clear that thinking of these methods 
solely in terms of (input) variable properties is the wrong perspective. Scale properties are not 
decisive regarding the adoption of GDA ― even categorization of continuous variables is not 
a requirement. Nonetheless, it is often preferable, especially in sociological studies: this 
reflects the observation ascribed to Benzécri that the oft-cited opposition between 
"quantitative" and "qualitative" variables is artefactual. A variable is relevant or irrelevant 
based on its meaning, and the investigation of the latter inevitably leads to identifying cut-
points, hence categories. 
Although its empirical potential has been amply demonstrated thanks notably to 
Bourdieu's work on taste and cultural stratification (1979),9 correspondence analysis is still 
rarely applied in sociological studies. Recent examples include a number of studies on taste 
and lifestyles (Le Roux et al. 2008; Silva and Wright 2009; Silva and Le Roux 2011; Bennett, 
Bustamante, and Frow 2013; Hanquinet, Roose, and Savage 2013; Purhonen and Wright 
2013), fields of power (Hjellbrekke et al. 2007; Denord et al. 2011; Flemmen 2012; 
Buhlmann, David, and Mach 2013; Kropp 2013),10 class and social inequalities (Veenstra 
2007), and political attitudes (Harrits et al. 2010). It is probably field analysis that makes the 
most of the empirical potential of correspondence analysis (Savage and Silva 2013) ― an 
aspect that will be explored in Chapter 3. Most relevant to our subject is a study on the British 
value system by Majima and Savage (2007) which, in addition to applying MCA because it 
provides a better representation of the complexity of the "space of values", is also a critical 
engagement with Inglehart's work. In many respects, the application presented in this chapter 
extends on their analysis. 
1.2.1. Making sense of the MCA output 
Before interpreting the value configuration identified in this study, two general 
considerations are in order. First, the argument in favor of correspondence analysis does not 
imply that the problems with Inglehart’s measures boil down to his reliance on factor 
analysis. MCA is preferred over other techniques for the underlying research philosophy. 
Nonetheless, in order to show that the cultural dimensions derived from correspondence 
                     
9  In addition to Distinction, other famous applications by Bourdieu include (Bourdieu and De Saint 
Martin 1978; De Saint Martin and Bourdieu 1987; Bourdieu 1999, 2000a). 
10 Bourdieu's concept of social space with implications for CA is discussed in Wacquant (2013). 
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analysis are not artefacts generated by methods alone, this section includes, in addition to the 
output from MCA, results from principal component and factor analyses. These comparisons 
demonstrate that the dimensions unraveled by MCA are more consistent than those produced 
by the latter methods. 
Second, given the emphasis on the individual level, it is crucial that these procedures 
identify universal dimensions of culture arising from individual differences that are not 
subject to the effect of country bias. Many cross-cultural studies rely on one or a combination 
of three approaches described in Leung and Bond (1989): (1) a "pancultural" analysis based 
on correlations of the observed variables at the individual level but ignoring the country of 
origin; (2) a "cross-cultural" or ecological (Robinson 1950) analysis using correlations of 
country means; and (3) an "intracultural" analysis performed at the individual level in each of 
the countries studied. Shweder (1973) found that the dimensions discovered at the cross-
cultural level are not necessarily observable in any of the intracultural analyses, and vice 
versa: a dimension found in all countries may go undetected at the cross-cultural level. Since 
differences between the configurations obtained at the pancultural and the cross-cultural 
levels are exceptional (Ostroff 1993), the analyses cannot produce universally valid 
dimensions of culture ― that is, scales whose composition is not subject to bias arising from 
the national context. For such dimensions to emerge, Leung and Bond (ibid.) propose a fourth 
type, termed "individual analysis". This includes within-subject and within-culture 
standardization procedures to eliminate patterning effects (stemming from different 
correlations within countries) and positioning effects (impacting the relative location of the 
responses in a specific national context) from the individual responses.11 
The analysis presented in this section applies Leung and Bond’s standardization 
procedure in the case of principal component and factor analyses. In MCA, structural effects 
are eliminated using the method proposed by Bry, Robette, and Roueff (2014), a 
standardization procedure adapted to categorical variables.12 I use data from the fourth wave 
of the WVS, collected between 1999 and 2004 in 60 countries, a total sample of 82,244 
(World Values Survey Association 2009).13 The 24 questions selected and combined into the 
                     
11 In this terminology, "individual analysis" is not to be confused with any analysis that is carried out at 
the individual level, e.g. the pancultural and the intracultural analyses. 
12 See Note A1.1.1. Standardization in MCA in Appendix 1, p. 138 for details. 
13 For the individual analysis, individual weights were recalculated in order to equalize the size of country 
samples (N=1.000). The number of allowed missing values was four, and countries with 100% of missing data at 
any variable were excluded. The countries included in this analysis are listed in Table 14 (p. 143) in Appendix 2. 
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15 items used in the study reflect a compromise between the requirements stemming from the 
criticisms reviewed above (that is, the questions should tap values, not mental states or 
specific policy preferences), and the pool of available items. The original scales were mostly 
preserved (but transposed to a 0 to 1 normalized scale, prior to standardization) for PCA and 
factor analysis, and recoded into binary modalities for MCA (see Table 15 in Appendix 2, p. 
145 for recoding rules).14 All three analyses apply orthogonal rotation.15 
Figure 1 shows the configuration emerging from a multiple correspondence analysis of 
our 15 variables after elimination of country effects. One of the main concerns with 
Inglehart's secular-traditional and self-expression-survival measures is that they conflate 
authoritarianism with religiosity and materialism. In the space defined by the three axes in 
Figure 1 (p. 21), these orientations form unambiguously separate dimensions. The ten 
modalities related to various religious attitudes and practices constitute the clearest opposition 
among the items in the battery (first axis in Plane 1 and 2), and thus account for the highest 
portion of the variance. The second axis (vertical in Plane 1 and 2, and horizontal in Plane 2 
and 3) translates an opposition regarding attitudes toward outgroups, gender roles, and 
political engagement in the form of an authoritarian-libertarian cleavage (top versus bottom). 
It is remarkable that even those attitudes to gender roles that are conceptually close to 
"traditional" forms of religiosity (rejection of divorce and hostility toward childless women) 
have a stronger relationship with authoritarianism. A third dimension (the vertical axis in 
Plane 2 and 3) can be best described as a materialism scale. With the exception of a very weak 
association with preference for giving people more say and freedom of speech, the libertarian-
authoritarian attitudes that Inglehart’s value change thesis assumes to be related to 
postmaterialism are not constitutive of this axis. 
  
                     
14  See preceding remark on categorization. In value research, examples of dichotomization in factor 
analysis include Moors (2003) and Welzel (2013). For example, Welzel dichotomizes three of the original 12 
variables used to construct his secular values scale. 




Figure 1 Cloud of modalities from MCA solution at the individual level 
Note: Plane 1-2: upper map and 2-3: lower map. Multiple correspondence analysis with orthogonal rotation of 15 variables from the 
fourth wave of the World Values Survey (1999-2004, 59 countries). Recoding rules are shown in Table 15 in Appendix 2. 
Individual analysis using the standardization methods eliminating country bias described in Bry, Robette, and Roueff (2014). Only 
modalities significantly impacting the axes based on test values are shown for each axis. These are in SMALL CAPITALS for Axis 1 
and 3, lower case for Axis 2, and italics for more than one axis. 
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Table 3 (p. 24) shows the loadings for the variables used in the MCA solution together 
with their loadings obtained in principal component and factor analyses (where the original 
scales were preserved for the most part). The major insight from this comparison is that while 
the religious-secular and the authoritarian-libertarian cleavages are detectable across the three 
solutions, it is the MCA solution that best captures the dimensions behind the original items. 
In factor analysis, in addition to less consistent factors, the materialism dimension identified 
in MCA is absent, and eigenvalues are considerably lower. The constructs resulting from 
principal component analysis are substantially closer to the MCA solution, albeit still less 
consistent. 
A good illustration of construct consistency across the three solutions is the different 
loadings of "acceptance of divorce". Originally measured on a 10-point scale, this item is 
associated with the authoritarian-libertarian dimension in the MCA solution, the religious-
secular dimension in PCA, and a third, "junk" dimension in factor analysis. Another case in 
point is the content of the third principal component, a dimension with some resemblance to 
the materialism axis identified in MCA. But this is an oversimplification: the pattern 
emerging from PCA is a politically charged variant of materialism, as shown especially by the 
sizeable negative loading of the item "say & freedom of speech", the second highest after 
"good pay most important", and also by the still significant negative loading of "subversive 
action". In contrast, the materialism dimension observed in MCA is more consistent as its 
correlations with political attitudes are none to very weak. 
The comparison with factor analysis is instructive: what remains undetected searching 
for latent variables that explain the items using regressions is unraveled calculating the 
relative distances of individuals within the space of 15 semantically opposed modalities in 
multiple correspondence analysis. A comparison between results from MCA and factor 
analysis in Majima and Savage’s study of the British value system (2007) leads to a similar 
conclusion. In their analysis, "Inglehart's 'traditional' values […] and 'survival' values […] do 
not separate out", and especially "the position of the 'materialist values' is out of place" (ibid.: 
308), that is, not where they are expected based on the postmaterialism thesis. 
The separation of the dimensions identified in correspondence analysis is crucial: 
complex scales should be anchored in a minimalist definition. With regard to religiosity, such 
a definition is a key concept in the classical sociological tradition: religion is the classification 
of things (including also actions, thoughts, space and time) into categories of sacred and 
profane (Durkheim 2001). Likewise, authoritarianism in its most general form is uncritical 
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reliance on/acceptance of coercion regardless of source, medium, beliefs or actual practices 
(Adorno et al. 1964). Concerning actual materialism, it is really "only" about the importance 
of material gain ― and unlike in Inglehart's typology where materialism involves a complex 
set of attitudes, its opposite value is not post- but non-materialism. 16 This is not to propose 
that the more the definition recycles this or that concept in the sociological tradition, the more 
relevant the empirical apparatus.17 The key point is that the sociological tradition provides the 
adequate theoretical framework for the study of values that is not found in the Maslowian 
assumptions which, extrapolated to the study of values have informed Inglehart's early 
studies, and continue to influence his research school, including recent work by Welzel 
(2013).18 
  
                     
16  Viewing political conflict through the prism of postmaterialism has at times led to serious 
misunderstanding. This is most striking with regard to the rise of Flemish nationalism which Inglehart explains 
by "an important latent function (…) to satisfy the need for belongingness" (1971: 1011). As evident from the 
context of the argument, Inglehart here refers to a non-materialist "kind" of belongingness, i.e., a postindustrial 
and postnationalistic drive to find meaning beyond parochial patterns of thought. This however is a remarkable 
exaggeration overlooking Flemings' decades-long struggle for more autonomy within the framework of a unitary 
Belgian state traditionally dominated by the French-speaking sectors. Identifying Flemish nationalistic 
tendencies as a shift from economic issues to "cultural and humanitarian gains" (ibid.: 1012) ignores precisely 
those issues that lay at the heart of Flemings' resentment going back to French-speaking dominance in an era 
where economic growth was driven by the heavy industry and mining concentrated in the Southern part of the 
country. The deepening of these conflicts is inseparable from the switching of Belgium's economic center of 
gravity to Flanders, with growing resentment of what Flemish elites began to portray as their region's financial 
contribution to an economically underperforming Wallonia. Therefore, Belgium's transformation into a federal 
state as a result of a long series of constitutional reforms has been the outcome of not simply a shift to "lifestyle" 
issues but of a hard-fought economic and legal struggle in the most "materialist" sense. 
17 For example, it has been argued that Weber's definition of the six value spheres is incoherent and runs 
into contradictions (Oakes 2001, 2003). The issue is addressed in Chapter 3. 
18 In social psychology, the importance of distinguishing between authoritarianism, conservatism, and 
religiosity is recognized, notwithstanding the fact that these dimensions form a broader domain which, from a 
Freudian perspective, "seem to reflect external projections of the superego" (Saucier 2000: 379). Concerning 
political attitudes, Ashton et al. (2005) found that a two-factor solution comprising a compassion versus 
competition (a construct related to religiosity), and a moral regulation versus individual freedom scale gives a 




 MCA  PCA  Factor Analysis 
 1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
comfort and strength from religion (get ~) .67 .05 .02  .73 -.06 .11  .68 -.04 .13 
religious .64 .00 .07  .68 -.06 .11  .60 -.02 .10 
religious service (frequency) .57 .01 .02  .67 .05 -.03  .54 .01 .05 
life after death (believe in ~) .54 -.07 -.05  .50 -.27 .16  .38 -.09 -.05 
learn faith important .47 .10 .00  .49 .14 -.05  .35 .08 .03 
reject outgroups .04 .46 -.08  .02 .67 -.20  .01 .30 .01 
strong leader -.02 .41 -.06  -.06 .43 .11  -.03 .25 -.01 
subversive action -.06 -.41 -.17  -.26 -.27 -.35  -.22 -.25 -.16 
acceptance of divorce -.22 -.38 .10  -.50 -.40 .12  -.51 -.45 .73 
childless woman (acceptance of) -.08 -.39 -.01  -.06 -.42 .07  -.06 -.24 -.02 
say & freedom of speech (importance of ~) -.03 -.34 -.29  -.14 -.21 -.57  -.15 -.26 -.17 
thrift -.04 .28 .25  -.08 .41 .19  -.03 .25 .04 
good pay (importance of ~) .00 -.09 .66  -.16 .05 .59  -.06 .17 .03 
unselfishness (important) -.03 -.03 -.48  -.04 .05 -.44  -.07 -.06 -.10 
less emphasis on money (good thing) .05 -.15 -.29  -.05 -.16 -.14  -.06 -.09 -.12 
             
Eigenvalue 2.72 1.70 1.11  2.31 1.38 1.17  1.72 .66 .66 
% explained 17.8% 11.2% 7.3%  15.4% 9.2% 7.8%  11.5% 4.4% 4.4% 
Table 3 Loadings for universal dimensions of values at the individual level 
Note: Observed in multiple correspondence (MCA), principal component (PCA), and factor analyses of 15 items. Data are from the 
World Values Survey, wave 4 (1999-2004, 59 countries). Country bias eliminated using the standardization methods described in 
Leung and Bond (1989) for PCA and factor analysis, and in Bry, Robette, and Roueff (2014) for MCA. All three analyses perform 
orthogonal rotation of the axes. Extraction uses the maximum likelihood method in factor analysis. Highest absolute values are in 
bold. The items are binary modalities for all variables in MCA, and mostly original scales in PCA and factor analysis. The Recoding 
rules are shown in Table 15 in Appendix 2. In the case of MCA where the input variables are categorical, the loadings are the 
correlation ratios (η2), calculated by dividing the between-variance of the partition (the variance of category mean points) by the 
total variance (the weighted average variance of the subclouds (within variance + between variance). 
One could object that Inglehart's typology is based on a minimalist configuration and 
other dimensions would emerge, were we to carry his analysis beyond just two dimensions. 
Indeed, Inglehart readily admits that we would get a "somewhat different solution" if further 
dimensions were retained in his factor analyses. Still, he dismisses that suggestion as 
misleading by arguing that "(d)oing so produces a far more complicated result that might 
superficially seem more scholarly", whereas "cross-cultural variation (…) can be interpreted 
with a relatively parsimonious model" (Inglehart 1997: 91). We can reasonably assume that 
had the psychographic variables, the Postmaterialism Index and the non-values been omitted 
from Inglehart’s analysis, a different configuration would have emerged from even a two-
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dimension solution.19 The clustering of the 15x2 semantically opposed modalities into three 
distinct dimensions at the individual level is an indication of substantive differences in their 
content, rather than an artefact of scholarly sophistication. 
1.3. Configural variance 
Inglehart’s factor analyses were performed at the pancultural and the cross-cultural 
levels (Inglehart and Baker 2000). The instability problems reviewed with regard to the 
Postmaterialism Index are in part related to equivalence issues: the same construct detected at 
the pancultural and/or cross-cultural levels may or may not be found at the intracultural level. 
It is then remarkable that equivalence issues rarely come up in the debates on Inglehart's 
measures (Haller 2002), although there is more awareness of these concerns in psychology 
than there is in sociology (Moors and Wennekers 2003). 
This section assesses the configural invariance of the authoritarianism and religiosity 
constructs. The method applied is an adaptation of the procedure described in van de Vijver 
and Poortinga (2002) to MCA. 20  This compares the loadings obtained from country 
subsamples and configurations at the cross-cultural level. Following target rotation of the 
loadings ― to make sure that the constructs are comparable even if the loadings are inverted 
or the dimensions succeed in a different order ― configural variance is evaluated with 
reference to a congruence coefficient called Tucker’s phi. This score ranges from 0 to 1, and a 
good agreement between two factors is indicated by a value higher than 0.9.21 The model 
includes 74 countries from the first four waves (1981 to 2004), and each country survey 
(wave) is evaluated separately.22 
                     
19 Discussing the configuration of the modalities in a 3-axis solution of their MCA of 21 variables from 
the WVS, Majima and Savage note that "rather than (…) endorsing the centrality of the materialist-post-
materialist (or a 'survival-self-expressive') dimension, it [the authors' MCA solution] suggests ruptures between 
libertarian and authoritarian views" (2007: 305). 
20 The authors tested the equivalence of Inglehart's postmaterialism instrument in 39 regions and found 
that in order to be configurally invariant, some response categories have to be eliminated, and that the construct 
becomes more salient in affluent countries. 
21 See Note A1.2.1. Tucker's phi coefficient in Appendix 1, p. 139 for the mathematical formula. 
22 Like in the analysis producing the 3-axis model, the individual weights were recalculated in order to 
equalize the size of the country samples (N=1.000) regardless of the number of surveys per country. The number 
of allowed missing values was two, and countries with 100% of missing values for any variable were excluded. 
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In contrast with the model discussed in the previous section, patterns attributable to 
structural effects are a focus in multilevel analysis. Therefore, to obtain the configuration 
whose invariance will be tested, country effects should not be eliminated. Also, the higher the 
number of constructs and constitutive items, the more likely that specific (and less congruent) 
country configurations will emerge. For this reason, I use a reduced set from the previous 
model, dropping the items that tap the third dimension (materialism) and retaining the eight 
items that best capture the religious-secular and the authoritarian-libertarian dimensions. 
The cloud of categories in the reduced two-axis model is shown in Figure 2 (p. 27). The 
loadings from the cross-cultural solution23 are presented in Table 4 with loadings from three 
countries that are informative of configural variations. Table 16 (p. 146) in Appendix 2 shows 
the classification of country surveys into three categories according to the congruence 
coefficients of their religious-secular and authoritarian-libertarian constructs. A Tucker’s phi 
of 0.95 and higher for both constructs is chosen as an indicator of good agreement.24 Of the 
162 country surveys, only 76 (47%) achieve this level of invariance for both constructs. One 
(usually religiosity) is invariant in 75 (46%), and none in 11 (7%) surveys. 
Table 4 offers a glimpse into how and why specific country constructs may differ from 
the general pattern. In the 1990 Japanese and the 1990 Dutch surveys, both constructs are in 
good agreement with the religiosity and authoritarianism constructs from the cross-cultural 
solution. In the 2002 Algerian survey, the first dimension appears to capture religiosity, but of 
a specific type: while the items "religious service" and "(identifies as a) religious person" have 
high loadings, "(belief in) life after death" and "comfort from religion" cluster together with 
the items forming the authoritarianism dimension in the cross-cultural solution. With regard 
to the first dimension, the secondary items (with loadings around .30) include participation in 
subversive political action, the rejection of outgroups, and a preference for say in government 
and freedom of speech. 
  
                     
23 In multiple correspondence analysis, where the input variables are categorical, the input data at the 
cross-cultural level is the global Burt table with equal weights for countries. 
24 Van de Vijver and Poortinga have argued that Tucker’s phis "substantially higher than .90 can still be 
obtained when one or two items show markedly different loadings on factors with high eigenvalues" (2002: 




Figure 2 Cloud of modalities from rotated MCA solution for the reduced battery at the individual level 
Note: Plane 1-2, multiple correspondence analysis with orthogonal rotation of 8 variables from waves 1 to 4 of the World Values 
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Table 4 Loadings using the reduced battery at the cross-cultural level and in three countries 
Note: Observed in multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of 8 items at the cross-cultural level (pooled-between solution). Data 
are from the World Values Survey, waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 surveys in 74 countries for the pooled-between solution). 
Standardization methods are not used. Orthogonal rotation of axes. Highest absolute values are in bold. Recoding rules are shown in 
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The specific configuration obtained for Algeria makes sense. Throughout the 1990s, 
Algeria underwent a civil war that killed more than 150.000 of its citizens and paralyzed the 
country’s economy. Pitting a military-bureaucratic elite against various currents of religious 
fundamentalism but also a secular opposition ― the latter enmeshed in its own conflict with 
religious extremists ―, the conflict had a strong religious component. During this period, 
Algerian mosques were a hotbed for antigovernment activism, and even armed insurrection 
(Testas 2002). These circumstances impinge on the meaning of attending religious service: 
rather than a simple indicator of piety, it gets infused with political undertones. The religious 
fundamentalist element of the conflict also explains why a preference for freedom of speech 
― an "anti-authoritarian" value in the cross-cultural construct ― is positively correlated with 
the rejection of outgroups. In contrast, the second Algerian dimension shows a different 
variant of religiosity in which beliefs are prominent but specific forms of practice (attending 
service) are absent. This inactivity extends to the political domain, but without the intolerant 
attitude that correlates with the fundamentalist/activist variant. 
In sum, none of the two Algerian dimensions is comparable with those observed in the 
Japanese, Dutch, and other surveys where the scales are highly congruent with the cross-
cultural solution. The coefficients in Table 16 demonstrate that this is not surprising: lower 
configural agreement is more frequent among non-Western countries. There is no reason to 
assume that configural inconsistencies would be absent from Inglehart’s and Welzel’s25 scales 
at the intracultural level, had a comprehensive study of construct equivalence been performed 
in their studies.26 
1.3.1. Illustration with generation as supplementary variable 
For an illustration of why religiosity and authoritarianism should not be collapsed under 
broader measures of "traditional values", I examine the relationship between these two 
constructs and generational cohorts. The comparisons in this section use scores from country 
surveys where both constructs show a good agreement (Tucker’s phi is 0.95 or higher). The 
                     
25 See Note A1.2.2. Welzel's secular and emancipative values in Appendix 1, p. 139 for details. 
26 In contrast, the Schwartz value scales have been subjected to a full test of invariance and were found to 
satisfy configural and metric (but not full) equivalence in 20 countries (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008). 
The analysis presented in the fourth section of this chapter, uses Schwartz's value constructs at the ecological 
level which are comparable between countries. 
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average scores for within-country partitions are relative to country means, thus not 
interpretable as between-country differences. 
Figure 3 (p. 30) presents the relationship between our two constructs and the categorical 
generation variable. The coefficient shown is the correlation ratio (or eta-square, η2)27. The 
dotted line connects the points where religiosity and authoritarianism have an equally strong 
relationship with generation as partitioning factor. 28  In most countries, generational 
differences are a lot more pronounced in authoritarianism than they are in religiosity. 
Obviously, this has to do with the fact that in many countries, the shift toward secularism has 
preceded the transition to less authoritarian values, as suggested by the very high correlation 
ratios for a number of economically developed nations. The picture might be different if more 
non-Western countries were included, but most of these had to be left out due to low 
configural congruence. The stronger relationship between generations and levels of 
authoritarianism is still remarkable, therefore Luxembourg and Japan, where religiosity is the 
more discriminating variable suggest specific patterns. 
Figure 4 (p. 30) reveals that from older to younger generations, the general Western 
pattern is a decline in both religiosity and authoritarianism. Japan and Taiwan clearly do not 
fit this template. In Taiwan (surveyed in 1994), there are close to no variations in religiosity 
across the five ten-year cohorts born after 1930. The Japanese public, while similar to the 
Europeans in its increasingly secular successive generations, deviates markedly from this 
model in that authoritarianism stops declining in the generations born after 1940. What is 
more, the 1970s Japanese cohort is even more authoritarian than are their parent generations 
(although only those born at the beginning of that decade were represented in the 1990 
sample). 
 
                     
27 See Note A1.1.3. Structuring factor and eta-square (η2) in Appendix 1, p. 139 for the definition. 
28 Because in correspondence analysis, the emphasis is on the relationship between meaningful (discrete) 
properties to which subjects relate in intricate ways, partitioning variables and related coefficients are often more 




Figure 3 Correlation ratios (η2) for the ordinal 
variable "generation" with religiosity and 
authoritarianism 
Note: Data for each country are from the last available wave 
of the World Values Survey. Generations are ten-year cohorts 
born between 1920 and 1979 for each country. The dotted 
line indicates an equally strong relationship between the 
ordinal variable "generation" on one hand, and religiosity and 
authoritarianism on the other. Country scores for these two 
constructs are from separate country MCAs. Only countries 
achieving good configural agreement for both dimensions 
with the reduced 8-item pooled-between solution shown in 
Figure 2 and Table 4 are shown. Construct congruence 








Figure 4 Religiosity and authoritarianism across 6 generational cohorts in Western and Eastern Europe, the 
United States, Japan, and Taiwan 
Note: Data are from the 1990 wave from the World Values Survey, except for Taiwan, surveyed in 1994. Scores are from separate 
country MCAs using a reduced 8-item battery. All countries achieve good configural agreement for both dimensions with the 
pooled-between solution shown in Figure 2 and Table 4. Standard scores are relative to within-country averages (0), therefore do not 
represent between-country differences. The scores for Western Europe are non-weighted averages from the 1990 Austrian, Belgian, 































































































































Figure 5 Generational subclouds of 
individuals in three country surveys along 
the axes of religiosity and authoritarianism 
Note: Scatterplots of individual data points with 
concentration ellipses for each generation using the 
coordinates along the religiosity (horizontal) and 
authoritarianism (vertical) axes. 1994. Scores are 
from separate country MCAs using a reduced 8-item 
battery. "X" represents the cohort mean point. The 




In multiple correspondence analysis, given the centrality of the positioning of subjects 
relative to properties, there is more emphasis on the dispersion of individuals than is on 
average scores. Figure 5 (p. 31) illustrates this with reference to the clouds of individuals and 
concentration ellipses for generational subclouds. 29  The Spanish sample from 2000 is 
presented as the prototype of the generational cultural cleavages implied by Inglehart’s value 
change theses and Welzel’s human empowerment theory. Here, each younger cohort is 
increasingly secular, as well as less authoritarian. Compared with that, the Japanese subclouds 
from 1990 display a puzzle. The absence of a general shift toward libertarian values becomes 
more perceptible with the continued scattering of the cohorts in the authoritarian region (the 
upper part of the vertical scale). The subclouds showing the Japanese cohorts surveyed in 
1981 confirm this pattern. With the exception of the 1910-19 cohort whose socialization 
mostly preceded World War Two and the 1960-69 cohort (partly still in their formative years 
when surveyed), the distribution of the generations along the authoritarianism axis show 
remarkable stability, and even cohort means have not moved significantly toward less 
authoritarianism. 
Considering the impact that modernization theorists like Inglehart, Castells (2011), 
Giddens (1990), and Welzel (2013) attribute to individual resources on value formation and 
value change, these cases are significant. The absence of generational shifts toward less 
authoritarianism in Japan and toward secularism in Taiwan suggests flaws in the 
postmaterialism thesis and weaknesses of the related measures. At the time of the surveys, the 
Japanese and Taiwanese societies had lived through more than four decades of impressive 
economic growth and had been out of war since World War Two. The postmaterialism thesis 
predicts slight reversions to materialist and "traditional" values in times of economic crises, 
but at the time of these surveys, the downturn and later stagnation that Japan has experienced 
since the early 1990s had not yet had time to develop, and Taiwan was years ahead of the 
late-1990s Asian crisis. Moreover, according to this theory, it is the experience of early 
socialization that is decisive in the formation of values. 
Unfortunately, missing data or configural inconsistencies do not allow comparisons 
with generational variances in other East Asian countries. Also, a general shift in values at the 
country level may occur without between-cohort variations. Still, we can reasonably surmise 
                     
29 Concentration ellipses have semi-axes equal to twice the standard deviation of the subcloud in the 
given direction. For normally shaped subclouds, concentration ellipses contain 86% of the cloud (Le Roux and 
Rouanet 2010: 70). 
 
33 
that the Japanese and Taiwanese cases are not just outliers, and that such national patterns are 
better grasped with measures adapted to the local context. Bomhoff and Gu (2012) found that 
the self-expression-survival construct is not relevant in East Asia because the way these 
publics relate to European concepts of authority and trust does not fit the pattern found in 
cross-country correlations. The above results suggest similar problems with the secular-
traditional scale. 
1.4. Ecological analysis 
1.4.1. Overcoming the incongruence impasse 
The preceding analyses have shown that construct variance makes it difficult to 
compare individual values across a wide range of nations. Of the 162 country surveys 
selected, only 76 achieve invariance for both religiosity and authoritarianism. Still, this does 
not mean that these 76 surveys qualify for comparisons of country differences. In order to be 
comparable cross-culturally, the scores from these surveys have to be tested for also metric 
and scalar equivalence. The majority of the 76 country surveys would not satisfy all these 
three criteria, therefore meaningful comparisons would be restricted to a handful of nations. 
The purpose of this analysis being conclusions on cross-national differences, these conditions 
are prohibitive. However, these limitations do not imply that we should give up the attempts 
at cross-national comparisons. The dead end represented by the above, progressively more 
rigorous criteria precludes comparison of country averages with regard to variables measured 
at the individual level.30 A reorientation at the ecological (country) level would extend the 
scope of the study beyond the few country surveys achieving scalar equivalence at the 
individual level.  
It is to be expected that the ecological analysis will find the same latent structure at both 
the individual and the ecological levels (Ostroff 1993). In cross-cultural value research, 
examples of such parallels include Inglehart's two-dimensional typology and Schwartz's 
circular structure of basic values. Regarding the Inglehart constructs, the similarities are very 
close, given the parsimonious model discussed above (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 28). In the 
case of Schwartz's typology, the circular structure identified in multidimensional scaling 
                     
30 See Note A1.2.3. Remarks on cross-cultural comparability of constructs in Appendix 1, p. 140. 
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reveals 9 or 10 orientations at the individual level (Schwartz 1992; Davidov, Schmidt, and 
Schwartz 2008) and 7 at the ecological level (Schwartz 1994, 1999, 2006). Further reductions 
yield three oppositions at the ecological and two at the individual level, the latter termed 
higher-order values. These particularities notwithstanding, the structures are comparable and 
express the same oppositions in substance at both levels. In particular, the opposition between 
autonomy31  and embeddedness at the ecological (e) level (Figure 6, p. 35) is related to 
openness to change versus conservation at the individual (i) level (Figure 7), while mastery 
versus harmony (e) and hierarchy versus egalitarianism (e) are comparable with self 
enhancement versus self-transcendence (i). In short, the value emphases that differentiate 
national cultures are related 32  to patterns of behavior detectable at the individual level. 
Applied to this study, we can assume that religiosity and authoritarianism are equally relevant 
at the national level. 
The reorientation at the country level does not mean that concerns with equivalence can 
be dispensed with ― only that the criteria to adopt will be less strict. If the latent structure 
identified at the ecological level (that is, using a database where the units of observation are 
the countries) is found within a specific country (where the observations are the individuals), 
then this will be a sufficient condition for including that country in cross-national 
comparisons. In that regard, Schwartz's work on culture-level values provides useful 
guidance: his national comparisons use country scores whose reasonably equivalent meanings 
have been established in separate country multidimensional scaling analyses (Schwartz 1994; 
Fontaine et al. 2008). Still, we should bear in mind that structural equivalence at the national 
level is not a blank check for comparisons between entities within one nation. Should we want 
to study the values of subnational entities, as in the analysis presented in a later section of this 
chapter, equivalence will have to be assessed also for each of those entities. 
  
                     
31 These seven poles are reduced to three oppositions since the "autonomy" pole of the autonomy versus 
embeddedness construct collapses "intellectual" and "affective" autonomy (Schwartz 2006: 145-149). 
32 Value researchers often use active verbs to express the hypothesized relationship between values and 
other aspects of social reality. For example, Schwartz writes that "a cultural emphasis on success and ambition 
may be reflected in and promote highly competitive economic systems, confrontational legal systems, and child-
rearing practices that pressure children to achieve" (Schwartz 2006: 139, emphasis added). To such turns of 





Figure 6 Empirical structure of basic values at the ecological level, identified in the Schwartz Value Survey 
Note: Multidimensional scaling, reproduced from Schwartz 2006: 147, Figure 2. 
Compare dimensions with theoretical model in Figure 7. Three value oppositions: autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. 






Figure 7 Theoretical model of relations 
among basic values proposed by Schwartz 
Note: Reproduced from Schwartz 1994: 24, Figure 
1. The 9 values are organized into two higher order 
value types: self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement 




Like in the individual-level analysis, the procedure to select the country scores for 
comparison applied here uses the congruence coefficient Tucker's phi. Loadings from country 
MCAs will be tested for equivalence using the configuration obtained at the ecological level. 
In contrast with the country MCAs (and the pancultural analysis at the individual level 
presented above) where the data structure is an indicator matrix, the ecological analysis uses a 
summary contingency table where the rows are the countries and the columns are the sums of 
responses in each of the response categories. For this reason, the ecological analysis is 
"simple" (instead of multiple) correspondence analysis (CA).33 
Figure 8 and Table 5 (p. 37) show that the latent structure at the ecological level is 
comparable with the arrangement found in the pancultural analysis presented in Figure 2 and 
Table 4. The oppositions are somewhat more straightforward than the structure emerging at 
the individual level. The Tucker's phi criterion for selecting a country for comparison is 0.95 
or higher for religiosity and 0.90 or higher for authoritarianism. Fixing a lower threshold for 
authoritarianism is a practical consideration: in cases where the congruence of the first 
dimension is 0.95 or higher, there is no reason to assume that a coefficient for 
authoritarianism whose Tucker's phi is between 0.90 and 0.95 is indication of significant 
construct variance.34 Table 17 (p. 147) in Appendix 2, shows that these criteria retain a total 
of 101 country surveys distributed over 53 countries (31 countries having more than one 
survey with invariant constructs). The comparisons in the remainder of this chapter, as well as 
the models discussed in Chapter 2 are confined to these scores. The diagram showing the 
countries with structurally equivalent scores is included in Figure 9 (p. 46) (and will be 
discussed in the fourth section). 
  
                     
33  The binary categories presented earlier are maintained ― that is, the number of columns in the 
contingency table including country totals is the same as in the indicator tables used in MCA. Like in the 
previous pancultural analysis, the procedure applies equilibrated weights (at 1.000) for each country sample. 
34 In such instances, given the orthogonal latent structure, the items constituting the religiosity dimension 
have no "residual loading" (that is, variance unexplained by religiosity) that could be "drained away" by the 
authoritarianism dimension, which would result in a construct that differs significantly from the benchmark. This 
condition is not met in the 2002 Algerian sample whose loadings are presented in Table 4: there, a Tucker's phi 
of 0.91 for the first, combined with an even lower (0.21) congruence coefficient for the second dimension means 
that relative to the test values, the significantly incongruent loadings in the second dimension are related to an 
inconsistent first dimension. (The database containing the loadings for the 162 country surveys from the 




Figure 8 Ecological analysis: cloud of modalities from rotated MCA solution 
Note: Plane 1-2 for the reduced 8-item battery observed in multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) at the ecological level. Data are 
from the World Values Survey, waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 surveys in 74 countries). Standardization methods are not used. 





religious service (1+/month) -.726 -.035 
religious -.756 -.080 
life after death (believe in ~) -.706 .086 
comfort and strength from religion (get ~) -.820 -.113 
subversive action (might do or have done) .103 .575 
reject outgroups -.028 -.496 
say & freedom of speech (most important) .026 .619 
childless woman (acceptance of ~) .088 .619 
  
  
Eigenvalue 2.40 1.89 
% explained 24.6% 19.4% 
Table 5 Ecological analysis: loadings from rotated MCA solution 
Note: Observed in multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) of 8 items at the ecological level. Data are from the World Values 
Survey, waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 surveys in 74 countries for the pooled-between solution). Standardization methods are not 
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Applying the same congruence criteria to Inglehart's constructs from the period selected 
for the Inglehart-Baker global cultural map (waves 1 to 3 of the WVS, conducted between 
1981 and 1998), the ratio of countries with comparable scores is significantly lower. Table 18 
(p. 148) in Appendix 2 shows the construct congruence coefficients for the secular-traditional 
and self-expression-survival value constructs presented in Table 2. (This data reduction uses 
principal component analysis in order to be compatible with Inglehart and Baker's study.) Out 
of 102 separate country surveys, only 31 (30%) have invariant constructs for both dimensions 
― the scores from the remaining 71 country survey are not comparable. Figure 14 (p. 149) in 
Appendix 1 shows the locations of the countries with both congruent and incongruent latent 
constructs from the last available country surveys from this period.35 At this level, the ratio of 
nations with comparable scores is even lower: 13 out of 64 (20%). In other words, most of the 
country locations which constitute the crux of Inglehart's account of cross-cultural differences 
in his typology do not correspond to comparable measures. This raises concerns with all 
subsequent chapters of his empirical analyses where these measure feature prominently ― 
most significantly with regard to secularization (Norris and Inglehart 2004) and human 
development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
1.4.2. Correlations with other indicators 
1.4.2.1. Schwartz's values scales 
Before turning to relative country positions in the space defined by religiosity and 
authoritarianism, a look at the correlations with Schwartz's values provides further clues as to 
the substance of these constructs. This brief review is necessary on several counts. First, we 
need instruments from other research programs as substantive references, and given the 
concerns with Inglehart's scales, Schwartz's structurally equivalent constructs are a 
compelling choice. Second, the religiosity and authoritarianism indicators proposed in this 
study do not measure basic values. Following Schwartz, basic values are (1) "beliefs that are 
linked to affect"; (2) "refer to desirable goals that motivate action" (3) "transcend specific 
actions and situations" (4) "serve as standards or criteria that guide the selection or evaluation 
                     
35 These country scores come from a reanalysis of WVS data, therefore are not identical with the scores 
used by Inglehart and Baker in their global cultural map presented in Figure 10. The country locations in the two 
maps nevertheless show a comparable arrangement, as expected. The comparisons between the latent structure 
obtained with correspondence analysis and Inglehart's constructs use the Inglehart-Baker map as reference. 
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of actions, policies, people, and events"; (5) "are ordered by importance relative to one 
another to form a system of priorities"; and (6) their "relative importance […] guides action" 
(2006: 143, emphasis in the original). Concerning religiosity and authoritarianism, while their 
relatedness to basic values is beyond doubt, the above criteria do not apply in their entirety. 
Regardless of their embeddedness in the fabric of everyday life, they do not transcend specific 
actions and situations (condition 3) and are not ordered in a system of priorities (conditions 5 
and 6). Compared with Inglehart's constructs, where some of the original items measure 
transient attitudes (e.g., "happiness" or the importance of "fight rising prices"), the religiosity 
and authoritarianism instruments measure more stable dispositions. (As pointed out above, the 
arguments in their favor include that consideration.) Nonetheless, they are more situation-
bound than Schwartz's dimensions. For example, one's attachment to religion can decline 
without a significant change in a related basic value like embeddedness. Or the proposed 
measure of authoritarianism is more susceptible to variations because it is a more 
parsimonious construct than Schwartz's hierarchy versus egalitarianism dimension. 36  The 
absence of ordering means that these scores do not express how religion or authority rank in 
relative importance in subjects' life: they only capture differences relative to an average 
defined with reference to the observations at a specific analytical level. (A global mean score 
in the ecological analysis.) Using the Schwartz instruments helps link these dimensions to 
basic values: this should be seen as an aid to interpretation. 
Finally, since the countries with incongruent religiosity and authoritarianism scales 
were eliminated from further study, the analysis is confined to a smaller (albeit not culturally 
homogeneous) set of nations. Most of the 53 countries passing the construct equivalence test 
belong in the European civilization. This is less of a hindrance for the purpose of the country 
comparisons discussed in the remainder of this chapter, but becomes a limitation in the study 
of the relationship between values and economic growth, an aspect examined in Chapter 2. 
The regressions in that chapter require a global coverage, and Schwartz's three value 
instruments will be used as independent variables in additional models whose results will 
provide insight that might not emerge from the models relying on a smaller number of 
countries. 
Table 6 (p. 40) shows the correlations between the two dimensions proposed as 
alternatives to Inglehart's constructs and Schwartz's three instruments. The scores come from 
                     
36 See earlier remark on the limitations of the variable pool available from the WVS. 
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51 countries where both sets are available and emerge at the ecological level.37 Schwartz has 
derived his scores from a multidimensional scaling of 45 value items collected by the 
Schwartz Value Surveys (SVS) of college students and schoolteachers between 1988 and 
2000 (Schwartz 2006). Figure 6 (p. 35) shows the two-dimensional projection of the 
arrangement emerging from this analysis. This empirical organization validates the theoretical 






Autonomy vs. embeddedness     -.42**    -.65** 
Egalitarianism vs. hierarchy -.04    -.49** 
Harmony vs. mastery     -.41**  .04 
Table 6 Correlations between the values identified in MCA and Schwartz's three scales 
Note: Ecological analysis, N=51. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
The autonomy versus embeddedness scale captures the extent to which a culture 
emphasizes individuality, as opposed to the priority given to the collectivity. The 
egalitarianism versus hierarchy dimension translates the opposition between viewing society 
as composed of morally equal individuals on the one pole, and justifying the unequal 
distribution of resources as natural, legitimate and necessary on the other. Harmony versus 
mastery expresses the quality of the relationship between the individual on the one hand, and 
the natural and social world on the other; and ranges from unity, acceptance, and 
understanding to change, self-assertion, and exploitation. Since the corresponding axes in 
MDS are not orthogonal ― meaning semantic affinities between adjacent values ―, these 
three constructs are correlated.38 
The strongest association is found between autonomy and authoritarianism. 
Authoritarian communities put restraints on personal autonomy and require submission to 
external forces regardless of one's will. Autonomy is also negatively related to religiosity, 
                     
37  22 countries from Schwartz's study for which scores on religiosity and authoritarianism are not 
available were left out. 
38 Refer to Table 8 (p. 44) for these correlations. 
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albeit to a lesser extent.39 This is because religiosity ― as operationalized in this study: 
independent of authoritarianism ― captures the religious outlook in the most general sense, 
which stresses the importance of the sacred as opposed to the profane. And, as Durkheim 
(2001) argued, the sacred pole of this opposition is associated with an emphasis on social ties, 
whereas irreligion means a weakening of those ties. These distinctions are important in order 
to understand that autonomy's significant correlation with both authoritarianism and 
religiosity does not invalidate the argument against the conflation of the two latter dimensions 
under a single construct. These correlations merely indicate that religiosity and 
authoritarianism are related to different aspects of the opposition between autonomy and 
embeddedness. And inversely: embeddedness does not fully account for either 
authoritarianism or religiosity. 
The latter suggestion finds further support in the negative correlation between 
egalitarianism and authoritarianism. An emphasis on hierarchy ― in the above sense, that is, 
viewing human beings as inherently unequal in worth ― is an expected proxy for 
authoritarianism. The robustness of the religiosity score is demonstrated by its zero 
correlation with the egalitarianism versus hierarchy dimension: since it measures religiosity 
without the contaminating effect of authoritarianism, the absence of association is predictable. 
On the other hand, if religiosity, as measured by this instrument had a significant ecological 
association with caritas, we would find a positive correlation with egalitarianism. In other 
words, this zero correlation also indicates the diversity of religious orientations with regard to 
social inequalities at the level of national cultures. This hypothesis is further nuanced by 
religiosity's negative correlation with the harmony versus mastery scale: harmony, as 
operationalized in the Schwartz typology is not a "pre-modern", but rather a "post-industrial" 
value. However, given that in the circular arrangement, harmony and embeddedness are 
adjacent values, there exists some affinity between these two values ― although a remote, 
much weaker one than between harmony and egalitarianism. 40  Finally, the absence of 
                     
39 This finding is in line with Schwartz's conclusion that "(t)he autonomy/embeddedness dimension gives 
less weight to religious faith. It focuses more on how legitimate it is for individuals to cultivate unique ways of 
thinking, acting, and feeling vs. submerging the self in an encompassing collectivity. […] At the same time, the 
low scores on autonomy/embeddedness suggest that the culture still stresses finding meaning through ties to the 
in-group." (Schwartz 2006: 150) 
40  While in topographical terms, embeddedness is a value adjacent to harmony (to the right, 
counterclockwise in Figure 6), the two constructs are negatively correlated (Table 8, p. 44). This is because in 
the empirical organization of basic values, harmony is closer to autonomy (the opposite of embeddedness). 
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association between authoritarianism and the harmony versus mastery dimension is also 
expected as both poles of the latter scale include elements related to an anti- (or post-) 
authoritarian outlook. 
1.4.2.2. Socioeconomic indicators 
The Inglehartian postulate of value change in a common direction in predictable 
patterns as a result of economic development41 can be saved if we found that higher levels of 
per capita GDP systematically correspond to different values. While the trajectory implied in 
this postulate does not mean convergence, because "cultural change seems to be path 
dependent" (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 49), it does suggest a correlation between economic 
output and values. The coefficients shown in Table 742 (p. 44) suggest that this is only partly 
true. Per capita GDP correlates with authoritarianism but not with religiosity, which is a 
further indication that the secular versus traditional construct is misleading. While the 50 plus 
countries for which we have meaningful constructs do not allow for even a cautious 
generalization, these findings are at odds with both the postmaterialism thesis and its later, 
nuanced version focusing on "postmodernization" (Inglehart 1997). It can be nonetheless 
inferred that the authoritarian variant of religiosity is more likely to weaken with rising 
national income. Of Schwartz's instruments (Table 8), per capita GDP's strongest and second 
strongest correlation with, respectively, autonomy and egalitarianism are expected on the 
basis of the latter's relationship with the authoritarianism scale. 
In contrast, income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) positively correlates 
with religiosity, but not with authoritarianism. This corroborates the thesis that in the absence 
of a comprehensive welfare system, the various social services performed by religious 
institutions are instrumental in sustaining religiosity (Haller 2002). In this regard, Inglehart's 
proposition that "rising security tends to produce a shift toward secular values" (Inglehart and 
Baker 2000: 42) finds empirical support ― with the important proviso that levels of 
existential security are often not captured by per capita GDP (the proxy for economic security 
in Inglehart's models). In this respect, the United States might not be as "deviant" a case as 
                     
41 Inglehart's use of the term "economic development" signifies economic growth. 
42 Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 1, p. 141 for the definition of the 
variables used in the correlations and regressions. 
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suggested by Inglehart (ibid.): starting from the early 1970s, real per capita wages in America 
have declined despite significant increases in productivity and per capita GDP.43 
  
                     
43 Discussing the processes leading to the Great Recession of the late 2000s, Ivanova notes that in the 
United States, "ever since the early 1980s, total weekly private earnings, measured in constant dollars, have been 
significantly lower than in the 1960s and the 1970s", and that "(i)ncome growth for 95 percent of the population 
has slowed down over the last three decades but stagnation has been most pronounced in the lower-income 




















Authoritarianism -.003      
Per capita GDP (logged) -.259    -.787**     
Income inequality     .567** .106 -.383**    
Democracy -.153    -.507**  .690** -.189   
Political violence  .214     .499** -.615**  .276 -.298*  
Physical integrity -.197    -.710**  .795**   -.356*    .625** -.579** 
Table 7 Correlations between the values identified in MCA and socioeconomic indicators 
Note: Value scales from ecological analysis, N=45. The value scores are from the last available survey for each country. The 
socioeconomic indicators are from the year of the country survey. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 
1, p. 141 for the definition of the indicators. 























Egalitarianism vs. hierarchy   .575** 
Harmony vs. mastery .283*  .572** 
Per capita GDP (logged)   .832**  .614**  .263* 
Income inequality -.387** -.393**   -.327** -.369** 
Democracy   .671** .488**    .337**  .665** -.224 
Political violence -.318** -.475** -.257* -.450**   .231* -.294* 
Physical integrity   .654**  .600**  .274*  .750**    -.422** .559** -.675** 
Table 8 Table Correlations between Schwartz's three scales and socioeconomic indicators 
Note: Value scales from ecological analysis, N=65. The value scores are from survey conducted between 1995 and 2000, the 
socioeconomic indicators from 1996. The Schwartz value scales are correlated because corresponding to axes in multidimensional 
scaling that are not orthogonal. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 1, p. 141 for the definition of the 
indicators. 





Figure 9 (p. 46) shows the positioning of countries in the space of religiosity and 
authoritarianism. The interpretation of the results and the comparisons with the Inglehart-
Baker (henceforth: IB) cultural map (2000: 29, reproduced here in Figure 10,44 p. 47) should 
take into account the following. First, as this study excludes all cases from the comparison 
where structural equivalence could not be established at the individual level, my typology has 
a narrower global coverage than what has become common in the Inglehart school. As we 
have seen, Inglehart's secular-traditional and self-expression-survival constructs are not 
comparable in the majority of countries ― which at the same time constitute most of his 
cultural typology. Second, since the construct capturing "actual" materialism in this study has 
not been found configurally invariant, the comparisons with the IB cultural map focus mainly 
on the latter's secular-traditional (vertical) scale ― although, as we have seen, the 
heterogeneity of Inglehart's constructs mean that the self-expression-survival scale is also 
related to authoritarianism.45 
A noticeable difference with regard to the IB map is the dispersion of ex-communist 
countries along mainly the religiosity, but to some extent, also the authoritarianism axis. In 
the IB map, these countries cluster in the secular range of the corresponding scale ― the few 
exceptions include Poland, Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The new map however, shows 
that there are more important differences between these countries in terms of religiosity than 
the secular-traditional scale suggests. Countries that in the IB map appear to be secular, like 
Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania are in reality more religious than the cross-national average. 
The difference is striking with regard to some republics of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. In the IB map, Russia and Lithuania are in essence equally secular, but this 
apparent similarity results from the fact that in Inglehart's secular-traditional scale, religiosity 
is conflated with authoritarianism. In reality, Lithuanians are significantly more religious than 
Russians ― more or less on pairs with the inhabitants of Austria, Canada, Macedonia, and 
Azerbaijan. The Lithuanian society is also much less authoritarian than the Russian. Using 
                     
44 Although the authors of the article in which this cultural map is presented are Inglehart and Baker, I 
continue to refer to these instruments as Inglehart's measures because of its antecedents and later applications in 
Inglehart's work. 
45 A further limitation is that the comparisons are restricted to the first four waves of the World Values 
Survey. The databases for the subsequent waves (5 and 6) either included too many missing data or were not 
available in a final, fully cleaned version at the time of this study. 
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Inglehart's construct, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia appear almost equally secular, 
whereas the former two are rather religious societies ― partly because religion played a 
significant role in the resurgence of Macedonian and Croatian national identity in the wake of 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Indeed, Croatia is one of the most religious among the 
European countries for which we have comparable data: it is on pairs with Italy, and second 




Figure 9 Locations of 53 societies on the dimensions of religiosity and authoritarianism 
Note: Correspondence analysis at the ecological level. Data are from the World Values Survey, waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 
surveys in 74 countries). Only countries with structurally equivalent constructs are shown ― scores are from the last available 































































































Figure 10 Locations of 65 societies on the dimensions of secular-traditional and self-expression-survival values 
Note: Reproduced from Inglehart and Baker 2000: 29, Figure 1. Data are from the World Values Survey, waves 2 and 3 (1990-1991 
and 1995-1998). 
The nations regarding which Inglehart's secular-traditional typology is not misleading 
are the few societies characterized by a combination of strong religiosity and 
authoritarianism, and their opposites: Nigeria, Turkey and India on the one hand, and 
libertarian and secular North-Western Europe on the other. Given that most developing and 
Third World-countries had to be excluded from the ecological analysis, the quadrant 
corresponding to higher degrees of both religiosity and authoritarianism is less "crowded" 
than the other quadrants. 46  In the case of most other countries, there are significant 
                     
46 Since in most developing countries, the two constructs show too much variance to be included in cross-
national comparisons, the inclusion of Nigeria, the most populous African country might seem surprising. As 
shown in Figure 11 (p. 51), it is thanks to its Christian population that the religiosity and authoritarianism 
indicators for that country pass the test of construct equivalence. They are not comparable with regard to 
Nigerian Muslims, but the demographic weight of Christians is such that overall, these two constructs achieve 
configural equivalence. But this difference raises an important point: cross-cultural research should pay more 
attention to configural specificities that may exist within nations. Whereas ecological analyses typically use the 
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differences in terms of religiosity and authoritarianism that go undetected using the Inglehart 
scale. For example, the persistence of traditional values in Latin America, as suggested by 
Inglehart's instrument is questionable. In the IB map, historically Catholic societies 
discriminate into two wider subclusters, with Latin American societies constituting a more 
traditional variant. This is an oversimplification: with the exception of Chile, none of the 
Latin American nations are authoritarian. In fact, while still religious, their publics are around 
as libertarian as several West-European societies. Given the influence of Liberation Theology 
(E. N. Evans 1992) during the late 20th century, this is hardly surprising. 
Since this alternative analysis includes fewer countries than does Inglehart and Baker's, 
it is difficult to isolate coherent historical and cultural clusters. Yet, a close inspection 
suggests that their categorization into "cultural zones" ― a typology relying on Huntington's 
classification of civilizations (1996) ― is moot. For example, Inglehart argues that the 
accelerated technological innovation and high rates of economic growth in a number of East 
Asian countries, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan can be traced back to a "Confucian" 
value orientation that is "similar" to the modernization "effects" of the Protestant ethic 
(Inglehart 1997; Hofstede and Bond 1988).47 The IB cultural indicates similarities between 
the dominant values of North-West European societies and Japan, the latter closely aligned 
with "Protestant Europe". But making the crucial distinction between religiosity and 
authoritarianism and abandoning the confusing self-expression-survival dimension, these 
parallels disappear, and the location of Japan suggests more similarities with Eastern Europe: 
secular but authoritarian. If there was indeed a Confucian cultural paradigm reminiscent of the 
value system of late modern North-Western European societies, such a configuration would 
be difficult to defend: Inglehart and other scholars in this research tradition (e.g., Welzel 
2013) argue that, at advanced stages of the economy, authoritarianism is inimical to economic 
growth because it does not foster creativity, a necessary condition for technological 
innovation.  
It is also doubtful whether "historically Protestant" nations form a coherent cluster. 
Societies with sizeable Protestant communities that can be traced back to the Reformation 
range from the Eastern part of Germany to the United States. Their dispersion along the two 
                                                                
country as the unit of observation, religious, ethnical, linguistic or other divisions may run so deep in some 
countries that it is legitimate to treat these subnational units separately. 
47  My use of the term "cultural zones" refers to Inglehart's use of this concept (borrowed from 
Huntington): cultural heritage based on a dominant religious tradition. 
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axes in Figure 9 reveals variations that are more significant than what is suggested by the IB 
map. Moreover, if Western Germany was indeed part of the Protestant cultural zone, its 
alignment with those Western European nations where Catholicism is the dominant religion is 
surprising. Also misleading is the "Anglosphere", which the IB typology isolates as a specific 
cultural configuration: being secular and libertarian, three English-speaking nations: Britain, 
Australia, and New Zealand have more in common with North Europeans than with the 
United States, Canada, and Ireland ― which, while libertarian, are significantly more 
religious nations. Furthermore, in terms of religiosity, Canada is much less closer to the 
former three countries, than what follows from its position along Inglehart's secular-
traditional scale in the IB map. 
With regard to the United States, the new axes help resolve the puzzle raised by 
Inglehart and Baker. In their study, they isolate the United States as "a deviant case, having a 
much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society" (Inglehart and 
Baker 2000: 31) and, citing Lipset (1988), interpret this finding as evidence of "American 
exceptionalism".48 An alternative interpretation is suggested in Figure 9 where the location of 
the US indicates no deviance from the advanced industrial paradigm: a highly religious but at 
the same time definitely not authoritarian society. In the IB map, Americans appear to have 
retained a traditional value system simply because Inglehart's typology does not differentiate 
between actual religiosity and actual authoritarianism. In this respect, the US is hardly an 
outlier: it is not significantly more religious than Italy and Croatia, and, even more 
importantly, much less "traditional" than most advanced industrial societies in the sense of 
being the least authoritarian. (The not significant correlation between per capita GDP and 
religiosity, shown in Table 7 is another indication that the postulate of "American religious 
exceptionalism" in the sense suggested by Inglehart needs revision.) The disappearance of the 
inconsistencies regarding the values of Americans is a further argument in favor of the more 
nuanced indicators presented in this study. 
                     
48 Discussing the processes that led to the formation of the American Republic, historian Gerald Horne 
(2014) argues that religious heritage is far less significant than suggested by the dominant, mostly ideological 
understanding emphasizing the early settlement by various Protestant communities (e.g., Puritans) and the 
religion of the "founding fathers". A more important consideration was the rallying of European whites behind 
an economic system based on slave labor, the development of which called for the abandonment of the religious 
conflicts that in the 18th century were still influential in European politics. I revisit this issue in Chapter 2 in 
connection with economic growth. 
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On the other hand, Inglehart's argument concerning the influence of the heritage of 
political regimes, like communism seems plausible. Indeed, with the exception of East 
Germans, Slovenes and Croats, most post-communist publics are authoritarian. In terms of 
religiosity, communism's secular imprint is less consistent, albeit still apparent in many 
countries. Yet, Inglehart's instruments conceal some important features of post-communist 
heritage. For example, a lot of formerly communist countries have populations nearly as 
religious as major developing nations like India ― an important finding which does not come 
across the IB map. The latter map also includes a Baltic sub-cluster within the communist 
zone. In the new map, however, the respective locations of Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians suggest significant differences between their values.49 In sum, if the combination 
of secular and authoritarian values corresponds to a "core" (post-)communist pattern, then it is 
found in less than half of the post-communist nations for which structurally equivalent scores 
are available. Still, the similarities with Taiwan and especially Japan suggest that this 
combination is not the exclusivity of communist heritage.50 
  
                     
49 While Latvia's scores are computed from a from a survey conducted in the year preceding its secession 
from the Soviet Union, Lithuania's come from a sample collected a decade later. (The scores from the more 
recent Latvian surveys were not found to be sufficiently invariant for comparisons ― see Table 17 (p. 147) in 
Appendix 1.) With this time factor in mind, these differences are still important. On the other hand, a wide time 
frame is not prohibitive: Inglehart and Baker's map includes scores from samples collected between 1990 and 
1997. The largest difference in this comparison is 11 years. 





Figure 11 Locations of subnational entities on the dimensions of religiosity and authoritarianism 
Note: Correspondence analysis at the ecological level. Subnational entities are supplementary observations ― that is, they do not 
contribute to the configuration derived from the countries x modalities contingency table. Data are from the World Values Survey, 
waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 surveys in 74 countries). Only entities with structurally equivalent constructs are shown. The overall 
country score is indicated by the three letter-code and the survey year (e.g., SUI 96 in the case of the 1996 Swiss sample). 
ARM Armenia; AUS Australia; AUT Austria; AZE Azerbaijan; BEL Belgium; BIH.FED Bosnia Fed.; BLR Belarus; BRA Brazil; 
CAN Canada; CZE Czech; ESP Spain; EST Estonia; GBR Great Britain, excl. N. Ireland; GER.E/W Germany East/West; INA 
Indonesia; IRL.N Northern Ireland; ITA Italy; KGZ Kyrgyzstan; LAT Latvia; LTU Lithuania; MEX Mexico; MKD Macedonia 
(FYR); MNE Montenegro; NGR Nigeria; PER Peru; PHI Philippines; PUR Puerto Rico; ROU Romania; RSA South Africa; RUS 



















































































































































(-) Secular               Axis 1 [1=24.6%] Religious (+)
 
52 
1.4.4. Subnational divisions 
Figure 11 (p. 51) expands the cross-cultural comparisons to subnational divisions whose 
selection includes two considerations. The first is that the subnational units have to represent 
entities with distinct cultural identities constitutive of the historical heritage of their 
respective societies. As implied in Schwartz's study of values at the ecological level (1994, 
2006), distinct identities involve different cultural emphases ― therefore it is only when such 
identities are strong enough that an ecological analysis is warranted. Variations of national 
identity may range from minor (e.g., regions of Austria) to substantial, to the point of 
corresponding to attachments that are more important than being the citizen of the country in 
question (e.g., regions of Belgium). The discriminating variable can be anything (region, 
religion, ethnicity, ancestry, etc.) depending on the national context.51 Race is included only 
when it corresponds to sociologically relevant variations of national identity.52  Countries 
where such distinctions are not relevant or are not available from the WVS dataset are 
excluded from this analysis.53 Second, the criterion of structural equivalence is maintained: 
subnational units whose religiosity and authoritarianism constructs do not pass the test of 
invariance presented in the earlier sections are excluded. 54  This precaution would be 
                     
51 The regions of Russia constitute an exception: there are no significant regional variations of Russian 
identity but given the country's size, the comparisons are of interest. (Information on ethnicity was unavailable 
for the Russian sample.) The Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia are near exceptions: although after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, these historical regions have not been reestablished as federal units, they continue 
to influence regional identities to some limited extent. 
52 For example, even if information on race was available for the French sample, it would be left out from 
this analysis because, at the time of writing, there is no racialized variant of French identity. This is not to say 
that race is unimportant in France or that various sectors of the French population defined on the basis of race 
relate to their country in the same fashion. Such differences exist and impact the lives of its citizens ― e.g., in 
the form of discrimination ―, but do not involve different templates of national identity (Safran 1991). In 
countries like Brazil, race is an important component of national identity (Skidmore 1993), and is therefore taken 
into consideration. 
53 In some countries, significant variations of national identity exist with reference to more than one 
variable. In these cases, the divisions reflect the information available in the WVS for the specific survey wave 
where the equivalence of the constructs was established at the country level. This explains why in the case of the 
United States, the subdivision refers to statistical regions, and not to ancestry and race (Hispanic, white and 
Afro-Americans).  
54 As a result, a number of units had to be dropped from the comparison, like the region of Brussels 
Capital in the case of Belgium or Protestants in the case of Northern Ireland. 
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unnecessary if the equivalence of our constructs had been established at the individual level. 
Since it is established at the country level, it should be tested for the purpose of every 
subsequent comparison where the unit of analysis is different. (Inglehart's studies regularly 
compare the values of generational cohorts across countries without evidence of comparable 
latent structures.) In addition, the analysis includes a number of subnational entities for 
countries (Venezuela, Macedonia, the Philippines, and South Africa) where the two constructs 
are equivalent only at the level of these units, but not at the national level.55 Given this 
incompleteness, no conclusion regarding the country can be drawn from the scores of these 
latter units. 
The dispersion of the subnational units along the axes of religiosity and authoritarianism 
reveals important nuances within national profiles. Some of the subdivisions have values that 
demarcate them from their mother nations. The most striking differences are found within 
small nations like Belgium, and especially Austria. Within Austria, Tyrol is an outlier because 
as religious as Northern Ireland, Southern Italy, the United States, and some South American 
nations, while Carinthia is much closer to the West-European profile. The location of the 
German States confirms their various historical trajectories: whereas the values of East 
Germans in Saxony and Brandenburg are close to the East European profile (albeit still less 
authoritarian), Bavarians are almost as religious as Austrians, and, at the same time, very 
similar to Carinthians, and closer to even North Italians than to East Germans along both 
axes. Moreover, with the exception of the two abovementioned parts, the States of Germany 
differ mainly in religiosity. In contrast, Italy becomes progressively both more religious and 
more authoritarian as one moves from the North to the South. The other example of 
significant regional polarization is Spain: Castilla and Leon, as well as Aragon have more in 
common with Brazil than with Catalonia ― which, in turn, is closer to (and also more secular 
than) the West-European median. 
Values are also associated with ethno-religious and sometimes linguistic divisions ― 
although it is less clear whether such differences reflect cultural heritage or regional 
                     
55 A further constraint is that when a country has several surveys with structurally equivalent scores at the 
subnational level, the scores selected for this map come from the survey with the highest number of comparable 
subdivisions. As a result, the national median profile shown in this diagram may differ from the one in Figure 9. 
For example, in the case of both East and West Germany, Figure 9 shows the scores from, respectively, 1997 and 
1999 because these are the last surveys where these scores are comparable. Yet, for the comparison between 
subnational units, the diagram shows the scores from the 1990 for both Germanys since there are more States 
(Länder) with invariant constructs from this than there are from the later surveys. 
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disparities in economic development. Belgium is an illustration: Flemings are not far from the 
median West-European profile (libertarian but moderately religious); Walloons are more 
secular and somewhat authoritarian ― as such, they are very close to France and the least 
authoritarian fringe of Eastern Europe. This might appear as a puzzle: the fact that influential 
currents of Flemish nationalism56 (which as a whole has become more influential over the last 
decades) have authoritarian tendencies is clearly not reflected in Flander's position relative to 
Wallonia. The evolution of Flemish identity is probably less influenced by such aspects of 
party politics, and is more sensitive to the economic component of the inter-Belgian conflict 
pitting a thriving, postindustrial Flanders against a de-industrializing Wallonia.57 Following 
the same logic, Walloons' stronger authoritarianism might be related to economic difficulties, 
rather than some specificity of Francophone culture, as would suggest the near identical 
positions of France, Wallonia, and French-speaking Suisse Romande along the 
authoritarianism axis.58 
Switzerland is another country where it seems difficult to separate the impact of ethno-
linguistic diversity from the effect of regional divisions. Like in the case of Austria and 
Belgium, regional differences in the values of the Swiss population are pronounced despite 
the country's small size. Similarities between the French-speaking cantons and France, the 
closeness of the Italian-speaking canton to Northern Italy might suggest cultural bonds that 
persist despite boundaries. In this respect, the German-speaking cantons constitute an 
exception because they are less similar to (West) Germany than is Switzerland on overall. 
In the case of the United Kingdom,59 the data confirm the stronger religiosity of the 
Scottish population, a characteristic that is often discussed as a component of Scottish cultural 
heritage (Bruce, Glendinning, and Rosie 2004). The Catholics of Northern Ireland are among 
                     
56 E.g., the Vlaams Blok party (rebranded Vlaams Belang after 2000). 
57 See earlier Note on Inglehart's misreading of Flemish nationalism. 
58 In the case of France (not included in the country subdivisions diagram), no scores are available from 
the years around 1990 where the Belgian survey was conducted. However, France's location in 1981 and 1999 
(shown in Figure 12) indicate little change along any of the two axes, which suggests that in 1990, it might have 
been similar to Wallonia. In 1999, its religiosity score is nevertheless equal to that observed for French-speaking 
Switzerland in 1996. 
59 Following Inglehart's reporting, the sample of Northern Ireland is analyzed separately from the rest of 
the British sample, hence the scores for "Britain" designate the weighted averages of England, Wales, and 
Scotland. Summary indicators for the United Kingdom are included in the analysis of the relationship between 
values and macroeconomic indicators. 
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the most religious of all the nations and subnational entities included in this comparison ― 
but at the same time, they are about as libertarian as the English. The location of Northern 
Ireland (Catholics and Protestants combined) indicates that Northern Ireland's Protestant 
population is less religious but more authoritarian than the Catholics.60 To appreciate the 
significance of this finding, it should be pointed out that these data come from 1990, when the 
armed conflict between the IRA and Britain was not yet over: what in media parlance used to 
be called "Irish" terrorism was alive and well. These scores demonstrate that the atrocities 
committed with the objective of seceding from the United Kingdom cannot stem from some 
typically Irish "cultural leaning": Northern Ireland's Catholics are not more, but less 
authoritarian than all the inhabitants of that province combined. What is more, these results 
again confirm the reductionism of Inglehart's secular-traditional instrument. Extrapolating the 
Huntingtonian argument positing a "clash of civilizations", a look at the location of Northern 
Ireland in the Inglehart-Baker map would suffice to link the atrocities committed in the name 
of the struggle for Irish self-determination to Northern Ireland's (as well as Ireland's) 
"surviving traditional values" and to point out an "Irish Catholic propensity toward violent 
conflict".61 In reality, neither the Irish population (Figure 9), nor Northern Ireland's Catholics 
have traditional values in the authoritarian sense: they only "look" traditional through the 
prism of instruments conflating authoritarianism with religiosity. (It does not follow that the 
populations with authoritarian values endorse political violence.) In the case of Northern 
Ireland's Catholics, their stronger religiosity cannot be separated from the fact that 
Catholicism has been instrumental in the preservation of Irish collective identity. 
                     
60  Although the scores for Northern Ireland's Protestant population are not structurally equivalent, 
therefore excluded from this diagram, this is a logical conclusion from the relative positions of the Catholics and 
Northern Ireland as a whole. Catholics and Protestants are the major subnational entities of Northern Ireland. 
61 This is a paraphrase of Huntington's postulate of a "Muslim propensity toward violent conflict" (1996: 
258), backed up by contingency tables crossing the number of ethnopolitical conflicts and civilizations ("Islam" 
versus "others") not subjected to tests of statistical association and presented without controlling variables. 
Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis has been criticized regarding the relevance of the civilization clusters 
(Hunter 1998; Esposito 1999; Fuller 2002), the posited doctrinal uniformity of religious traditions (Esposito and 
Voll 1996), and the evolution of violent conflicts contradicting the thesis of clash (Gurr 2000; Henderson and 
Tucker 2001; Russett, O’Neal, and Cox 2000; Chiozza 2002; Henderson 2005; Neumayer and Plümper 2009). 
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Although the number of available subdivisions is lower, comparable polarizations are 
manifest also in Eastern Europe. They are most prominent within Serbia,62 ranging from very 
secular, moderately authoritarian "Yugoslavs" to authoritarian and secular Serbs (themselves 
similar to Russians), and religious and very authoritarian Serbian Muslims, the majority of 
whom represent the province of Kosovo. The relevance of Yugoslav identity (a category that, 
many years into the armed conflict in post-Yugoslavia was still available among the options 
offered to respondents) is confirmed: this low degree of authoritarianism probably reflects the 
post-nationalist attitude evident in the labeling. However, it is difficult to isolate a consistent 
relationship between values and religious background (especially denomination), even within 
one single political entity. Within Bosnia, Muslims are more secular and also more 
authoritarian than Catholic Bosnian Croats whose position is closer to Croatia, itself highly 
religious (the latter not included in this diagram).63 In the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Muslims are more religious than the country overall, on pair with the US South, 
several South American countries and Nigeria. With regard to Ukraine, the relative positions 
of the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups do not seem to corroborate the ideological claim 
of Ukrainian nationalism that it represents a cultural outlook that is closer to Western Europe 
than Russia. Its Ukrainian majority is slightly more, rather than less authoritarian and more 
religious than its Russian minority.64 
The regions of the United States65 differ primarily in religiosity. The Southern and 
Midwest states have the most religious populations, while the West coast is the most secular, 
                     
62  At the time of the 1996 survey, Serbia and Montenegro were the last remaining republics of 
Yugoslavia, dissolved in 2006. Their respective samples are of sufficient size to be representative of the two 
republics, therefore studied separately. 
63 The overall scores for Bosnia show higher degrees of both authoritarianism and religiosity than what 
follows from the respective locations of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims). This is because the national 
average is influenced by the values of Bosnian Serbs whose scores are not structurally equivalent, therefore do 
not appear in the diagram. 
64 Nonetheless, it would be hard to find evidence of the "cultural roots" of the interethnic conflicts that 
plague Ukraine at the time of writing. In 1996, when this survey was conducted, Ukraine was years ahead of the 
political turmoil that led to the recalibration of its relationships with Russia and the armed conflict between its 
main ethnic groups. Ukraine's scores from three years later (presented in Figure 12) show no evolution toward 
less authoritarianism. 
65  For regional subdivisions, refer to Table 19 for Canada, and to Table 20 for the United States 
(Appendix 2). In the case of the United States, the classification adopts the US Census Bureau's definition of 
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and also the least authoritarian. Interestingly, the North-Eastern states are no less authoritarian 
than the South, although the differences between the four regional scores are small. In North 
America, the religious-secular divide seems to reflect the degree of urbanization: in both the 
United States and Canada, the regions with the highest concentration of urban population ― 
the North-East and the West Coast in the US; Ontario and Pacific Canada ― are more secular 
than the less urbanized regions. (This is a more plausible interpretation than stressing the 
impact of coastal location: Canada's most religious geographical unit is the Atlantic 
Provinces, a sparsely populated, less industrialized region.) Although the two instruments for 
Quebec had to be excluded from this comparison, Canada's national score suggests that 
Quebeckers66 are even more secular and more authoritarian than the rest of the country. These 
differences between the United States and Canada, at both the national and regional levels 
corroborate the findings of other researchers, highlighting a more-than-subtle cultural divide 
between the two nations.67  Nevertheless, this general pattern involves important nuances, 
such as the cultural proximity between the Pacific United States and Canada overall. 
Australians represent a transition between the British and North American profiles: 
secular like the Brits and libertarian like Canadians and the inhabitants of the Pacific United 
States. However, this reflects the values of the Anglo-Celtic majority: the values of 
Australians of European ancestry68 are not far from the West European median: moderately 
religious and significantly more authoritarian than the United States, Canada, and Australia. 
Ancestry and ethnicity are related to different values in the case of Mexico and Peru, the two 
Latin American countries where subnational entities can be compared.69 The scores indicate 
that Mexicans and Peruvians of Caucasian ancestry are less authoritarian but no less religious 
than their respective nations overall, although this narrow scope does not allow for 
conclusions. 
                                                                
four statistical regions. (The sample size does not allow to go beyond this level.) These four regions have partly 
distinct historical trajectories, especially in the case of the former Confederate states in the South. 
66 In the Canadian survey, no information was available on the language of the respondents. The Quebec 
sample, which includes a minority of English-speaking Canadians, had to be excluded because its religiosity and 
authoritarianism scores are not equivalent with the structure at the cross-country ecological level. 
67 See for example Adams (2003) on the myth of converging American and Canadian values. 
68 Australians were classified according to respondents' self-reported ancestry since this constitutes a 
more significant component of Australian identity than geographical regions (Pakulski and Tranter 2000). 




1.4.5. Evolution between two surveys 
Maintaining structural equivalence as a necessary condition for comparison, the number 
of countries for which at least two surveys are available drops significantly, from 53 to 31 in 
Figure 12 (p. 59).70 The reference for this comparison is Inglehart and Baker's map showing 
the evolution of their country scores in Figure 13 (p. 60). 71  To appreciate the country 
trajectories along the axes representing the religiosity and authoritarianism instruments 
proposed as alternatives to Inglehart's measures, let us go over his main argument concerning 
value change. From the proposition that "economic development seems to move societies in a 
common direction" (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 30), it follows that closest to "the cutting edge 
of cultural change" (ibid.: 31) ― that is, highly secular and strong self-expression values ― 
are the economically most developed nations. (An important proviso is the postulate of 
cultural exceptionalism exemplified by the United States, an oversimplification reviewed 
above.) 
Let us start with the trajectories of ex-communist nations. In the dynamic IB map, a 
typical pattern is a shift to "more traditional" values ― Slovenia being an exception. Inglehart 
and Baker attribute this evolution to the "collapse of their economic, social, and political 
systems" (ibid.: 41). Undoubtedly, the 1990s in the former communist states were a decade 
marked by crises, involving ― to varying degrees depending on the national context ― 
economic recession, unemployment, the collapse of established forms of governance, the rise 
of extremist movements, and in more than a few instances, also armed conflicts. From this 
perspective, the corresponding shift toward traditional forms of authority, a logical response 
to rising existential insecurity, makes sense. Figure 12, however, shows a more complex 
picture. Of the 10 formerly communist countries for which we have reliable measures, only 
Ukraine and Croatia had shifted toward more authoritarianism ― and even in these cases, the 
increase had been minor. In eight countries, authoritarianism had decreased, and, with the 
exception of Russia, this change had been substantial. 
  
                     
70 Four countries with large populations: India, Japan, Nigeria, Turkey are left out from this analysis. 
71 As with the previous comparisons, given the constraint of equivalence, the country scores are not 
necessarily from the same year as in Inglehart and Baker's study. For some countries, more than two surveys 





Figure 12 Change over time in location on the dimensions of religiosity and authoritarianism for 31 societies 
Note: Correspondence analysis at the ecological level. Data are from the World Values Survey, waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 
surveys in 74 countries). Only countries with at least two sets of structurally equivalent constructs from separate surveys are shown. 
Refer to Figure 8 for the arrangement of the modalities and Table 17 (p. 147) for the country congruence coefficients. 
The case of Serbia is especially significant, as this country had undergone, between the 
surveys whose results are reported, one of the worst emergencies of the post-communist 
transformation. In the wake of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia's nationalist 
leadership drove that country into a long series of local wars and had maintained its grip on 
power for more than a decade until it was overthrown in a popular revolt in 2000. Throughout 
the 1990s, the country had been in an almost constant state of war, the last stage of which, 
with the conflict in Kosovo, took place between the two surveys (1996 and 2001). Although 
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were over, it was during this five-year period that the Serbian 
population, already weakened by economic and political sanctions, had suffered some of the 
most important shocks with the international bombing campaigns that destroyed an important 
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authoritarianism. They had become more religious ― an understandable development, given 
the strong religious emphases in ascending Serbian nationalism. The latter inevitably included 
a discriminatory component (Pešić 2000; Radić 2000), and at a minimum, created the 
conditions for an increase in popular authoritarianism. Yet, the overall picture in Serbia is 




Figure 13 Change over time in location on the dimensions of secular-traditional and self-expression-survival 
values for 38 societies 
Note: Reproduced from Inglehart and Baker 2000: 40, Figure 6. Data are from the World Values Survey, waves 2 and 3 (1990-1991 
and 1995-1998). 
Taking Inglehart's secular-traditional scale as yardstick, the decrease in authoritarianism 
among the Bulgarian, Czech, East German and Slovakian populations during the 1990s is no 
less surprising. Although free from armed conflict, these societies had not been spared the 
turbulence of democratic transition. The economic downturn had been especially severe in 
Bulgaria, and Slovakia had been governed by forces espousing a bigoted variant of 
nationalism (G. Evans and Whitefield 1998). Still, these four societies had become more 
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libertarian. Like in the case of Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine, the increased religiosity of 
Bulgarians and Slovaks might be related to the reaffirmation of national identity or to the 
repression of religious life under communism. (A slight increase had occurred also in the 
Czech Republic.) In sum, the value change in these post-communist societies that Inglehart 
and Baker describe as "a retrograde movement" (ibid.: 41) ― to the extent that "retrograde" 
implies a regression to parochial worldviews ― had not occurred in most of the post-
communist nations for which comparable measures exist. What they measure as an 
"increasing emphasis on traditional values" is, in reality, an increase in religiosity. This is also 
evident in the fact that in East Germany and Slovenia ― as well as in other countries where 
neither religiosity, nor authoritarianism have increased ―, Inglehart's secular-traditional 
measure does not indicate such reversions. 
Outside transitional Eastern Europe, it is also difficult to identify a general movement 
toward secularization. Significant decreases in religiosity are restricted to France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Spain, and Canada. Altogether, religiosity 
had declined between two surveys in 10 out of 31 countries, including the post-communist 
world. In Brazil and Mexico, the two most populous Latin American nations, it had increased 
substantially. In these two countries, existential insecurity might be part of the explanation: 
the 1990s were a decade of economic instability, marked by, in addition to rising inequality, 
social exclusion, and violence related to organized crime. The positive correlation found 
between religiosity and income inequality (Table 7, p. 44) suggests that the degree to which 
religious institutions are involved in the provision of welfare services can be inferred from the 
(un)availability of government or market options, and also the vulnerability of the population 
in absence of such options. However, religiosity had also increased in affluent societies such 
as Austria, Italy, and Finland. 
Like religious revival in Eastern Europe, religious decline may also reflect the direction 
of political transition, especially in post-authoritarian or post-conflict contexts. In Spain, it is 
probably linked to the transition from the Franco regime under which the Catholic Church 
wielded considerable political influence. In the case of Ireland and Northern Ireland, where 
the findings show a decisive secularization trend between 1990 and 1999, it might be related 
to the winding down of the armed conflict in Northern Ireland, and the ensuing political 
settlement in view of which the religious component of national identity recedes 
progressively. These particularities aside, the general trend is progression toward less 




The findings presented in this chapter confirm what many Inglehart critics have long 
suggested. Instead of stemming from sociologically more coherent definitions of religiosity, 
authoritarianism and materialism, Inglehart's measures are produced by their conflation which 
renders them unable to adequately account for such phenomena as non-authoritarian 
religiosity, secular authoritarianism or even actual materialism. The instruments adapted to 
the complexities of the individual level offer an opportunity to better grasp the content of 
these values. Overall, the MCA solution, based on the positioning of individuals relative to 
opposed value modalities yields conceptually clearer dimensions than do those obtained by 
their linear combinations (PCA) or latent variables imposed on the data (factor analysis). The 
switch in focus from a variable-centered logic to relations between subjects and properties has 
also shown remarkable stability of values across generations in two non-Western societies. 
Given the ambitions of many cross-cultural researchers, the opportunities offered by the 
approach presented in this study are rather modest. This study has found very few cases from 
outside the Western/European context where value dimensions are comparable at all. On the 
other hand, the origins of configural disagreement offer insights that are no less valuable than 
the cases where such comparisons are warranted. Most importantly, given MCA's emphasis 
on subjects, value research stands to benefit from a reorientation toward the intracultural 
(within-country) level. A major limitation of MCA is that unlike in factor analysis, we still 
lack best practices to assess structural equivalence at the individual level.72 At this stage, it is 
not clear what methods are available to test the summary indicators produced by MCA for full 
equivalence. This study has addressed equivalence at the construct level but leaves it to future 
research to assess whether the constructs identified in MCA can be found to achieve also 
metric and scalar agreement, a precondition for comparison of country means of instruments 
relevant at the individual level. However, as previous cross-cultural research has shown, 
comparable latent dimensions at the individual level are exceptional regardless of the method. 
A sensible alternative to the impasse of incongruent latent structures at the individual 
level is ecological analysis with its less stringent equivalence criteria. The country locations 
using indicators exempt of the shortcomings related to measures produced by the conflation 
of values challenge the Inglehartian thesis of value change. The findings obtained with these 
alternative indicators call into question the core Inglehart thesis of value change induced by 
                     
72 These issues are discussed in Blasius and Thiessen (2006a, 2006b), and Blasius and Graeff (2009). 
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economic growth ― at least to the extent that rising national affluence does not systematically 
bring about shifts away from "traditional sources of authority". We have seen that such a 
thesis hinges on a restrictive definition of religiosity in which the coercive elements of 
institutionalized religion are paramount ― not on religiosity proper. Had Inglehart adopted 
measures taking into account the semantic specificities of the value domains, he would have 
arrived at a similar conclusion. 
At this stage, the invariance issues pertaining to the complex constructs presented in this 
thesis preclude any conclusion on how national affluence affects materialism ― if by 
materialism we mean a value clearly demarcated from religiosity and authoritarianism. 
Furthermore, due to the incongruence of Inglehart's value constructs, we cannot tell whether 
the value change that his thesis posits is actually borne out by his indicators. These concerns 
aside, the evolution of country locations, as well as the location of subnational entities relative 
to national averages provide further support for the robustness of the religiosity and 
authoritarianism instruments. We can plausibly argue that in the societies that constitute the 
European civilization (for which we have reliable measures), religiosity does not "evolve" in 
the direction posited by Inglehart, and per capita GDP has a stronger association with 
authoritarianism than it has with religiosity. An important insight from these comparisons is 
that what in the Inglehart typology appears to constitute more or less coherent historical 
clusters are less manifest when making the warranted distinction between religiosity and 
authoritarianism. It is then difficult to decide whether the location of the societies along the 
two axes can be explained by some "independent" effect of religious heritage or other factors. 






2. Values and economic growth 
For two decades following the first formulation of the postmaterialism thesis, Inglehart's 
studies have focused on economic growth as cause and values as outcomes. In the mid-1990s, 
this was followed by an inquiry into the opposite direction: culturally induced economic 
growth. While his interest in the "cultural determinants" of economic growth is manifest in a 
significantly smaller number of writings ― and he appears to have abandoned this line of 
research ― , the arguments presented in the two studies (Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang 
1996a, 1996b) and deconstructed in this chapter constitute an important current in Inglehart's 
work and the research tradition it continues to inform. 
The thesis of culturally induced economic growth was advanced in Culture Shift in 
Advanced Industrial Society (Inglehart 1990). In Sacred and Secular, co-written by Pippa 
Norris (Norris and Inglehart 2004), the relationship between religious tradition and work 
values is studied in connection with the endogenous growth model proposed in these studies. 
In The Human Development Sequence (Inglehart-Welzel 2005), the process of political 
emancipation in the developing world is linked with the deregulatory wave scaling back 
government intervention ― policies whose theoretical references include the growth model 
Inglehart was seeking to update. It also reemerges in Welzel's update to the Inglehartian thesis 
of value change (2013). Another consideration in favor of deconstructing Inglehart's model of 
culturally induced growth is his theoretical perspective. The latter shows a closer engagement 
with sociology than does his work on postmaterialism, in which references from psychology 
and political science are paramount. Finally, it is this excursion into culturalist explanations of 
economic development that provides the impetus for much of the non-scholarly spinoffs from 
value research. Therefore, for social scientists engaging with substantialist accounts of 
economic development, the endogenous growth model updated with a cultural variable 
presented by Inglehart and his collaborators constitutes an important reference. 
The first part of this chapter presents the explanatory models in two articles written by 
Granato, Inglehart and Leblang (henceforth: GIL) (1996a, 1996b). This discussion centers 
around the endogeneity approach, an umbrella term designating those currents in the social 
sciences which propose incorporating cultural variables into economic growth models. 
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The second part examines the role of entrepreneurship, as opposed to state intervention 
in the processes nudging national economies toward growth. Given that GIL ground their 
models in endogenous growth theory, this section engages with the related assumptions 
concerning the origins of innovation, in particular innovation in basic technologies. The 
discussion contrasts the neoclassical framework with the empirical accounts of heterodox 
perspectives.  
The third part reports findings from regressions of economic growth and per capita 
GDP. These are discussed with reference to GIL's model presented in the first part. The 
models include religiosity and authoritarianism, the latent constructs identified in Chapter 1 
and three value scales from Schwartz's ecological analysis (1994, 2006). 
The theoretical rationale of GIL's articles being the established reading of Max Weber's 
Protestant ethic (PE) thesis, the discussion of the interconnections between religion and 
economic growth could be integrated into this chapter. However, the implications are more 
complicated than what follows from the often routine references (including Inglehart's) to this 
seminal text in sociology. Given that a thorough engagement with the PE thesis would take up 
disproportionate space in this chapter, it is integrated into Chapter 3 where it is discussed in 
connection with the critique of the substantialist perspective. This is in line with Weber's 
original PE argument, which demarcates itself from an idealist/culturalist interpretation. At 
this stage therefore, I merely note that the impetus behind the newfound interest in Weber's 
work among economists and many practitioners of value research can be traced back to the 
attempts at developing models of economic growth including a cultural variable. 
2.1. The endogeneity approach 
The debates on the interconnections between what the current terminology defines as 
"values" on the one hand, and "economic outcomes" on the other is among the most enduring 
in the social sciences. As GIL recognize, the renewal of the empirical interest in these issues 
stems from a criticism of neoclassical models of growth (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). The 
limitations of these models relate to their treatment of the production function as dependent 
on a number of exogenous variables like savings, population growth and shifts in technology. 
Yet, under the assumption of rationally motivated actors, the inclusion of a variable capturing 
technological innovation in growth models is problematic because "the compensation of 
nonrival old ideas in accordance with their current marginal cost of production-zero-will not 
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provide the appropriate reward for the research effort that underlies the creation of new ideas" 
(Barro 1996: 6). However, in the absence of technological innovation, per capita growth will 
slow down or eventually halt. As a result, the exogenous growth model shows an unchanging 
standard of living (GIL 1996b). It also postulates diminishing returns to reproducible capital 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1990; Barro 1991) ― that is, economies with lower initial per capita 
GDP levels will grow faster than those with higher initial levels. The latter relationship is 
confirmed in regression models ― with the implication that over the long run, per capita GDP 
will converge. This has not been the case: the gap between the economically most developed 
and the poorest countries has not disappeared. 
In contrast, endogenous growth models do not assume decreasing returns to scale. They 
focus on the productivity of the population and include a proxy for various contributing 
factors like research and development (Romer 1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt 1992), education and know-how (Arrow 1962; Uzawa 1965), political 
institutions (North 1990; Helliwell 1994; Leblang 1996; Acemoğlu, Johnson, and Robinson 
2001). There have been efforts to study some of these variables (especially know-how) as 
primarily individual rather than contextual attributes under the label of "human capital" 
(Schultz 1963; Becker 1964; Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 1990; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
1992) ― a consideration that reconciles these adjustments with rational choice theories. 
These models all imply some kind of "cultural input" that is assumed to have an impact on 
productivity and thus to contribute to economic growth. While the exact content of this 
cultural variable is debated, the literature identifies it as a value component. 
Building on these insights, McClelland (1967) had argued that differences in individual 
economic performance are the outcome of cultural differences in the emphases on 
achievement values. Various other values associated with individual achievement or lack 
thereof have also been proposed as positively or negatively impacting growth: "amoral 
familism" (Banfield 1958); "withdrawal of status respect" (Hagen 1963); "modern values" in 
a generic sense (Lerner 1958) and in connection with a subset of specific values (Inkeles and 
Smith 1974); non-conformity and creativity (GIL 1996a, 1996b); "generalized social trust" 
(Putnam 1993); "postmaterialist" values (with a negative impact), as opposed to "materialist" 
values (Inglehart 1997); "pro-" and "anti-business" (Lipset 2000), and "entrepreneurial 
values" (Porter 2000). Referring to Lucas (1988) who has identified culture as key to growth 
performance, GIL's study of these issues makes it clear the authors intend to "pick up" the 
discussion on endogenous growth models. Specifically, their concern is "why certain 
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countries grew at markedly different rates even though they may have similar endowments in 
population, working age population, urban residence, education levels, proportion of GDP in 
agriculture and manufacturing, and proportion of primary commodities in merchandise 
exports" (GIL 1996b: 387). They propose that, all other things equal, it is cultural values that 
make the difference: values impact growth via thrift and achievement motivation. Like the 
endogenous model proposed to augment, GIL's handling of this additional cultural variable 
remains embedded in neoclassical growth theory under the assumption that "individuals 
maximize a standard utility function" (ibid: 689). 
 
 
Model Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -.70 7.29* 3.16  2.40* 
 (1.08) (1.49) (1.94) (.77) 
Per Capita GDP in 1960 -.63*  -.42* -.43* 
 (.14)  (.14) (.10) 
Primary Education in 1960 2.69*  2.19* 2.09* 
 (1.22)  (1.06) (.96) 
Secondary Education in 1960 3.27*   1.21  
 (1.01)  (1.08)  
Investment 8.69*   3.09  
 (4.90)  (4.40)  
Achievement Motivation  2.07*  1.44* 1.88* 
  (.37) (.48) (.35) 
Postmaterialism  -2.24* -1.07  
  (.77) (1.03)  
R2 Adjusted .55 .59 .69 .70 
SEE .86 .83 .72 .71 
LM (χ2(1)) .42 .65 .68 .87 
Jarque-Bera (χ2(2)) .05 .30 .18 .57 
White (χ2(1)) .28 .24 .37 .18 
SC .119 -.117 -.095 -.352 
Table 9 OLS estimation of mean rate of per capita economic growth (1960-89) by Granato, Inglehart, and 
Leblang 
Note: Reproduced from Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang (1996a: 617). 
Dependent variable is mean rate of per capita economic growth, 1960-89. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in 
Appendix 1, p. 141 for the definition of the indicators. 
N is 25 for all models. Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < .05. 
To provide empirical support for their proposition, GIL present a series of regressions 
using variables identified by Levine and Renelt (1992) "as having robust partial correlations" 
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(1996a: 616) with output growth. The independent variable capturing the relevant aspect of 
culture is the Achievement Motivation (AM) Index. This is constructed on the basis of 
responses to four questions, each of them related to goals that survey respondents might or 
might not consider important for children to learn: "thrift, saving money and things", 
"determination", "obedience", and "religious faith". The index sums up the percentage of 
respondents choosing the first two goals minus the percentage favoring the last two goals 
(ibid.: 611). GIL justify the inclusion of the AM Index in their growth models arguing that a 
nation's rate of domestic investment heavily impacts growth over the long run, adding the 
"weberesque" claim that since "investment depends on savings […] a society that emphasizes 
thrift, produces savings, which lead to investment, and later to economic growth" (ibid.: 613). 
Notice that this reasoning glosses over fundamental differences between household, 
government and corporate savings and investments. In essence, it argues that an individual's 
motivation to save has a sizeable positive impact on investment in the kind of activities, 
including technological innovation that sustain output growth. Although it could be argued 
that household savings are a good proxy for institutional investment, GIL do not provide 
empirical evidence for such a linkage. 
The results of GIL's regressions are presented in Table 9 (p. 67).73 The four models 
indicate that initial levels of per capita GDP correlate negatively with growth rates. Poorer 
countries therefore grow faster than do richer ones ― a confirmation of the hypothesis of 
conditional convergence implied in the Solow/Swan model. Investment in physical and 
human capital has a positive effect in Model 1 but not in Model 3 where the cultural variables 
are added. The variable proposed to augment the endogenous growth model, achievement 
motivation has significant effect in all three models where it is included. Another value, 
postmaterialism has a negative effect in one model, but this effect disappears once controlling 
for the other variables in the baseline model. A retained significant effect of the 
Postmaterialism Index would mean that the value that Inglehart's earlier theses present as 
capturing the seminal cultural shift in the area of rising affluence and "postmodernization" is 
"a Protestant Ethic in reverse" (GIL 1996a: 613) ― or a drag on growth.74 Noting that when 
achievement motivation is added to the model, the significant effect of investment disappears, 
GIL propose that this is because (a) achievement motivation "encourages relatively high rates 
                     
73 Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 1, p. 141. 
74 See the criticism of the Postmaterialism Index, reviewed in Chapter 1. 
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of investment", and (2) "the direct path from culture reflects the effects of motivational factors 
on entrepreneurship and effort" (ibid.: 620). 
GIL formulate their arguments as part of an exchange with Swank (1996) and Jackman 
and Miller (1996a, 1996b) who are critical of their update to endogenous growth theory. 
Specifically, Swank argues that corporatist state policies, that is, top-down (as opposed to 
bottom-up) processes have played a key role in sustaining post-World War II economic 
growth. Jackman and Miller question the adequacy of values as independent variables that 
postdate the period from which average growth rates are used as dependent variable. They 
present regressions using a defensible chronological ordering relative to the dependent 
variable, which show "weak to nonexistent […] relationship between culture and economic 
growth rates" (1996a: 651). They also point out GIL's selection bias manifest in confining the 
analysis to mostly democratic and economically developed countries. Another criticism 
concerns construct equivalence: as with the value constructs discussed in Chapter 1, GIL do 
not provide evidence that the four items constituting their Achievement Motivation Index tap 
a comparable latent structure across the countries included in their analysis. Jackman and 
Miller (1996b) present factor analyses showing that the four items used to construct their 
Achievement Motivation Index do not arrange in semantically homogenous dimensions in all 
the 25 countries surveyed. This means that GIL's value instrument in the model does not 
measure the same thing across all countries, therefore its inclusion as an independent variable 
cannot account for how variations in a specific element of culture impact output growth. 
Finally, Swank, Jackman, and Miller criticize the reductionist definition of culture and the 
linear representation of "what theoretically is a multifaceted, complex relationship" (Swank 
1996: 665). 
GIL's arguments have continued to fuel the debates on the interconnections between 
values and economic growth. Studies relying on the Lucas/Romer augmented endogenous 
model have found significant effects for the cultural variable (e.g., Petrakis and Kostis 2013), 
while others have pointed out that GIL's results are contingent on a definition of culture that is 
not stable because stemming from an underspecified model (Edwards and Patterson 2009). 
McClelland's related thesis that the emphasis on achievement and other values linked with 
"market rationality", entrepreneurship, individualism, and "work ethic", as transmitted 
through socialization explains economic growth has been both endorsed (Marini 2004; Allen 
et al. 2007; Park and Voigt 2008; Minkov and Blagoev 2009; Gorodnichenko and Roland 
2010; Forson, Janrattanagul, and Carsamer 2013; Maridal 2013; Zelekha, Avnimelech, and 
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Sharabi 2013) and questioned (Pryor 2005; Beugelsdijk and Smeets 2008; Hanson 2009) on 
empirical grounds. Causal linkages between social capital and economic performance have 
been supported (Whiteley 2000; Dasgupta et al. 2009; Rutten and Gelissen 2010) and also 
rejected (Foley and Edwards 1999; Schneider, Plümper, and Baumann 2000; Beugelsdijk 
2005; Freitag 2006). Some authors (e.g., Westlund and Adam 2010) have suggested that 
social capital explains economic performance at the firm level but not at the level of large 
spatial units. 
2.2. Entrepreneurship versus the state nexus 
2.2.1. Technological innovation 
In this section I turn to a subclass of culture, captured in the broad term "innovation" 
that mainstream economics regards as a decisive factor of economic growth. We have located 
the impetus for endogenizing technological innovation in growth models, like the related 
attempts with reference to a cultural variable in the effort to improve on the predictive power 
of the Solow/Swan model. GIL identify two mechanisms by which culture impacts economic 
growth: via an indirect path by encouraging "relatively high rates of investment", and a direct 
path that "reflects the effect of motivational factors on entrepreneurship and effort" (GIL 
1996a: 620). The following definition (literally a text-book example) sums up the neoclassical 
roots of this approach: 
 
"There are three types of agents in this [endogenous] model. First, producers of final 
output hire labor and intermediate inputs and combine them to produce final output, 
which is sold at unit price. Second, R&D firms devote resources to invent new products. 
Once a product has been invented, the innovating R&D firm obtains a perpetual patent, 
which allows the firm to sell the good at whatever price it chooses. This price is chosen 
to maximize profits. Third, households maximize utility, subject to the usual budget 
constraint." (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 285, emphasis added) 
 
This formulation makes it clear that the proposed improvement on the Solow/Swan 
model maintains the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. Technological change 
occurs because firms seek competitive advantage over one another. The profit from 
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inventions that turn out to be marketable (that is, respond to consumer demand) are of 
sufficient scale to provide continued push for R&D, hence technological change. The end 
result is the perpetual rearrangement of the market around product innovations that rational 
consumers adopt in order to maximize utility. Utility maximization means always striving for 
more, and marketable innovations are a means to achieve that. Overall, assuming a market 
economy, the trigger of the market processes leading to innovation is the consumer ― as in 
neoclassical theory. The "creative destruction" drive of the individualistic entrepreneur 
(Schumpeter 1934) merely responds to the impulse received from the consumer. It is in this 
theoretical framework that GIL propose to insert a cultural variable. This is expressed in the 
following formula (reproduced from Equation [1] in GIL 1996a): 
 
= , + ∏ +      [1] 
 
"where  is output growth (per capita) for country i, ,  is a set of economic variables 
[initial levels of wealth and investment in human capital] measured at the beginning of 
the time period for country i. […]  is a set of 'other variables' including a constant, 
physical capital investment rates […], and whatever other variables the investigator is 
interested in exploring." (ibid.: 615, emphasis added) 
 
GIL suggest that the Χ variables include cultural values. The first issue with this model 
is one of specification. To make their model fully compliant with the neoclassical framework, 
GIL assume that "individuals prefer more consumption to less" (GIL 1996b: 689) ― a 
proposition which seems to have been lost on Inglehart critics. Although this assumption 
constitutes a pillar of neoclassical economics, its adoption by Inglehart is by no means 
evident. After all, his postmaterialism thesis posits that as societies enter the era of affluence, 
materialist impulses subside. If individuals indeed behave as posited by neoclassical growth 
theory, then the postmaterialism thesis becomes impossible to defend. The postulate of 
whatever threshold beyond which individual preferences switch in favor of less consumption 
is incompatible with the endogenous growth model. 
The second, more important critique concerns the less articulated, but nevertheless 
significant implication of neoclassical growth theory. In the various formulations based on 
Lucas's growth model ― including the above quote from Barro and Sala-i-Martin, as well as 
GIL's proposition ―, "new ideas are treated as endogenous to the firm, not as part of the 
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institutional organization required to transform ideas into products" (Mazzucato 2013: 50, 
emphasis added). Heterodox empirical accounts refute this view and identify the state as the 
single most important actor in the allocation of resources conducive to economic growth and 
stress the role of military expenditures as a major source of technological innovation. 
The suggestion that technological R&D and, by implication, economic growth are 
dependent on the state already appeared in the 1950s and 1960s, notably in the writings of 
Galbraith (1984) and Mills (2000). By describing the state not as a mere anti-cyclical 
interventionist which, in times of crises, steps in to prop up consumer demand in order to 
avert a depression, these authors go well beyond Keynesian theory. The first detailed account 
of the role of military procurement in sustaining an ever increasing portion of the civilian 
economy following World War II was given by Baran and Sweezy in their essay Monopoly 
Capital (1968). As the private sector has neither the resources (funds, and especially time), 
nor the strategic thinking required for the kind of innovation that is conducive to 
technological breakthroughs, state-driven innovation in basic technologies is the rule rather 
than the exception. Some forty years later, Ruttan's monograph on the mechanisms of 
military-induced R&D technological innovation (2006) showed that following the early 19th 
century (that is, since the beginning of the industrial revolution), all innovations in basic 
technologies had been state-funded and military-related.75 
Against the assumption that technological innovation is the outcome of the spontaneous 
actions of creative individuals and firms which, driven by the profit motive, merely respond to 
consumer demand by churning out products that enhance others’ and their own well-being, 
                     
75  Ruttan (ibid.) identifies six such stages of technological breakthrough. (1) The invention of 
interchangeable parts was the result of the military’s increased need for hand weapons (rifles) during the 
territorial expansion of the United States in the early 19th century. This pushed the industrial sector from the 
handicraft paradigm to standardized mass-production, and laid the bases for the industries that emerged during 
that century from railroad construction to the automotive industry. (2) The technologies creating the basis for 
commercially viable civil aviation were brought about thanks to the arms race during and in the wake of the two 
world wars. Specifically, jet propulsion technology, which made possible cheaper and long-distance air travel, 
was developed by the military of the major belligerent powers during World War II. (3) Nuclear technologies 
would not have been developed were it not for the strategy of mutual military deterrence during the Cold War 
era. (4) The creation and expansion of the computer industry following World War II were also driven by the 
increasingly sophisticated requirements of the arms race. (5) The R&D programs that gave birth to the internet 
were financed with the purpose of providing the military with a decentralized communication system capable of 
functioning even after a nuclear attack has destroyed larger sections in the network. (6) Finally, the space 
industries integrate all of the above technologies in one giant R&D economy. 
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Baran, Sweezy, and Ruttan have shown that the type of technological innovation that nudges 
the economy toward increased production is a state-driven, therefore top-down process. 
Moreover, the technologies on which commercially viable applications are based are, in their 
initial stages, often developed for quite different purposes with no civilian use in sight. Ruttan 
uses the concept of spinoff to describe the various processes which, through a long period of 
gestation, and as an unintended consequence, result in the commercial adoption of 
technologies originating in military procurement. Most importantly, Ruttan's monograph 
presents evidence that without state-funded military R&D, the technologies that, over the 200 
years following 1800 have been instrumental in revolutionizing production either would not 
have been invented or would have appeared at much later stages. 
The thesis of state-funded technological innovation includes two important 
qualifications. First, while the private sector does allocate resources to R&D, this is not the 
kind of activity that results in the paradigm shifts leading to innovation in basic technologies. 
Corporate funded R&D focuses on combining already invented basic technologies into new 
product formats and marketing ― the latter in the broadest sense, including not only 
branding, but also public relations efforts and lobbying for legal innovations in line with 
corporate strategy.76 Second, the fact that private firms participate in the development of basic 
technologies does not invalidate the thesis of state-funded innovation. From the aviation 
industry to the pharmaceutical sector, corporate participation in basic technology R&D is a 
reality, but the funding comes primarily from taxpayer money. Obviously, while internet-
based commercial applications are the result of processes that qualify as R&D, the paradigm 
shift in computer technologies making them possible was the invention of the internet, which 
gave rise to a myriad of specific applications. None of the latter was available until the early 
defects of internet technology had been overcome ― in the meantime, related applications 
were still restricted to the military and state-funded research laboratories. Ground-breaking 
new technologies require decade-long testing and improvement before they become 
                     
76 Parallel to the advances in automation and the related outsourcing of physical production to low-wage 
countries, branding, that is the "creation of meaning" becomes part of the production process. With the transition 
from what neoclassical terminology calls "search goods" to "experience goods" (Nelson 1970), and the resulting 
shift in marketing focus from use value to symbols, branding no more merely sells but increasingly also creates 
the product (Galbraith 2007; Klein 2000; Bourdieu 2005; Hesmondhalgh 2012). The giant budgets spent on 
marketing are rightly considered as part of corporate "research" and "development" because they indeed 
constitute innovations. But their products are related to, in Galbraith's word "want synthetization" and sales, not 
the activities whose outputs result in technological paradigm shifts. 
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commercially applicable. Exposed to the pressure of profit expectations over a much shorter 
time horizon, the private sector cannot provide the funds necessary for the kind of R&D 
activity that produces those technologies. As a result, the technology hubs discussed as 
showcases of "entrepreneurial capitalism" would not exist were it not for government-funded 
R&D. For example, Silicon Valley has been, since its mid-20th century inception, heavily 
dependent on the military-industrial complex, a sophisticated network of state-funded 
cooperation between government, academia and private enterprise that owes its existence to 
the defense considerations originating in World War II, and especially the Cold War 
(Cumings 2010).77 Market mechanisms are part of the picture ― but not until the phase of 
spinoff where the already invented new technologies mature to commercial viability. 
Government intervention and protectionist state policies, rather than "Confucian work 
ethic" have been found instrumental also in inducing the rapid growth of East Asian 
economies. Wade (1990) has argued that Taiwan's late 20th century boom had been the 
outcome of heavy regulation of and direct government intervention in the corporate sector in 
the form of incentives for investment in new industries and public firms funded by taxpayer 
money engaged in technological innovation. The same diagnosis has been proposed by Chang 
with regard to South Korea (1993) and Japan (2008a), and research into the developmental 
state has evolved into a field in its own right (P. B. Evans 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999; Chang 
and Evans 2005; Reinert 2007; Chang 2008b). 
Expanding on these works, Mazzucato's survey (2013) of the commercially most 
successful recent applications in information technology and the pharmaceutical industry 
found that the R&D activity sustaining them was no less dependent on public funding than the 
technologies discussed in Ruttan. The rapid expansion of the pharmaceutical industry shows 
how the biotechnology sector has adopted the military-industrial template. The bulk of 
pharmaceutical R&D funds are secured via government agencies (e.g., the National Institute 
                     
77 The Apple product line is a case in point, discussed at length in Mazzucato (2013). While from the 
press to academia, Apple is usually praised as an icon of entrepreneurial innovation, every technology built in its 
products was developed using public funds, including not only seminal hardware and software applications but 
also more recent, smaller scale innovations like touch-screen technology, developed using the US federal 
government's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) funds. In addition, Apple was heavily reliant on 
government support (including direct equity investment) in the early stages of its existence, and continues to rely 
on "tax, trade or technology policies that supported US companies such as Apple that allowed them to sustain 
their innovation efforts during times when national and/or global challenges hindered US companies from 
staying ahead, or caused them to fall behind in the race for capturing world markets" (ibid.: 124). 
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of Health in the United States), not corporate reserves. In turn, pharmaceutical corporations 
spend heavily on securing monopoly positions via patent rights (Baker 2007; Angell 2005; 
Gambardella 1995). Crucially, the emergence of the US biotechnology industry is the 
outcome of a powerful lobbying effort crowned by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which 
allowed the patenting of products obtained from publicly funded R&D. 
Endogenous growth theory, including its Inglehartian adaptation to accommodate 
"achievement values" suggests that in order for a knowledge-economy to develop, investment 
in creative work should be compensated by granting monopoly rights. It follows from the 
postulate of market equilibrium that those investing in such activities should earn a premium 
proportionate to the market value of their efforts. However, the existing patent regime 
precludes the risk-takers, the public, from the reward of their investment in basic technologies 
― hence a contradiction with the endogenous growth model. Elaborating on the related 
formulas, Barro and Sala-i-Martin propose that "once a good has been invented, the 
institutional setup will allow the inventor to collect the present value" (2004: 292, emphasis 
added) of that invention: 
 
"A researcher will find R&D investment attractive if this present value78 is at least as 
large as the R&D cost." (ibid.: 293) "The intermediate good that is about to be 
discovered generates a present value of monopoly profits that just covers the R&D cost 
[…]" (ibid.: 294). 
 
If Barro and Sala-i-Martin's formulation captured the existing innovation regime, we 
would find that little or close to no R&D investment takes place. Their formula suggests that 
the state will decide against investing in R&D because it is aware that it will not receive the 
"monopoly profits that just covers the R&D cost". Against this hypothesis, the reality is large-
scale public investment in R&D whose profits accrue not to the investor (the "risk taker") but 
to the firms whose R&D-related monopoly and other profits are secured thanks to an 
institutional setup channeling public money to private ends. Put differently: if the endogenous 
growth model withstood empirical testing, public investment in drug R&D would lead to 
low(er) drug prices and significantly less exclusive marketing rights. In the case of justifiable 
restrictions on production, it would mean quicker and smoother transition from patent 
protection to generic (that is, freely reproducible) drug status. Against this assumption and 
                     
78 That is, the present value from the sales associated by the invention, collected by the investor. 
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owing to the pharmaceutical sector's lobbying power in shaping legislation, the price level in 
the drug market is kept at significantly higher levels than what would follow if investment in 
medical R&D was actually compensated in line with the above model (Drahos and 
Braithwaite 2004). 
These properties of the existing patent regulation are related to a general consideration 
underpinning the copyright regime. Without willful copyright violations, the American 
economy could not have sustained its 19th century expansion. For the first hundred years of 
the American Republic, these violations had been endemic because tolerated, and even 
supported by the state. Studies by heterodox economists (Reinert 2007, Chang 1993) have 
found that at the early stages of modernization, the corporate-controlled intellectual property 
rights regime is prohibitive. The economic history of copyright corroborates this: against the 
assumptions of neoclassical growth theory, the American economy had modernized not in 
spite of but partly thanks to large-scale cultural piracy (Lessig 2004). The non-recognition of 
foreign authors' rights during the industrial revolution on the one hand, and the dominant 
copyright regime on the other point to the same underlying rationale: creative work and 
innovation takes place primarily outside the scope of the "free" market. Compensating for 
investment in creative work "at a market price" is not a necessary condition for technological 
innovation and, by implication, economic growth.79 
2.2.2. Take-off stage 
The empirical accounts of state-driven economic growth follow a long tradition of 
heterodox economic thinking. Regarding early capital accumulation, List (1885) and 
Hobsbawm (2001) have argued that bourgeois entrepreneurship and risk-taking were not 
crucial in the industrialization of 19th century Britain, where investment was protected from 
competition as a result of Britain’s grip on her colonial empire. Polanyi (2001) and later 
Wallerstein (1975) have proposed that the modern capitalism could not have emerged without 
colonial expansion, which was instrumental in providing access to cheap resources. Slavery, 
in particular, had been a catalyst of economic growth of major Western powers from the late 
17th through the second half of the 19th century. British, French, Spanish and Portuguese 
                     
79 Summing up the substantial government intervention in the US economy, Block (2008) has argued that 
despite the wealth of available evidence, the "developmental state" remains concealed from the public because 
the two major political blocks are uniform in their support for this state of affairs, and articulate their conflicts 
over issues that separate them. 
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colonial expansion depended on, and these nations' domestic economies grew in conjunction 
with slave labor, facilitated thanks to a deregulated global trade in slaves (Adelman 2006). 
More recently, historian Gerald Horne (2014) has argued that in the case of Britain's 
American colonies, the economy's dependence on slave labor was such that it initiated the 
revolt of 1776. The founding of the American Republic as an independent state was 
motivated, in large part by the US merchant class's irritation with what they regarded as 
British attempts at regulating and abolishing slave trade. The US settler elite realized that 
there was more to gain from ending religious conflict imported from Europe, and uniting the 
white merchant elite behind the consolidation of the slave economy. 
These historians propose that the economic boom based on the global trade in the most 
sought after commodities of the 18th and 19th centuries was brought about not by 
entrepreneurial ingenuity but a system of production built on slavery. Before the Industrial 
Revolution, this system relied on sugar; later, the Industrial Revolution gave an impetus to 
cotton trade, and the epicenter of factory production in the Western world became the textile 
industry (Grandin 2014). The emergence of cotton as the most important commodity of global 
trade in the first half of the 19th century testifies to the endurance of institutionalized slavery: 
rather than a relic from the pre-industrial past, it became, if anything, more important to all 
rapidly industrializing economies (Baptist 2014). 
The linkages between slavery and capitalist transformation do not fit the established 
understanding in abstract economic theorizing. While neoclassical currents typically do not 
discuss the issue, slavery does get attention in institutional economics. An influential analysis 
is presented by Acemoğlu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) who explain colonialism's enduring 
negative impact on the economies of the former colonies by differences in "white settler 
mortality". In regions (loosely corresponding to the tropics) where they encountered a climate 
that they had difficulties adapting to, white settlers established fewer settlements and were 
present in much smaller numbers than in temperate climates where they did not have to face 
such hardships. Being fewer in number under the tropics, and finding manual work 
unbearable, they employed slave labor to extract natural resources. Lower absolute number 
and density of white settlers, as well as reliance on forced labor meant that they failed to 
import the "inclusive institutions" of Western culture. The result was that countries in the 
tropics were left with a legacy of "labor-repressive" institutions, which explains much of their 
later failure to modernize.  
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This variant of institutional analysis is perfectly compatible with neoclassical growth 
theory in that the basic formula of growth remains intact: market forces, when unhindered 
thanks to inclusive institutions will drive an economy toward innovation and hence 
expansion. Acemoğlu and his coauthors treat slavery as a merely incidental, "climatically" 
imposed (or at least necessitated) arrangement, not as an inherent feature of early capitalist 
development. By any standards, Southern Brazil, Argentina, the Southern United States 
hardly classify as "tropics" where white settlers had to have recourse to "non-inclusive" labor 
practices ― yet, these countries were powerhouses of slave labor, fully integrated into the 
global economy. Speaking of Western colonial powers in a global context, the "inclusivity" of 
their political institutions is a myth: it is impossible to separate their domestic political and 
economic arrangements from the repressive institutions put in place in the colonies. As these 
powers were making the transition between two paradigms of power concentration: feudal on 
the on hand, and corporate capitalist on the other, slavery was a natural development, 
triggered by fast-paced industrialization in the absence of countervailing power.80 
2.3. Values as independent variables in models of macroeconomic outcomes 
The analysis presented in this section engages with GIL's models of culturally induced 
growth. The model specification is informed by the insights from the heterodox accounts and 
the criticism of GIL's models reviewed in the previous section. The regressions of economic 
growth and per capita GDP use the same structural variables as in GIL's analysis plus a 
number of factors related to historical context and cultural values. The Achievement 
Motivation Index and the measure of postmaterialism have been replaced by measures of 
cultural values that satisfy configural equivalence at the country level. This does not mean 
that the latter indicators measure entirely different things: Inglehart's measure of achievement 
motivation is related to the importance of individual autonomy, an orientation captured by the 
authoritarianism score. 
                     
80 The profound affinity between colonialism and early capitalist development explains the ambiguity in 
Marx's own approach to the issue. On the one hand, he condemned colonialism as immoral, an extreme form of 
repression, that was nevertheless a necessary condition for capitalist transition. On the other hand, he identified 
in it a progressive element, related to the transfer of "civilization", and also a necessary stage on the road toward 
capitalism's autodestruction (Merle 2003). 
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Since in the case of the religiosity and authoritarianism constructs presented in 
Chapter 1, configural equivalence is not achieved for the majority of countries outside 
Europe, the models using these as independent variables are unavoidably Eurocentric. While 
this is an inconvenience, it is not exceptional: most of the 25 countries included in GIL's 
models belong in the Western world. In contrast, these alternative models use data from 45 
countries. Nonetheless, to compensate for this limitation, I also discuss models using the three 
value constructs based on the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, presented in Chapter 1), whose 
equivalence is verified at the country level (Schwartz 1994, 2006).81 This gives a total of four 
analyses: two sets, respectively, for economic growth and per capita GDP as dependent 
variables. The regressions using the religiosity and authoritarianism scores (45 countries) are 
referred to as Partial, those with Schwartz's values (66 and 65 countries) as Expanded Sets. 
Each set includes six models. 
  
                     
81 An extension of this analysis would include cross-country regressions of individual values on a number 
of country-level and individual variables. Coefficients for per capita GDP as an independent variable would be 
informative of the impact of country differences in total output on individual values. A requirement for these 
multilevel models is metric equivalence of the latent constructs (that is, invariant units of measurement at the 
individual level). With regard to authoritarianism and religiosity, this is achieved for significantly fewer 
countries than in the case of structural equivalence at the country level. (Results of these tests are not included in 
this study.) In the case of the Schwartz value constructs, a seven-instrument variant of the ESS values scale 
(using a 21-item battery administered by the European Social Survey) has been found to achieve metric 
invariance in 20 countries (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008). Therefore, the ESS values scale can be used 
in cross-country multilevel models where ― the individual observations being nested in countries ― scalar 
equivalence at the individual level is not a requirement. However, given the purpose of this study, this low 





Table 10 (Partial Set, p. 82) and Table 11 (Expanded Set, p. 83) present results from 
regressions of economic growth using these two sets of value constructs as independent 
variables. The dependent variable is the mean rate of per capita GDP growth between 1996 
and 2013. The choice of this 18-year period stems from the constraints related to time-series: 
most of the value scores in both analyses (using the World Values Survey and the Schwartz 
Values Survey) come from surveys conducted, for the most part, during the 1990s. A rule of 
thumb is that the independent variables (including the value instruments) should not postdate 
the dependent variable ― in this case output growth and per capita GDP. In the case of GIL's 
analysis, this is bypassed, since their value scores (both the Postmaterialism and the 
Achievement Motivation Indices) come from the early 1990s wave of the WVS, whereas their 
dependent variable is mean per capita GDP growth between 1960 and 89. On the other hand, 
as short-term fluctuations in the rates of economic growth preclude meaningful comparisons, 
the strategy to consider long periods is understandable. 
Keeping to the above rule, the period considered for this analysis is shorter than it is in 
the case of GIL's study (18 years, as opposed to 30). An alternative solution would be to 
adjust the timeframe according to the exact survey year for each country: this would extend 
the reference period for output growth in the case of countries with the earliest available and 
comparable scores. Given that for religiosity and authoritarianism, the earliest measures come 
from the early 1980s, this would mean using thirty-year averages for some countries. 
However, doing so would mean that one would compare mean rates of growth that 
correspond to different stages of the global economy. In this study, there is no theoretical 
rationale for comparing the growth rate of Britain between 1981 and 2013 with that of Russia 
between 1995 and 2013. This calls for a standard timeframe with regard to the dependent 
variable.82 The year of 1996 is chosen as the most sensible compromise: most of the country 
                     
82 In many respects, the selection of the end year is a no less difficult task. A timeframe running through 
2013 will result in different growth rates for the countries most affected by the late 2000s global financial crisis 
than what would be obtained using a shorter period ― for example, with 2008 as the last year. However, this is 
not necessarily a concern: if countries differ with regard to the repercussions of crises on their respective 
economies, then it is reasonable that the dependent variable capture these differences. After all, the different 
exposure of national economies to such crises is part of their performance. On the other hand, one could argue 
that in the case of post-communist countries, the collapse of their national economies during the early 1990s will 
make it difficult to draw sensible conclusions on the way various independent variables impact growth rates 
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scores from the WVS are from surveys conducted between 1990 and 1996; Schwartz's scores 
are from surveys conducted in the mid-1990s. For the Partial Set, no value score anterior to 
1990 was considered,83 whereas for the few countries whose value scores are from later years, 
the maximum time-lag is seven years. This means that even in these cases, the greater part of 
the period considered for the dependent variable was ahead of the survey.84 
As in GIL's study, the independent variables in the reference model include per capita 
GDP at the beginning of the period, enrollment in primary and secondary education, and the 
ratio of private plus public domestic investment. A fifth variable measuring income inequality 
is also added to this model.85 The second model includes only values, to which the third 
model adds historical factors. Subsequent models differ in the combination of independent 
variables for which significant effects have been found. This discussion compares the relevant 
models from the Partial and the Expanded Sets.86 
  
                                                                
across all countries. This is a more justifiable concern: as opposed to the late 2000s global crisis, the collapse of 
communism was a "less universal" phenomenon. It is partly for this reason that growth rates prior to 1996 are 
excluded from the dependent variable. Nonetheless, it is impossible to settle on a period in which the dependent 
variable is not impacted by conjunctures specific to national history. 
83 The exclusion of the scores from the 1980s does not mean a reduction in the number of countries 
selected for the analysis, because the countries in question have invariant constructs also from later surveys. 
84 These limitations are found in most cross-cultural surveys, the WVS being no exception. The wider the 
geographical scope, the less likely that structurally equivalent country indicators will fall within the same short 
timeframe. 
85 In view of the role of the military in technological innovation, one could wonder why these models of 
growth do not include a measure of military expenditure. The answer is that the growth-inducing impact (the 
"spinoff", in the terminology used by Ruttan and Mazzucato) of military R&D operates over the very long run. 
(For example, the funding for ARPANET, the US defense project initiated in the late 1960s leading to the 
creation of the Internet had not had a large-scale commercial impact until the implementation of the World Wide 
Web in the early 1990s.) The data available from the World Bank tracks military expenditure starting from 1996 
― a too narrow time frame to measure the effect of military spending on economic growth. Also, the data do not 
distinguish between spending on military R&D and other military-related purposes. As a result, high military 
expenditure relative to the GDP might conceal very different activities: large-scale procurement of existing 
technologies in the case of nations at or in preparation for war, and countries modernizing their military 
infrastructure, investment in R&D of basic technologies, etc. Including the absolute value (in per capita dollars) 
of military expenditure as independent variable would be close to tautological, since this variable is also a proxy 
for GDP: rich countries spend more on their military. 




Model Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 11.34** 2.80** 2.59** 5.25* -1.22 1.80** 
 (2.44) (.24) (.23) (2.19) (.80) (.34) 
Per capita GDP in 1996 (logged) -1.11**   -.67*   
 (.16)   (.26)   
Primary education (1970-96) -.03      
 (.02)      
Secondary education (1970-96) .02   .02* .03**  
 (.01)   (.01) (.01)  
Investment (1970-2011) .14**   .07   
 (.05)   (.05)   
Change in income inequality 
(1987-2006) 
-.02      
(.06)      
Former colonial power, 20th century   -1.69** -.88 -1.42** -1.44** 
   (.38) (.45) (.35) (.41) 
Former colony, 20th century   -2.40* -1.0   
   (.94) (1.0)   
Authoritarian regime (post-1945)     1.48** 1.11** 
     (.33) (.38) 
Political violence 
(1980 to survey year) 
  1.04** .72** 1.16** .98** 
  (.19) (.21) (.14) (.15) 
Values from 
ecological MCA 
Religiosity  .01     
  (.49)     
Authoritarianism  2.44** 1.19** .10   
  (.50) (.41) (.59)   
              
R2 Adjusted .69 .33 .68 .74 .74 .64 
SEE 1.04 1.26 1.05 1.0 1.0 1.08 
Durbin-Watson 1.95† 1.82† 1.86† 1.92† 1.68† 1.83† 
Jarque-Bera (χ2(2)) 4.52 14.61** 8.57* 2.58 7.04* 11.09** 
White (χ2(×)) 36.66* 3.17 22.85 36.39 19.51 16.76 
×df (20) (5) (14) (35) (14) (9) 
Table 10 OLS estimation of mean rate of per capita economic growth (1996-2013) with authoritarianism and 
religiosity 
(Partial Set) 
Note: Dependent variable is mean rate of per capita economic growth, 1996-2013. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the 
models in Appendix 1, p. 141 for the definition of the indicators. Best performing model in bold fonts. 
N is 45 for all models. Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 





Model Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 3.88** 6.04** 4.81** 3.58* -1.50* 6.16** 
 (1.17) (.86) (.76) (1.36) (0.72) (.82) 
Per capita GDP in 1996 (logged) -.69**   -.55**  -.44** 
 (.15)   (.17)  (.09) 
Primary education (1970-96) .0      
 (.01)      
Secondary education (1970-96) .02*   .02*   
 (.01)   (.01)   
Investment (1970-2011) .14**   .12** 0.14**  
 (.03)   (.03) (0.03)  
Change in income inequality 
(1987-2006) 
.08*   .06 0.09** .15** 
(.03)   (.03) (0.03) (.03) 
Former colonial power, 20th century   -1.04* -.44   
   (.41) (.34)   
Former colony, 20th century   -.94* -.42   
   (.39) (.39)   
Authoritarian regime (post-1945)     0.67*  
     (0.30)  
Political violence 
(1980 to survey year) 
  .40** .30** 0.41**  






 -.003     
 (.25)     
Egalitarianism 
vs. hierarchy 
 -1.52** -.93** -.15   
 (.38) (.29) (.28)   
Harmony vs. 
mastery 
 .57     
 (.51)     
              
R2 Adjusted .58 .27 .39 .62 0.54 .42 
SEE 1.0 1.15 1.10 .97 1.02 1.09 
Durbin-Watson 1.87† 1.93† 2.04† 2.08† 2.22† 1.71† 
Jarque-Bera (χ2(2)) 13.63** 15.31** 11.16** 11.14** 12.26** 19.83** 
White (χ2(×)) 45.19** 26.03** 40.92** 53.19 41.91** 8.50 
×df (20) (9) (14) (41) (14) (5) 
Table 11 OLS estimation of mean rate of per capita economic growth (1996-2013) with Schwartz's three 
ecological values 
(Expanded Set) 
Note: Dependent variable is mean rate of per capita economic growth, 1996-2013. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the 
models in Appendix 1, p. 141 for the definition of the indicators. Best performing model in bold fonts. 
N is 66 for all models. Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 




As in GIL's models, per capita GDP at the beginning of the period (1996) is negatively 
correlated with economic growth in both sets of regressions.87 This means that the economy 
in poorer countries has grown at significantly higher rates than in rich countries. Taking into 
account the significant positive correlation of investment, this finding seems to corroborate 
the conditional convergence hypothesis. The positive effect of change in inequality in the 
Expanded Set ― poorer societies having a more unequal distribution of income ― points in 
the same direction. However, the diagnostic tests88 indicate that the residuals in both reference 
models are heteroskedastic, and, in the case of the Partial model, not normally distributed. 
These models therefore have a bad fit and should not be retained for drawing conclusions. 
In Model 2, with only values as independent variables, the explained variance in both 
sets falls to about half its value in the reference model ― yet around 30%, it is still large. 
Moreover, the coefficients across the Partial ad Expanded Sets point to the same underlying 
phenomenon. Recall from Chapter 1 that the authoritarianism construct is negatively 
correlated with Schwartz's measures of autonomy versus embeddedness and egalitarianism 
versus hierarchy. (In other words, the two letter constructs are related to different aspects of 
authoritarianism. 89) In Model 2 of the Partial Set, authoritarianism has a strong positive 
correlation with economic growth. This means that the economy in countries with more 
authoritarian populations has grown at higher rates during the observation period than it has in 
countries with less authoritarian populations. Given that in the Partial Set of 45 countries, 
nations having recently transitioned from authoritarian to democratic regimes constitute a 
higher portion than in the Expanded Set of 66 countries, this could simply suggest that 
recently democratized nations tend to grow at faster rates. However, the negative coefficient 
of egalitarianism versus hierarchy in the Expanded model points to a general rule (at least for 
the 18-year period examined): the countries with more authoritarian populations indeed have 
higher rates of per capita GDP growth. 
This finding involves two interpretations. On the one hand, since authoritarianism is 
also a proxy for national affluence, it may be a confirmation of conditional convergence: 
poorer economies grow at a faster rate. On the other hand, it can indicate problems with 
endogenous growth theory: the culturalist reinterpretation of neoclassical theory posits a 
positive relationship between self-actualization, an anti-authoritarian outlook and innovation 
                     
87 The countries included in the regressions are shown in Table 21 Appendix 1, p. 151. 
88 See Note A1.3.2. Diagnostic tests in Appendix 1, p. 142 for these measures. 
89 See Table 6 in Chapter 1. 
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― and hence economic growth. Obviously, the timeframe in this study may not be sufficient 
to adequately test the latter proposition, and it can be that over shorter periods, the effects of 
conditional convergence are more important than are those of endogenous growth. (The 
positive correlation between achievement motivation ― an anti-authoritarian value ― in 
GIL's models pertains to mean rates of growth measured over 30 years.) Before drawing any 
conclusion, however, notice that religiosity in the Partial Set, and autonomy versus 
embeddedness, and harmony versus mastery in the Expanded Set have not been found to be 
significant predictors of economic growth. This is an important finding, and underscores the 
arguments against measures conflating authoritarianism with religiosity, reviewed in detail in 
the previous chapter.90 Also, Model 2 performs better than the previous ones across both sets 
― but the residuals are still heteroskedastic in the case of the Expanded Set. 
The subsequent models provide further insight into this relationship. As the factors 
related to historical context enter the model (Model 3 in both sets), the still significant effects 
of authoritarianism and egalitarianism versus hierarchy are substantially reduced. This is 
because former colonial status and exposure to political violence explain away much of the 
relationship between authoritarianism and economic growth. 91  The economy in former 
colonies and in societies that have undergone periods marked by violence in the last decades 
of the 20th century has grown at higher rates. As these nations happen to be poorer, this is 
another indication of convergence. 
With regard to the linkage between economic growth and authoritarianism, Inglehart's 
later study on the processes of political emancipation includes a proposition that appears to be 
at odds with the thesis examined here: 
 
"(E)arly industrialization did not bring a pronounced shift toward self-expression 
values. Indeed, it seems likely that the emphasis on individual autonomy underlying 
self-expression values was more widespread in some preindustrial societies than in 
industrial society. Industrialization is linked with increasing emphasis on economic 
                     
90 The insignificant correlations between the latter two Schwartz constructs and growth rates are also 
consistent with religiosity's negative correlation with autonomy versus embeddedness and harmony versus 
mastery (Chapter 1, Table 6). 
91  Other models in the same sets included a measure of democracy as independent variables. Their 
coefficients are not reported here because democracy has not been found to be a significant predictor of 
economic growth in any of these models. Democracy becomes a significant predictor in the models of per capita 
GDP (see next section). 
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accumulation and economic growth ― and the mass-production assembly line requires 
conformity and discipline, rather than individual creativity and self-expression." 
(Inglehart-Welzel 2005: 34).  
 
The contradiction could be resolved by pointing out that GIL's 1996 studies focused on 
mainly already industrialized countries, whereas the above argument relates to societies in the 
"take-off" phase (Rostow 1959) where authoritarian values are believed to bestow a 
competitive advantage. But the 1996 studies make it clear that they propose a general model 
of endogenous growth. Nevertheless, Inglehart's later proposition could still find support in 
the significant correlations between growth rates and the measures of authoritarianism across 
both sets. After all, the nations that were still in the early phase of industrialization at the turn 
of the century had obviously grown at higher rates. 
However, in both sets, the remaining variance of the dependent variable related to 
values is explained away in Model 4 in both sets, where the macroeconomic indicators are 
brought back in. Per capita GDP at the beginning of the period, secondary education and 
political violence retain their significant impacts. The coefficient of authoritarianism and 
autonomy versus embeddedness is further reduced and becomes insignificant. Crucially, this 
is the first model that passes all diagnostic tests in the Expanded Set (Table 11), where values 
are measured by Schwartz's scales. Compared with that, the removal of insignificant 
predictors from Model 4 and the variables responsible for bad fit from Model 5 reduces the 
explained variance and leads to a worse fit in Model 6. 
In the Partial Set (Table 10), Model 5 emerges as superior based on the diagnostics,92 
and it also has the highest explained variance. Introducing a variable accounting for 
authoritarian regimes after 1945 while dropping initial per capita GDP, the explained variance 
does not decrease and the model becomes more straightforward. Poorer countries have 
achieved higher rates of economic growth, tend to have more authoritarian publics and are 
more likely to have lived under authoritarian regimes after 1945. Political violence remains a 
significant predictor in both sets. 
Let us briefly sum up how the models presented in this section compare with GIL's 
regressions of economic growth. Their strengths include the wider geographical coverage, the 
structurally equivalent measures of cultural values, the value scores that in the majority of 
                     
92 Model 4 in the Expanded Set and Model 5 in the Partial Set have also the lowest squared residual 
variance or standard error of measurement (SEE) in both sets, another indication of best fit. 
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cases predate the dependent variable (and are anterior to most of the growth period considered 
where they come from surveys after 1996), and the historical factors among the independent 
variables. Their weakness has to do with the shorter timeframe (18 versus 30 years): average 
growth rates over shorter periods are more subject to periodic fluctuations. Nonetheless, a 
near 2-decade timescale is not too narrow, and given the options between a longer timescale 
and a more realistic chronological sequence of the independent and dependent variables, the 
model specification is defensible. In sum, with a specification using contextual factors and 
more appropriate indicators of culture, we have not found a significant effect of values on 
economic growth rates. 
2.3.2. Per capita GDP 
Table 12 (Partial Set, p. 89) Table 13 and (Expanded Set, p. 90) show results from 
regressions of per capita GDP. Because GIL's models do not include per capita GDP as 
dependent variable, these models merely complement the models of per capita GDP growth. 
Most of the independent variables from the previous set have been preserved, although 
with some modifications required by the change in the dependent variable. Income inequality 
now corresponds to the mean value of the Gini coefficient between 1997 and 2006, and 
political violence is the average for the period 1980-2008. Exposure to authoritarian regime is 
replaced by an indicator of democracy for the period 1990-2008; the mean ratio of private 
plus public domestic investment by expenditure on research and development relative to the 
GDP.93 Finally, the models do not include baseline per capita GDP, since such an independent 
variable would pick up most of the variance and the models would become tautological. 
The interpretation is made easier in that the all models across the two sets pass all the 
diagnostic tests. Not surprisingly, R&D expenditure is a significant predictor of per capita 
GDP in most models.94 The predictive power of values is stronger in both sets: in the "values 
only" Model 2, both religiosity and authoritarianism in the Partial Set, and two of the three 
Schwartz instruments (autonomy, in addition to egalitarianism) in the Expanded Set have 
significant coefficients. Compared with the growth models, the correlations with 
authoritarianism and autonomy are now negative: higher per capita GDP figures are related to 
                     
93 The replaced variables have not been found to be significant predictors in any of these models.  
94 It would be difficult to interpret this finding as evidence of the short-term growth-inducing effect of 
R&D. R&D expenditure is used because the effect of the ratio of investment on per capita GDP is not 
significant. Rich nations tend to spend a higher percentage of their GDP on R&D. 
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less authoritarian, more autonomous publics. (Authoritarianism positively correlated with per 
capita GDP growth because the economy in poorer countries has grown at higher rates.) The 
contextual factors (Model 3) are also significantly correlated with the dependent variable. 
They also explain away the effect of religiosity and egalitarianism (Model 4), while 
authoritarianism and autonomy retain their significant, albeit reduced impacts.95 The negative 
coefficients of income inequality across both sets confirm the recent findings by Acemoğlu 
and Robinson (2012) and Piketty (2013) that high rates of inequality are a drag on long-term 
growth. 
An important difference with the growth models is that authoritarianism and autonomy 
retain their predictive power across all models in both sets ― that is, even when the variables 
with significant coefficients from Model 1 are reintroduced in Model 5. Also instructive is the 
change in explained variance when the value measure is dropped in Model 6: it is important 
(15%) in the Partial Set but less pronounced in the Expanded Set (3%). (The latter matters 
more because of its wider geographical coverage.) A good part of the variance explained by 
Schwartz's autonomy instrument in Model 5 is picked up by R&D expenditure, democracy, 
and political violence in Model 6. The positive correlation with levels of democracy across 
the Expanded Set, together with the small decrease in explained variance with the dropping of 
the autonomy variable in Model 6 is a strong indication that it is political arrangements, not 
cultural values that are decisive regarding differences in domestic output. Discussing the 
discrepancies between citizens' cultural values and forms of governance in his later writings, 
Inglehart admits such macro effects with regard to government accountability, but he does not 
consider this possibility for the explanation of economic development.96 
  
                     
95 These results again confirm that Schwartz's autonomy and egalitarianism scales are related to different 
aspects of authoritarianism. 
96 "Relatively widespread self-expression values in such countries as Chile, South Korea, and Hungary 
could not initiate regime changes toward more democracy as long as these countries’ authoritarian regimes 
obtained financial, military, and political support from one of the two superpowers." (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 




Model Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 5.96** 9.40** 9.47** 9.69** 9.42** 9.47** 
 (1.48) (.10) (.51) (.46) (.47) (.51) 
Primary education (1970-96) .02      
 (.01)      
Secondary education (1970-96) .01      
 (.01)      
R&D expenditure, % of GDP .93**    .23  
(1996-2011) (.15)    (.13)  
Income inequality (1987-2006)   -.03* -.02* -.02* -.03* 
   (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Former colonial power, 20th century   .64* .57** .49** .64* 
   (.24) (.17) (.17) (.24) 
Democracy (1990-2008)   .13** .08** .07** .13** 
   (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) 
Political violence  (1980-2008)   -.46** -.23* -.25** -.46** 




Religiosity  -.63**  -.18   
  (.21)  (.19)   
Authorita-
rianism 
 -1.93**  -1.21** -.95**  
 (.22)  (.19) (.23)  
              
R2 Adjusted .58 .66 .68 .83 .84 .68 
SEE .87 .83 .82 .70 .69 .82 
Durbin-Watson 2.06† 2.23† 1.75† 2.13† 2.17† 1.75† 
Jarque-Bera (χ2(2)) 14.08** 29.51** 19.91** 18.72** 15.49** 19.91** 
White (χ2(×)) 16.09 7.85 20.83 24.31 27.32 20.83 
×df (9) (5) (14) (27) (27) (14) 
Table 12 OLS estimation of logged per capita GDP (2013) with authoritarianism and religiosity 
(Partial Set) 
Note: Dependent variable is logged per capita GDP, 2013. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 1, p. 141 
for the definition of the indicators. Best performing models in bold fonts. 
N is 45 for all models. Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 





Model Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 4.86** 7.58** 9.22** 8.55** 7.40** 6.68** 
 (.51) (.45) (.47) (.57) (.31) (.26) 
Primary education (1970-96) .02**      
 (.01)      
Secondary education (1970-96) .02**    .01** .02** 
 (.0)    (.0) (.0) 
R&D expenditure, % of GDP .59**    .29** .48** 
(1996-2011) (.11)    (.11) (.10) 
Income inequality (1987-2006)   -.03** -.01   
   (.01) (.01)   
Former colonial power, 20th century   .73** .17   
   (.27) (.24)   
Democracy (1990-2008)   .16** .06* .06* .09** 
   (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
Political violence  (1980-2008)   -.31** -.19* -.16* -.19* 






 1.38**  1.09** .65**  
 (.14)  (.18) (.18)  
Egalitarianism 
vs. hierarchy 
 .53**  .10   
 (.20)  (.18)   
Harmony vs. 
mastery 
 -.45     
 (.27)     
              
R2 Adjusted .77 .76 .65 .78 .84 .81 
SEE .82 .83 .91 .81 .75 .79 
Durbin-Watson 1.94† 1.75† 1.83† 1.72† 1.61† 1.82† 
Jarque-Bera (χ2(2)) 19.88** 26.04** 30.76** 30.54** 22.38** 26.36** 
White (χ2(×)) 7.79 7.39 13.79 24.29 17.29 10.38 
×df (9) (9) (14) (27) (20) (14) 
Table 13 OLS estimation of logged per capita GDP (2013) with Schwartz's three ecological values 
(Expanded Set) 
Note: Dependent variable is logged per capita GDP, 2013. Refer to Note A1.3.1. Variables used in the models in Appendix 1, p. 141 
for the definition of the indicators.  Best performing models in bold fonts. 
N is 65 for all models. Unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 




A recurrent argument in culturalist theories of economic growth (e.g., Putnam (1993)) is 
that the cultural heritage of authoritarian power structures has a direct negative impact on 
long-term growth, therefore explains persisting differences in per capita output. Before 
interpreting the small residual effect of a variable related to authoritarianism on levels of per 
capita GDP as evidence of the plausibility of this argument (compatible with endogenous 
growth theory), we have to consider another possibility. Controlling for contextual factors, 
this might be attributable to a reverse effect ― that is, at more advanced stages of economic 
development, attitudes required for coping with the challenges of postindustrial society give 
rise to attitudes that are at odds with the authoritarian mindset. This explanation is in line with 
the conclusions of the earliest criticisms of Inglehart's work, most importantly by Flanagan 
(1982a, 1982b, reviewed in Chapter 1). It also endorses Hirschman's observation that "the 
many attributes alleged to be preconditions of industrialization could be generated on the job 
[…] by certain characteristics of the industrialization process" (1984: 99).97 Moreover, it is 
also compatible with the "minimalist" version of the postmaterialism thesis, which restricts 
the "detraditionalizng" effect of economic growth to a decrease in authoritarianism. In this 
respect, the finding that religiosity (like its "Schwartz-correlate", embeddedness) loses its 
predictive power in models of per capita GDP when contextual effects are controlled for is 
significant: increasing national affluence is not a driver of secularization. It can be a "driver" 
― or at least correspond to a de-emphasis ― of authoritarian values. However, evidence 
from the study presented in the previous chapter suggests that causation in the opposite 
direction ― that is, reversion to authoritarian values in times of economic downturns, as 
proposed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) ― is not likely, at least not over short periods. 
2.4. Conclusion 
In his review of Orientalism, B. Turner points out that "the main focus of criticism must 
[…] be couched at a more theoretical level by demonstrating the incoherence of the paradigm 
which generates a series of false problems about bourgeois entrepreneurship, […] 
spontaneous capitalist development and stationary societies" (1978: 394). Inglehart's study of 
                     
97 Flanagan's finding from the early 1980s that rapid economic growth in East Asia has been conducive to 
a shift away from traditional values has found recent empirical support (Chee-Beng 2011). In particular, 
advertising efforts to increase household consumption in line with corporate growth imperatives have been 
proposed as instrumental in mediating this effect (Ciochetto 2011).  
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the relationship between cultural values and economic growth constitutes an empirical 
offshoot of this paradigm. For this reason, it is an important reference for the scholarship 
critically engaging with culturalist approaches to the study of macroeconomic phenomena. 
This chapter has attempted to give a theoretical overview, augmented with an empirical 
demonstration. 
Because "(t)he durability of neoclassical economics is in its ability to absorb all 
challenges to its organizational hegemony" (Finlayson et al. 2005: 523), a significant effort in 
the discursive space of late capitalism goes into accommodating criticism of neoclassical 
economics. These efforts have gained momentum as the policies enacted starting with the 
1970s and justified with reference to the dominant school in economics have drawn 
significant opposition. However, disagreements between actual government policies and the 
dominant representations of market mechanisms will be reconciled by improvements to the 
theory that do not constitute a departure from those representations. Therefore, while attempts 
at bringing cultural variables into endogenous growth models recognize that attitudes, 
motivations, consumer preferences, etc. are not exogenous to the investigation, the update 
proposed is fully compatible with the original presuppositions. This is because the cultural 
update leaves intact the assumption of outcomes conditional on endowments that economic 
actors bring to the market. If not all actors are fully or equally rational, then ― within the 
bounds of the proposed modifications ― this means that the "returns to their investments" 
individually or collectively will reflect those differences. These differences, although 
expressed in cultural terms, boil down to natural differences because culture is a variable left 
unexplained. 
The culturalist reframing of endogenous growth theory does not depart from the 
standard neoclassical assumptions of utility-maximizing individuals engaged in market 
competition.98 While the universalistic definition of "utility" and "rationality" does not hold in 
                     
98 In a review of culturalist schools' efforts to incorporate values in endogenous growth theory, Maseland 
(2005) writes that "(m)erely filling in the preferences within the neoclassical model does not amount to any 
theoretical insights, nor does it make clear what would be the difference between culture and other sources of 
preference, so that to speak of 'culture' instead of 'preference' has no genuine added value. […] Only when 
combined with an elaborate theory about the nature, emergence and development of cultural preferences, such 
work could fundamentally contribute to our understanding of the economy. Unfortunately, such a theory is 
hardly available in the data-sets of Hofstede, Inglehart, or Schwartz underlying most of this work. That is not to 
say that this work is entirely devoid of theory; but a theory about the origins and development of cultural values 
is absent." (7, emphasis added). 
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the case of GIL's updated endogenous growth model incorporating cultural variables, the two 
approaches are similar in their methodological individualism whereby both neglect contextual 
factors. Values enter the endogenous growth model as "isolated", that is, without being 
explained, and are considered as mere emphases impacting the importance of achievement. 
As a result, the assumption of micro-to-macro causation, macro outcomes resulting from 
simple aggregation of atomized individual found in neoclassical economy remains 
unchallenged. 
Against these assumptions, the various historical processes reviewed in this chapter 
indicate that the economy in major industrial powers has been growing at a steady rate despite 
the absence of private investment in basic technological innovation within a market 
framework responding to existing consumer demand. If by "market framework" is meant a 
variety of bottom-up processes driven by autonomous consumer demand, then the empirical 
evidence provides a refutation. Forced labor and large-scale piracy at the onset of 
industrialization; R&D dependent on public funding, and a patent regime designed to secure 
monopoly profits earned thanks to taxpayer money at later stages; protectionist trade policies 
and militarism throughout ― the sources of economic growth are hardly the kind of 
innovation effort implied in endogenous growth theory. While this latter does allow for 
patenting (a form of "monopoly"), but only to the extent of compensating for the firm's risk 
taking effort in "devot[ing] resources to invent new products" (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 
285). As we have seen however, the risk taking implicated in the processes conducive to 
innovation in basic technologies and growth occurs mostly beyond the firm's reach. Left to its 
own devices, the firm cannot provide the resources required for technological breakthroughs. 
Rather than standing as empirical evidence of the plausibility of endogenous growth theory, 
the processes sustaining technological innovation are related to state capitalism, market 
oligopolies, and rent-seeking. In other words, the "free market" is neither a necessary 
condition, nor a major driver of technological innovation and economic growth. 
This is an important point because the specification problems with regard to GIL's 
model include the handling of responses to a question on savings behavior as a proxy for 
corporate and government savings without presenting empirical evidence. Even if such a 
linkage could be established, the various processes stimulating the economy to grow indicate 
that growth is dependent on debt creation rater than savings. In particular, public investment 
in basic technological innovation, a costly process with no marketable output in sight during a 
long period of gestation is impossible without high levels of public debt. Also contributing to 
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debt creation is the actual patent regime in the United States where the costs of R&D are 
borne by the public but the rewards of patent protection are collected by corporate interests 
with political clout. From the "savings" perspective underpinning GIL's endogenous growth 
model, this is a highly inefficient arrangement ― nonetheless, the economy keeps growing 
under this paradigm. 
The empirical models of growth and per capita GDP incorporating the religiosity and 
authoritarianism constructs as well as Schwartz's value scales lend support to the criticism of 
GIL's proposed update to the endogenous growth model. In models of growth rates, the 
predictive power of values is progressively reduced to zero when controlling for contextual 
variables. With per capita GDP as dependent variable, a modest correlation with 
authoritarianism/autonomy persists even after controlling for contextual factors. However, 
this might be an indication of the cultural change triggered by the transformation related to 
economic growth. These results corroborate the study by Edwards and Patterson (2009) 
which, addressing the problem of endogeneity using more robust tests, have found that 
economic variables encompass (cannot be separated from) those representing culture. 
The theoretical implication following from these (as well as all) growth models is a 
caution against generalization. Given the complexity of the mechanisms at work and the 
scarcity of data over long periods, it is difficult to identify a universal pattern of growth by 
relying on correlations alone. Findings from any regression per se are not evidence of 
causation in any hypothesized direction ― nor is explanation the exclusivity of regression. It 
does not follow from the empirical growth models discussed in this chapter that exposure to 
authoritarian regimes or political violence is a necessary condition to achieve high rates of 
economic growth. As significant predictors, these factors merely indicate that between 1996 
and 2013, the economy has grown faster in poorer countries. Nevertheless, the fact that 
militarism is the primary source of technological innovation means that this avenue of 
funding is contingent on the political efforts to justify high military expenditure in response to 
armed conflicts or credible threats thereof.99 But the models discussed here do not link the 
political violence produced beyond national boundaries with the processes of R&D and output 
                     
99 "The first question is, can the private sector be relied on as a source of major new general-purpose 
technologies? The quick response is that it cannot! […] Each of the general-purpose technologies that I have 
reviewed have required several decades of public support, primarily in the form of military R&D and defense or 




growth.100 Similarly, a significant residual (but slight additional) effect of variables capturing 
cultural values on growth, even in models with the best fit is not evidence of "culture making 
the difference" because this can also indicate that cultural change is a corollary of 
industrialization. 
Regressions, like all attempts at formalized explanation in the social sciences yield 
plausible inferences only when grounded in a solid historical account. The latter is remarkably 
absent in the culturalist reformulation of the endogenous growth theory presented by Inglehart 
and his collaborators. Placed within the context of the heterodox perspective, the findings 
presented in this study suggest that economic growth is not "driven" by cultural values. This 
proposition includes an important proviso: if by culture we mean the kind of "thing" implied 
by conventional wisdom: a reification of mental representations abstracted from their 
objective referents. The last chapter expands on this largely overlooked aspect of the research 
tradition followed in Inglehart's work. 
  
                     




3. Symbolic versus material forms of agency 
A longer version of the section titled "Weber versus substantialist reason" has been 
published in Volume 5, Issue 1 of Elpis in Hungarian under the title "Az elektív affinitás: a 
fogalom hanyagolásának okai és következményei" ["Overlooking Elective Affinity: Causes 
and Consequences"] (Lakatos 2011). Copyright for this part is held by the author. 
At a superficial level, it could seem that the two Inglehart theses on social change 
presented in Chapters 1 and 2 use two opposed lines of reasoning. The postmaterialism thesis 
and its later formulation conceive of value change as a corollary of economic growth and 
stress that cultural shifts stem from major changes in the material conditions of existence. In 
contrast, the attempt to update the endogenous growth model with a cultural variable is based 
on a proposition positing a reverse causation. In addition to the argumentation followed in 
these studies, later reengagements with the issue show that Inglehart has been grappling with 
the problem of directionality: 
 
"Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Daniel Bell have argued that 
socioeconomic development brings pervasive cultural changes. But cultural theorists 
from Max Weber to Samuel Huntington have claimed that cultural values have an 
enduring and autonomous influence on society. Paradoxically as it may seem, both 
schools are right." (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 48, emphasis added). 
 
"We believe that economics shapes culture and politics ― and vice versa. The causal 
linkages tend to be reciprocal. Political, economic, and cultural changes go together 
because societies without mutually supportive political, economic, and cultural systems 
are unlikely to survive for long: in the long run, the respective components adapt to 
each other or the system flounders." (Inglehart 1997: 15, emphasis in the original). 
 
These quotes make it clear that Inglehart's answer to the dilemma of causality with 
regard to the cultural or economic "origins" of social outcomes has been a cryptic "both". By 
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alluding to the posited reciprocity as paradoxical, he proposes an escape from the impasse that 
has the somewhat dialectical appearance of reconciling conflicting logics. In this chapter, I 
argue that this proposed resolution is mistaken (and even meaningless) on two counts. First, 
reciprocal effects can occur between entities that can be shown to exist in the first place. 
Therefore, in order to resolve the dilemma raised by Inglehart, one has to first demonstrate 
that the "respective components": the economy and culture (or, additionally, politics) indeed 
constitute discrete domains of social reality. An unfortunate but pervasive tendency in value 
research is to evade this discussion and reify these categories, which, at close inspection are 
merely analytical. Second, the postulate of reciprocal causality between these reified entities 
is not paradoxical at all: it stems from the substantialist vision of reality that postulates that 
self-contained substances exist and moreover constitute the primary focus of inquiry. 
Therefore, if economy and culture are indeed objectively delimited entities, it is reasonable to 
suppose that they interact, and that these interactions include impacts in both directions. As 
both Inglehart theses assessed in this study are built on an implicit adherence to this postulate, 
a critical assessment has to also dissect the underlying rationale. 
This chapter is intended as an overview of the major issues with the theses reviewed in 
the first two chapters. The first part outlines the substantialist reason from the perspective of 
field analysis, the alternative proposed to overcome the limitations of Inglehart's approach. 
Using Weber's concept of elective affinity, formulated in his Protestant ethic thesis as a guide, 
the second part examines the sociologically most pertinent aspect of the substantialist 
perspective: the distinction between cultural and objective conditions. It contrasts the complex 
argumentation in the PE thesis with its interpretation in some of the most influential 
references to his work, including Inglehart's. The third part organizes the insights from the 
earlier sections with reference to Bourdieu's studies on symbolic power. The fourth part 
applies the principles of field theory to the dilemmas facing practitioners of value research in 
connection with the value dimensions and the construct validity issues identified in Chapter 1. 
3.1. Substances versus relations 
The conventional distinction between realms of culture and economy corresponds to the 
opposition between subjective/symbolic and objective/material aspects of agency. This 
opposition is one of the most enduring legacies of Western civilization. At a most elementary 
level, it reflects thinking in terms of substances. Field theory ― the general framework of 
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relational sociology, the approach proposed in this chapter as an alternative to the research 
tradition followed by Inglehart represents a break with this thinking. The main differences 
between the approaches can be spelled out as follows. 
Substantialist reason focuses on entities and various properties attributed to them. 
Entities are represented as objectively limited, albeit not disconnected parts of reality. Applied 
to human behavior, they correspond to discrete units of observation such as individuals or 
groups of individuals ― but also autonomous domains of action. When such domains 
translate oppositions ― e.g., "culture" and "economy" ―, they constitute counterparts. In 
statistical formalization, the focus on entities means that the analysis privileges the variables. 
The fact that in the social sciences, including its substantialist currents, description and 
explanation are formulated in terms of individual or collective behavior is not incompatible 
with this feature. Depending on formulation, anything can be vested with the status of entity 
― collectivities as well as individuals. The variables refer to those basic properties of the 
entities that are decisive regarding the outcome (the dependent variable). The entities enter 
into relation via direct contact in a quasi-mechanical framework. To explain outcomes, the 
inquiry will isolate a set of properties (independent variables) which, acting as vectors, drive 
one set of entities into impacting others in a chain of successive contacts. Outcomes ― values 
of the dependent variables ― are represented as deductible and predictable from the 
properties of the interacting entities. 
Substantialist thinking has long been overcome in the natural sciences (Cassirer 1953; 
Hesse 1970). This is because modern physics and chemistry in particular owe their existence 
to a break with substantialist reason: disregarding relations and attributing substances to 
analytical categories is the hallmark of prescientific thinking. The focus on substances is a 
focus on sensations ― that is, an inventory of easily accessible qualities that transpire before 
the inquiry has even started. This one-sided preoccupation gives rise to a series of false 
problems. Surveying early inquiries into electricity, Bachelard (2002) shows that their 
standard assumption was that electricity is a substance ― as opposed to the scientific view, 
which regards electricity as a flow. Electricity ― the flow of electrons ― is a dynamic 
phenomenon involving a constant rearrangement of its "constitutive" elements within a field 
of force. But this dynamic character is not recognized by substantialist reason: for example, 
from the observation that dust sticks to a body charged with electricity, it will conclude that 
"electricity is glue" (ibid.: 109). Representing electricity as a flow requires an inconvenient 
break: it is easier to think of things as "self-contained", discrete entities, than as relational 
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phenomena lacking definite attributes, constantly evolving, and existing within the interaction 
of parts. Likewise, chemistry originates in the recognition that the properties of compounds 
do not derive from, and are thus unexplainable with reference to the properties of the 
constituting elements. Complex, interrelated arrangements, like compounds have emergent 
properties that result from relations, the chemical bonds between the parts. 
Proponents of field theory hold that substantialist thinking is still the dominant 
paradigm in the social sciences (Abbott 1988, 1992b; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992a, 1992b 
Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Martin 2003; Savage and Silva 2013). To 
situate current substantialist sociological approaches, Emirbayer (1997) refers to a typology 
by Dewey and Bentley (1949) distinguishing between self-action and inter-action as two 
subclasses of substantialist perspectives. Both consider entities as fixed and clearly delimited, 
and maintain the postulate of direct contact but their focus is different. In self-action, things 
act "under their own powers" (Emirbayer 1997: 283), while in inter-action, "the relevant 
action takes place among the entities themselves" (ibid.: 285, emphasis in the original), and it 
is the "variables [the attributes of the entities that] do things, not social actors" (Abbott 1992b: 
441). 101  Emirbayer identifies methodological individualism (especially rational choice 
theories and its variants in game theory), norm-based currents in critical theory, value 
research and microsociology, holistic neofunctionalist and systems theories with the self-
action perspective; the variable-centered paradigm from survey research to historical-
comparative analysis with the inter-action perspective. 
In contrast, field theory is concerned with an investigation of relations because it is 
relations and not substances that constitute the explanandum available to rational inquiry. In 
the broadest sense, field theory refers to "those theories that do not involve a clearly existent 
substantial medium" (Martin 2003: 4). In the social sciences, field theory denotes those 
approaches that explain individual action with reference to relative positions within a field 
structured along relations of force. These originate in the totalistic perspective of Gestalt 
theories, as formulated in Lewin's psychology (1936), which emphasizes that perception can 
only be understood with reference to the field of perception ― as opposed to a succession of 
stimuli, the view of behaviorism. Non-deductibility: the emergence of novel properties not 
reducible to the properties of the parts; and downward causation: "the influence the 
relatedness of the parts of a system has on the behaviour of the parts" (Schröder 1998: 447) 
                     
101 Among proponents of field analysis, the latter approach is sometimes referred to as the "sociology of 
variables" (Esser 1996; Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux 2000). 
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are synonyms for what relational sociologists call field effect. (It is the same relational 
orientation that separates chemistry from substantialist inquiries like alchemy.) The properties 
of the field, as well as "social properties [in general] are supervenient on individual properties 
and yet not reducible to those properties" (Sawyer 2001: 580): they determine, constrain 
action and perception. The relations of force within any field are constituted with reference to 
a specific gravitational principle ― in social fields, this is a prize or value (V. W. Turner 
1974), an asset, a stake or different types of capital (Bourdieu 1979, 1980a, 1980b) toward 
which the actors are oriented in "organized striving" (Martin 2003). Social fields are fields of 
struggle, although ― as I will argue later in this chapter with reference to Bourdieu's theses 
on symbolic power ― in order for the gravitational force specific to a field to exert its effects, 
it is not a necessary condition that its principle be recognized by the actors engaged in the 
struggle. To account for regularities in individual behavior, sociologists must get at that 
organizing principle ― but that is not possible within the variable-centered perspective, 
where the objective is to maximize explained variance. To illustrate the issue, Lieberson 
(1985) uses an example from physics: 
 
"(S)uppose we visualize a study in which a variety of objects is dropped without the 
benefit of such a strong control as a vacuum ― just as would occur in nonexperimental 
social research. If social researchers find that the objects differ in the time that they take 
to reach the ground, typically they will want to know what characteristics determine 
these differences. Probably such characteristics of the objects as their density and shape 
will affect speed of the fall in a nonvacuum situation. If the social researcher is 
fortunate, such factors together will fully account for all of the differences among the 
objects in the velocity of their fall. If so, the social researcher will be very happy 
because all of the variation between objects will be accounted for. The investigator, 
applying standard social research thinking, will conclude that there is a complete 
understanding of the phenomenon because all differences among the objects under 
study have been accounted for. 
Surely there must be something faulty with our procedures if we can approach 
such a problem without ever considering gravity itself." (Lieberson 1985: 102-3, 




Lieberson gives a parallel from sociological research on occupational mobility. 
Variations in the dependent variable socioeconomic status (SES) are usually explained with 
reference to individual characteristics such as gender, education, parental SES, etc. (More 
elaborate, e.g., multilevel models might take into account nesting, that is, categories of 
contextual variables like region, ethnicity, etc.) An adequately specified model ― one that 
will be accepted by the researcher as a "plausible" explanation of SES ― will be reflected in 
high explained variance, significant predictors, etc. Whereas in the case of falling objects, it is 
understood that high explained variance and significant coefficients for the independent 
variables (object density and shape, etc.) do not provide an explanation of why things fall, 
such concerns are remarkably absent from much of empirical research in the social sciences. 
However, the question remains: "[d]oes that provide us with a clue as to the forces 
determining the dependent variable [occupational mobility]? The answer is, regretfully, 
probably not" (ibid.: 104). 
In a similar fashion, the updated endogenous growth model proposed by Granato, 
Inglehart, and Leblang (GIL) (1996a, 1996b) based on regressions, like the alternative models 
presented in this study tell very little ― in fact, nothing ― about why national economies 
grow. My models merely show that with a different specification ― and keeping to the same 
statistical tests ―, it is possible to produce results that appear to contradict the conclusions 
derived from GIL's reference models at every major point. But none of these models 
"explains" what is of interest to us, namely differences in levels of output and rates of 
economic growth. Just as GIL's regressions provide no evidence that cultural values have an 
impact on economic growth, mine provide no evidence that they have not. Nevertheless, a 
specification resulting in a robust coefficient of a cultural variable (ceteris paribus) in a model 
of economic growth does not, in itself, indicate substantialist inquiry. On the other hand, an 
interpretation attributing various effects to this or that substance of property does. Perhaps 
nowhere is this more transparent than in the advocacy of noble substances: 
 
"A precious substance must be sought, so to speak, deep down. It is hidden under 
wrappings. […] Thus extracted, reduced, and purified, it is a quintessence; it is a juice. 
The commonly held ideal which has no difficulty in beguiling substantialist thought is 
that of possessing in a very small volume the principles of either nourishment or 
healing. This myth of substantial concentration is accepted without question. […] Once 
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a secret power has been attributed to a substance, you can be sure that the valorizing 
induction will know no further bounds." (Bachelard 2002: 124-125, emphasis added). 
 
Applying to our study, once the precious cultural substance is found ― e.g., 
"achievement motivation" in Inglehart's growth models ―, it is proposed as a solution: 
literally and also metaphorically, as some kind of curative essence that should be fed to the 
system, the "body social" so that it can achieve the performance deemed ideal (in this case, 
high levels of production or economic growth). Corrupt substances can be equally effective: 
values "inimical" to growth will condemn an economy to stagnation or low growth rates. The 
same "curative implications" are also found with regard to the causal relationship in the 
opposite direction, from the economy to values. From the finding of a significant "impact" of 
economic growth triggering a shift to emancipative values follows that the system should 
have more of it ― at least in cultural zones that are considered economically backward. 
The difficulties related to the application of the general linear model (GLM) in the 
social sciences matter here because they are closely related to substantialist thinking. The 
typical research design in which GLM features prominently is the econometric approach, a 
variable-centered inquiry that is very difficult to reconcile with the relationality of social 
phenomena (Esser 1996; Clogg and Haritou 1997; Manzo 2005; Lebaron 2010). Econometric 
models are associated with the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics, which posit 
isolated and utility-maximizing actors. The quest in various currents of sociology to gain 
recognition by the dominant school in economics has led to the widespread adoption of the 
econometric approach, and hence, regression models (Rouanet and Lebaron 2006) ― and also 
to the often articulated belief that the GLM is an explanatory model. 102  GIL's updated 
endogenous growth model reviewed in the previous chapter is a case in point. 
While the econometric approach supposes clearly isolable pure effects, the applicability 
of linear models is constrained by collinearity: the fact that social phenomena are contingent 
on a combination of interrelated effects, including structural effects. The solutions to this 
problem: path models, filling in interaction terms, increasingly sophisticated tests for 
autocorrelation, normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals, etc. do little to resolve the 
major issues associated with the unrealistic theoretical framework of the GLM. With 
                     
102 "The 'explanatory' phraseology is the plague of regression. […] Any statistical method can be used for 
an explanatory purpose, as the case may be, but there is no such thing as an 'explanatory statistical method'." (Le 
Roux and Rouanet 2006: 20) 
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reference to Abbott (1988), the latter comprises the following assumptions: (1) social science 
deals with fixed entities with variable attributes, (2) the attributes of entities do not fluctuate 
over different periods, (3) the meaning of the attributes is univocal, (4) the sequence of the 
variables is identical in every case studied; (5) the determinants are not interrelated 
(proscription of collinearity), (6) the meaning of an attribute does not depend on the context. 
Beneath the complexity of GLM-formalization lies the substantialist reason inherited from 
pre-Newtonian science: "attributes determine each other principally as independent scales 
rather than as constellations of attributes" (Abbott 1992b: 433). It is with regard to these 
concerns that Bourdieu has been critical of the variable-centered Lazarsfeldian research 
tradition (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992b; Wacquant 2013). 
As opposed to this focus on entities, their properties and impacts in substantialist 
perspectives, the focus in field analysis is the gravitational force that "we can neither see nor 
measure except via its effects, and instead of trying to maximize explained variance, [field 
theory] proceeds by assuming in principle a perfectly simple determination" (Martin 2003: 5). 
Accordingly, the methods must be integrated in a research design where the inquiry takes into 
account the emergent and non-deductible qualities of the forces structuring the field. 
Correspondence analysis, the technique applied in this study to explore the space of cultural 
values has been developed in accordance with these principles. In Chapter 1, we have seen 
that using this method had helped identify latent dimensions that would have remained hidden 
or appeared less consistent using conventional, linear techniques like factor and principal 
component analysis. This is because correspondence analysis, by focusing on the relations 
between subjects and properties is more appropriate for getting at the latent principles 
structuring the field than are the data reduction techniques seeking "superimposable" 
metavariables. As a rule of thumb however ― because it is not with this or that method that 
criticism of substantialist perspectives takes issue ― field theorists caution against 
methodological fetishism, including that of correspondence analysis. What matters is 
awareness that "the most 'empirical' choices cannot be disentangled from the most 'theoretical' 
choices in the construction of the object" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992b: 225).103 
                     
103 For example, field analysis and network analysis can be related perspectives (de Nooy 2003). The two 
approaches and their respective techniques are reconcilable and even complementary: network analysis can show 
how the latent principles structuring the field are translated into interactions between actors. The same applies to 
the combination of regression and geometric data analysis (Rouanet et al. 2002). 
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3.2. Weber versus substantialist reason 
In the value-based subclass of the substantialist perspective, the object of inquiry is 
often constructed using Weber's theses on modern capitalism as something of an ultimate 
reference. The assurance with which it is accepted that Weber proposed that capitalism 
"emerged" as a corollary of a specific religious outlook permeates much of contemporary 
scholarship. This interpretation informed the works of Banfield (1958), Troeltsch (1958),104 
McClelland (1967), Harrison (1992), Putnam (1993), Huntington (2000), and Fukuyama 
(2001) ― to name just some among the most influential. Inglehart has been consistent in his 
acceptance of this view, stressing that "[f]or Weber and his disciples, […] culture shapes 
economic and political life" (1997: 15, emphasis added), since Weber proposed that "the 
Protestant ethic generated the spirit of capitalism" (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 160, emphasis 
added). 
In this section, I argue that the idea of culture-driven economic growth attributed to the 
Protestant ethic (PE) thesis is misleading. Revisiting the original Weberian propositions 
concerning the rise of capitalism, the focus of this discussion is the elective affinity between 
symbolic and material forms of agency. Weber's elaboration on the processes designated by 
this concept suggests that rather than a theoretical compass of the substantialist perspective, 
his PE thesis is a precursor of sociological field theory. In spite of that, its significance is 
typically overlooked in the canon on Weber, including those currents that strive to 
"endogenize" a cultural variable in econometric models. 
3.2.1. Religion as "spur" or "drag" 
Given the influence of the established reading of the PE thesis, value-based inquiries 
discuss religiosity in general, as well as specific religious cultures as either catalysts of or 
impediments to economic growth. Religious traditions are posited to impact growth in various 
ways, although cross-country and within-country regressions do not provide evidence that 
religious affiliation impacts economic performance (McCleary and Barro 2006; Noland and 
Pack 2004; Noland 2005; Young 2009). The insight attributed to Weber about the impact of 
                     
104 Troeltsch, an early adopter of this interpretation went further than most and argued that in addition to 
the unintended consequence of asceticism, there is a second, direct relationship between Calvinism and 
capitalism. This is because in primitive Calvinism, "means are excluded from the consideration of righteousness" 
(MacKinnon 1988: 200). 
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the Protestant ethic on capital accumulation is often cited to point out that certain religious 
cultures exert a positive influence on growth, despite the fact that their tenets are inimical to 
the calculative behavior they "foster". In fact, much of the literature on the role of 
achievement values in economic development also includes a reflection on a Protestant 
"spark" inducing long-term economic growth in Medieval Western Europe, a theoretical 
benchmark against which other religious cultures should be compared. Inglehart follows this 
tradition by suggesting that those religious cultures that promote the moral outlook that, in the 
case of Protestantism, "played a key role in the rise of capitalism" (GIL: 1996a: 608) nurture 
the kind of conduct that is conducive to faster economic growth. 
Most culturalist accounts agree that it is not the Protestant Ethic’s theological substance 
but its non-religious repercussions that have been conducive to rational calculation, thrift, and 
an overall utilitarian outlook. Likewise, they stress that a statistically significant relationship 
between economic growth and any religious culture is not evidence of a residual effect of 
theological substance. Therefore, rising production rates are explained as an indirect and 
unintended consequence. Accordingly, Tawney’s proposition (1926) that the rise of 
capitalism was facilitated by the retreat of religious worldview and the erosion of religious 
authority is not incompatible with the dominant reading of the PE thesis. This approach is 
perhaps even more pronounced in the work of Sombart (1951) who ascribed the role played 
by Jewish urban society in modern capitalist development to neither some intrinsic element of 
the Judaic tradition, nor even an unintended consequence of religious conduct, but to the 
emancipation of Jews from discrimination in late medieval and early modern Europe.105 
Distinctions between theological substance, actual impact and embeddedness in a 
multitude of contexts tend to disappear as the focus shifts from Christianity to other religions, 
and the inquiry goes beyond the West. Such shifts usually result in the superposition of the 
ascribed theological substance over all other relevant contextual factors that the inquiry finds 
associated with a specific religious tradition. The treatment of Islam with reference to a 
religious essence is a case in point: the central propositions of Orientalism (Said 1979) can be 
read as a theoretical outline of culturalist accounts of socioeconomic development, especially 
                     
105 This rather "structuralist" approach contrasts with Sombart’s later writings (1934) where he invested 
ethnic groups ― Jews included ― with a cultural "essence", presenting a racialized view of socioeconomic 
development that reproduced many of the tenets of political anti-Semitism and even national socialism. 
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those invoking religious essence as explanatory variable.106 In varying formats but intact in 
content, these ideas resurface in all culturalist accounts of socioeconomic development. As 
research programs, these seek to isolate those specific elements in non-Western cultural 
heritage (religious or otherwise) that would explain the absence of modern capitalist 
development in this or that society. This tendency to study culture through substantialist 
theoretical lenses extends also to currents critical of Western capitalism. For example, it is 
clearly formulated in the writings of Marx and Engels, who treated the Asiatic mode of 
production as inimical to socioeconomic progress (Marx and Engels 1972). 
Culturalist accounts of socioeconomic development display remarkable variation as to 
where the roots of cultural "dynamism" and "stationariness" should be located. Therefore, it is 
more accurate to appreciate their core proposition as a postulate of an opposition between 
dynamism and stationariness ― that is, regardless of their actual carrier (or "vessel"). It is 
then not surprising that recent culturalist efforts to explain the rapid economic growth of East 
Asian societies during the second half of the 20th century interpret this expansion as the 
outcome of some specifically Asian "work ethic" ― usually one that stems from "Confucian 
values", "Confucian dynamism" (Hofstede and Bond 1988; Landes 1999) or "Confucian 
statist policies" (Swank 1996). 
Sometimes the discovery of the "inherent dynamism" of specific non-Western cultures 
leads to the suggestion that the "universal virtues" of the Protestant Ethic may be present also 
in other religious traditions ― giving rise to a "New Orientalism" (Lee 1997). Thus, for 
Inglehart, "the functional equivalent of the Protestant Ethic is operating most vigorously in 
East Asia and is fading away in Protestant Europe" (1997: 31, emphasis added) as 
"Confucian-influenced107 societies […] have outperformed the rest of the world by a wide 
                     
106  In his survey of Orientalism, Turner identifies four elementary propositions: (1) "a dichotomous 
contrast between the static history and structure of Islamicate societies and the dynamic evolutionary character of 
Occidental, Christian culture"; (2) "a list of causes which explain [this] stationariness"; (3) treating "Islam as an 
all-embracing, undifferentiated and timeless set of beliefs and practices" whose "psychological effects were to 
foster resignation, acceptance and fatalism", explaining the "absence of Western motives ― achievement 
motivation, innovation, anti-authoritarianism"; and (4) a "predominantly idealistic and essentialist" epistemology 
(1978: 373-374, emphasis added). 
107 In Chapter 1, we have seen that the Japanese society is one of the most secular among those for which 
we have comparable data. The suggestion of "Confucian dynamism" does not eschew this diagnosis, but insists 
that a Confucian "mindset" is still palpable in the East Asian work ethic, therefore has an indirect positive impact 
on economic growth. 
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margin" (ibid.: 217). Leaving aside the fact that a great portion of the huge East Asian 
population follows religions other than Confucianism, Confucianism has a long history of 
being perceived as not only a stimulus but also a hindrance to economic growth in Western 
scholarship. For example, US sinologist, John Fairbank (1982) attributes China’s failure to 
modernize along a Western trajectory to Confucian values, which he identified as "static" ― 
just like those ascribed to Islam in culturalist accounts. Remarking the irony in the recent 
investment of Confucian values with a spark of capitalist dynamism, economic historian 
Harriet Zurndorfer points out that "it is these same qualities such as loyalty to one’s family 
which made historians, social scientists, and not least Chinese intellectuals themselves, in the 
past regard Confucianism as an impediment in […] the process of institutionalizing 
capitalism" (2004: 4, emphasis added). In a similar fashion, there have been also attempts at 
locating a "dynamic core" in the tenets of Islam (Bellah 1958; Wertheim 1961; Kennedy Jr 
1962; Alatas 1963). In sum, the "carrier" may change but the substance (progress-prone 
versus stagnating), the "state of mind" as vector remains intact. 
3.2.2. Elective affinity 
Curiously however, the ultimate reference of these culturalist accounts, Weber's PE 
essay not only does not propose a causal mechanism going from values to the economy, but 
explicitly cautions against a culturalist interpretation: 
 
"[…] we have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis 
as that the spirit of capitalism […] could only have arisen as the result of certain effects 
of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the 
Reformation. In itself, the fact that certain important forms of capitalistic business 
organization are known to be considerably older than the Reformation is a sufficient 
refutation of such a claim." (Excerpt from the chapter titled "Luther's Conception of the 
Calling" in Weber's first essay in the PE series; Weber 2005: 49) 
 
This sounds clear enough, so the question is rather why Weber's warning continues to 
fall on deaf ears. It can be that once a text is admitted into the canon, the interpretation gains 
in prestige to the detriment of the content. Another possibility is that the original text includes 
an argument that lends itself easily to misinterpretation. In the following, I expand on that 
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latter factor by pointing out that while the logic of the argument in the Protestant Ethic was 
already difficult to follow at the time when Weber wrote his essays, it still presents readers 
with a challenge that is atypical with regard to even some of the most debated theories in the 
history of the social sciences. The key to this misunderstanding is Weber's concept of elective 
affinity, a concept borrowed from chemistry. 
The trajectory of this concept in the various translations of Weber is revealing of the 
confusions surrounding it. Although it occupies a central place in Weber's thought, it does not 
appear in the first English translation of his Protestant Ethic by Talcott Parsons, published in 
1930. On the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and ideas ― the section where 
its absence will be spotted by later Weber scholars ―, Parson's rendering reads: 
 
"In view of the tremendous confusion of interdependent influences between the material 
basis, the forms of social and political organization, and the ideas current in the time of 
the Reformation, we can only proceed by investigating whether and at what points 
certain correlations between forms of religious belief and practical ethics can be 
worked out." (Weber 2005: 49, emphasis added) 
 
In the German original, the concept that Parsons translated as correlation[s]108 appears 
as Wahlverwandtschaft[en]. Parsons might have struggled with the translation of the German 
term, and by opting for "correlation", he had settled on a concept he thought to be closest to 
the original meaning. But it was not to be: literally, Verwandtschaft means relationship, while 
Wahl stands for election, selection or choice; in English, the sense of the term is best captured 
by elective affinities. The still prevailing confusion over the meaning of this concept has 
much to do with the influence of this first English translation. It was more than 70 years later 
that the term elective affinities first appeared in a new translation by Peter Baehr and Gordon 
Wells (Weber 2002), replacing Parson's "correlations". Not if this was the first time that the 
more accurate rendering had surfaced in the English-language scholarship on Weber: in their 
monograph titled "Max Weber: Essays in Sociology", Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills had 
                     
108 Given the context in which this term was mostly used in the early 20th century, it can be argued that 
Parsons might have had in mind "co-relationships", that is, common or combined relationship ― an 
understanding much closer to the concept of elective affinity. However, this does not change the fact that for the 




already discussed elective affinity as "the decisive conception by which Weber relates ideas 
and interests" (Gerth and Mills 1946: 42). Nevertheless, the term had been absent from much 
of the English-language literature discussing one of Weber's seminal text for a long time after 
its first publication.109 
Contemporary students of social science may wonder why such etymologizing is 
relevant at all. Beyond its literal meaning, what is designated by elective affinities? Why is it 
attracting an increasing awareness among Weber scholars, to the point that recently, there 
seems to be a resurgence of the debate on its sociological implications? Formulated carefully, 
the answer to this question will not only shed light on how and why Weber's original PE 
thesis "got lost in translation", but also help grapple with some of the most important 
theoretical issues in contemporary sociology. With regard to Inglehart's theses on value 
formation and value-induced economic change, it will also show the methodological pitfalls 
awaiting practitioners adopting the "variable-centered paradigm". In other words, the 
semantic differences between correlation and elective affinity are more than just an issue of 
hermeneutic sensibilities. It is instructive of Weber's ideas on the relationship between ideas 
(or values) and social phenomena that he never considered it as one of causation. While 
correlation implies a sense of causal sequence involving an independent and a dependent 
variable, the kind of relationship designated by elective affinities is irreducible to a sequential 
framework. 
As a scientific concept, elective affinity came into use in chemistry during the second 
half of the 18th century. According to a dictionary edited by the Grimm Brothers (1854), its 
German form first appeared in a publication by Swedish chemist Torbern Bergman on the 
formation and decomposition of chemical compounds titled "De attractionibus electivus" 
(1785)110. Bergman's work in chemistry lay down the foundations of research into chemical 
reaction and decomposition; his achievements include the most detailed affinity table ever 
produced. Wahlverwandtschaft was introduced in conversational German thanks to the 
literary work of German writer and polymath Johann von Goethe. Weber scholars generally 
agree that Weber had most probably borrowed the concept from Goethe (Radkau 2009) 
whose work he used to cite in a number of his writings, including the Protestant Ethic. There 
                     
109 At the same time, it did appear in the French translation (affinités électives), originally published in 
1964 (Weber 1990). 




is also agreement that Goethe's metaphoric use of the term is embedded in his own adventures 
in physics and chemistry (Howe 1978; McKinnon 2010), and that it reflects an outlook that 
became established in the natural sciences.111 
Less clear is its relevance to the social sciences, despite its centrality in Weber's work. 
In addition to the confusion over the translation of the term into other languages, including 
English, this unawareness is due to at least two other factors. One is that Weber never 
bothered to give an explicit definition of elective affinity. On the other hand, he did define the 
concept implicitly by discussing at length its sociological implications in writings related to 
the PE thesis. That his line of reasoning has been mostly ignored, can be explained by another 
peculiarity: what is conventionally known as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, "the book" was never a proper book, but two articles published in 1904 and '05, in 
the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, and intended for debate. Therefore, for an 
elaboration on the main propositions of the PE thesis, readers have to turn to a series of four 
more articles that Weber wrote within the scope of the debate that his two earlier papers had 
provoked between 1907 and '10. These additional articles were published in the same journal 
but came to be relegated to insignificance (or at least overlooked) once Weber's body of work 
began to exert a wider influence. As a result, practitioners of sociology couching their 
arguments in what came to be accepted as Weber's views on the relationship between 
Protestantism and capitalism ― but not familiar with the full line of reasoning published in no 
less than six articles ― are likely to miss the central proposition in the full series. It is then 
not surprising that following several decades of little interest in these matters (Howe 1978; 
Parkin 1983; Thomas 1985), the resurgence of the debates on the actual propositions of the 
PE thesis (Löwy 2004; Chalcraft 2005; de Paula 2005, Runciman 2005; Treviño 2005; Carrier 
2010; McKinnon 2010) came after both a revised English translation of the original two 
                     
111 Starting in the second half of the 18th century, chemistry underwent a profound transformation, and its 
influence began to extend to the forums of the educated classes. Goethe used Wahlverwandtschaft as a metaphor 
for the formation and the breakup of romantic relationships in his eponymous novel, published in 1809. This 
roman, full of chemical allegories used as a description of the processes of attraction and repulsion, provides a 
detailed description of the logic designated by elective affinities. These intricacies are meant to illustrate the 
diverging affinities of various chemical elements. On the one hand, some elements (individuals) naturally attract 
each other even while being present in different compounds (couples): in each other's presence, these will be 
driven to form a new bond (couple), "no matter what". On the other hand, attraction between other elements 
occurs only in their free (that is, bondless, "single") state. Profound rearrangements ― including unforeseen 
outcomes ― may take place as a result of the reactions set in motion by the stronger affinities. 
 
111 
articles and the full exchange between Weber and his critics had been published in English 
(Chalcraft and Harrington 2001).112 
Weber wrote his elaboration on the PE thesis as rejoinders (Weber 1907; 1908; 1910a; 
1910b) to four articles by two critics of his original argument, Karl Fischer (1907; 1908) and 
Felix Rachfahl (1909; 1910). A common thread in the criticism addressed to Weber by these 
two authors is that they both regard the PE thesis as an idealist approach to explaining 
economic behavior. (In this respect, they share the views of those in the posterity who portray 
Weber as a proponent of the culturalist paradigm ― but differ from the latter in their rejection 
of that approach.) In reply to those interpretations ― while rebutting vehemently such 
"distortions" ―, Weber gives a detailed presentation of the processes designated by the term 
elective affinity. In addition to stressing that the relationship between the Protestant ethic and 
the spirit of capitalism can be understood only by analyzing the macro-social outcomes of 
individual activity, he calls attention to the correspondence (Adäquanz) between forms of 
capitalist enterprise on the one hand, and a methodical organization of individual conduct, on 
the other. He goes to great lengths to emphasize that it would be wrong to appreciate this 
correspondence, "elective affinity" as a cause-to-effect relationship. There is neither cause, 
nor effect: forms of capitalist enterprise do not "stem from" any idea whatsoever, or vice 
versa. 
In his reply to Rachfahl, Weber writes that "'ascetic' Protestantism [by its emphasis on 
vocation] has created for capitalism [that is, its logic] a corresponding 'soul', the soul of the 
'man with a calling' who does not need the same means of feeling at one with his actions as 
the man of the Middle Ages" (1910a: 73, emphasis in the original). Later on, he argues that 
what came to be known as modern capitalism is born out of the elective affinity between the 
form (the forms of capitalist enterprise preexisting the Reformation) and the spirit (the 
capitalist mentality resulting from the interaction between Protestant asceticism and the 
"calling"). At this point, he insists that the spirit and the form may also exist independently of 
each other. An equally important proposition is that the historic form (the early capitalist 
enterprise as existing independently of the spirit) is not to be confused with modern 
capitalism. The form without the spirit is found in medieval Venice, Genoa and Florence; 
whereas the case study of Benjamin Franklin and his printing shop illustrates that the spirit 
can exist without the form. It is only in the "compound" called modern capitalism that these 
two elements are related ― but their bond gives rise to qualities that neither of them has. 
                     
112 The latter was not available in English before 2001. 
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Using the chemical analogy and in view of the exchanges between Weber and his 
critics, the roots of the misunderstanding surrounding Wahlverwandtschaft come to light. 
First, elective affinity is not about similarity but sympathy or attraction. Like in chemical 
reaction, in order for elements to attract each other, it is not necessary that they have similar 
properties. The only condition is to have complementary qualities. Dissimilarity between 
elements may turn out to be a factor that makes them "eligible" for attraction, hence reaction 
(the formation of bonds). Second, the logic of attraction invalidates any claim to "causation" 
by this or that element entering the reaction (or to causal relationship between the elements 
and the compound) as meaningless. The molecule called water is "caused" by neither 
hydrogen, nor oxygen ― nor any "agent" whatsoever. Third, the properties of the compound 
(water, modern capitalism, etc.) resulting from the bond between the elements do not follow, 
and cannot be predicted from the properties of the elements (atoms in the case of water; form 
and spirit in the case of modern capitalism). The latter suggestion is a key proposition in the 
study of emergence ― in fact, chemistry as we know it since the 18th century has been a 
science of emergent properties (Luisi 2002).113 
Retaining the chemical terminology with regard to the compound called modern 
capitalism, the elective affinity between the elements gives rise to two separate reactions 
(McKinnon: 2010). (1) The first is the reaction between the ethic of the calling and the 
asceticism of certain Protestant factions. The resulting compound is the spirit of capitalism 
with its own qualities that are irreducible to the properties of either element. Put differently, 
the properties of the elements entering into reaction with each other are not extrapolated to the 
compound. The spirit of capitalism is not ascetic in the Protestant sense, since it does not 
value asceticism on its other-worldly merits. Nor is it an ethic of the calling, since the 
religious justifications of doing one's job well are played down. (2) The second reaction 
occurs as a result of the attraction between this emergent mindset and the various forms of 
capitalist enterprise that had preexisted the Reformation. From this reaction emerges modern 
capitalism.114 
                     
113 "(T)he emergence of the novel entity water obliges the two components to a relatedness (chemical 
bonding and the corresponding mixing of the electronic orbitals) that profoundly affects the properties of both 
hydrogen and oxygen. […] (T)he chemical properties of H and O bound to each other in the water molecules 
have nothing to do with the physical properties of the free gases." (Luisi 2002: 196) 
114 In most instances when it appears in Weber's PE articles, the concept of emergence merely denotes 
"occurrence" without implying non-deductible properties. In other formulations, however, it includes 
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What transpires from the above is that currently influent ascriptions of a "causal chain", 
a "path model" or "superposition" regarding the manner in which variables interact miss the 
core proposition of the PE thesis. Weber's thesis is not "culturalist" any more than it is 
"structuralist". Indeed, addressing Rachfahl's repeated insistence on an idealist reading of his 
thesis, Weber makes the remark that such an understanding would be just as worthless as a 
materialist interpretation: 
 
"I […] stated explicitly the truism that religious–psychological factors were only able to 
foster capitalist development directly in the context of numerous other, especially 
natural-geographic, 'conditions'. Finally, […] I again made clear as early as 1908 – in 
order to preclude every 'absolutisation' of the causal constellation I discussed – that my 
studies analyse exclusively the development of an ethical 'lifestyle' adequate to the 
emergent capitalism of modern times. If, therefore, others have 'overestimated the scope 
of my discussion', this is not my fault. I added that after finishing my essays I could 
quite possibly be accused of 'capitulating to historical materialism'."115 (Weber 1910b: 
95, emphasis in the original) 
 
Notice Weber's use of the adjective "adequate" in the above quote. In this context, it 
serves to make it clear that he does not prioritize this or that component of human conduct in 
the explanation of social phenomena. Adequacy simply stands for correspondence between 
two items whose mutual attraction does not mean causal sequence. With regard to the logic of 
reaction, Weber argues that it is impossible to isolate a "trigger" among the elements 
constituting the complex set of relations in which modern capitalism is embedded. But even 
this more cautious formulation can be misleading if the concept of embeddedness serves to 
reify modern capitalism as a "substance", existing in a form that is somehow demarcated from 
the very relations of which it is (nothing but) the label. The most important proposition that 
Weber is trying to "get out" over the course of his debates with Fischer and Rachfahl is that it 
                                                                
unequivocal reference to such properties, in line with the concept of elective affinity: e.g., "emergence of 
'methodical conduct' of life" (1908: 50), "the emergence of the 'capitalist' spirit" (1910a: 82). 
115 Regarding the materialist (and less known) misreading of the PE thesis, Weber's prediction proved 
accurate in light of engagement with his work in the writings of Anthony Giddens (1970), the Weber scholar 
Frank Parkin (1983) or Gerth and Mills (1946). For these authors, elective affinity is no more than the 
superposition of ideas on (material) "interests" ― in line with what influential currents of Marxism regard as 
ideological justifications (superstructure) of the dominant mode of production. 
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is empirically implausible to assume that constituents of emergent qualities "impact" one 
another in the sense of a causal sequence ― or that the emergent quality exists "on its own", 
independently of the "bonds". More to the point, it is only based on a superficial reading of 
his original two articles (and unfamiliarity with the whole PE series) that Weber could be 
credited with dissociating "economic" and "cultural" aspects: 
 
"As far as the opportunity allowed, I have indicated elsewhere […] how the emergence 
of 'homo oeconomicus' was limited by quite definite objective conditions, and that it 
was these conditions ― geographical, political, social and other ― that limited the 
culture of the Middle Ages, in contrast to antiquity." (Weber 1910b: 131, emphasis 
added) 
 
In sum, Weber's PE thesis not only did not hold an idealist view of the processes leading 
to the rise of modern capitalism, but defined itself against such an approach. What in their 
critique of GIL's endogenous growth model Jackmann and Miller (1996b) call the "ritual 
invocation of Weber's argument about Protestantism" is misleading: what Weber set out to 
explain was not how whatever spirit "gave rise" to a new economic order, but rather how 
specific mental dispositions formed in a given socioeconomic context turned out to be 
adequate for already existing forms of capitalist enterprise.116 
                     
116 While the actual and largely overlooked propositions of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis cannot be 
reconciled with their substantialist reading, other aspects of his sociology of religion do show substantialist 
influences. 
On Islam, Weber's approach (1965) was dominated by an almost exclusive focus on the Middle East to 
the neglect of South-East Asia and Africa. His central claim that the spread of Islam was mainly the result of 
military conquest (a proposition adopted in much of culturalist literature stressing the inherently "violent" 
character of the Islamic creed) stems from this one-sided focus. However, outside the Middle East, Islam spread 
mainly as a result of a peaceful evolution facilitated by charismatic individuals, itinerant traders and preachers 
(B. S. Turner 2010a, 2010b; Grandin 2014). 
With regard to Hinduism, Weber suggested that its effects on the economy were negative (1958). In this 
respect, he followed the dominant Euro-centric interpretation which attributed India's caste system to an intrinsic 
Hindu element. This, however is untenable in light of the fact that Hindu scriptures do not endorse 
discrimination based on caste, and within Indian society, the caste system existed also among Christians, Sikhs, 
and Muslims (Mehta 2006). On the other hand, caste played "an important role in the organization of trade 
among geographically extended kin groups" (Bayly 1978: 185). 
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3.3. Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power 
The previous section has attempted to outline how a school of thought informed, among 
others, by a misreading of Weber fails to recognize the embeddedness of mental 
representations ("culture", "ideas", "values", etc.) in the context of agency in general and 
material production in particular. The substantialist perspective that, in value research, has 
developed into a dominant practice has adopted what Weber would call a doctrinaire 
derivative of his PE thesis. A compelling argument with this perspective has to point out that 
the opposition between symbolic and material aspects of agency is scholarly, not empirical. 
From the field analytical perspective, a critique of Inglehart's theses has to build on the 
philosophical tradition that defines its inquiry against this opposition. To that effect, 
Bourdieu's work on symbolic power is the toolkit of choice, since it constitutes the most 
coherent sociological refutation of this opposition. If the enduring relevance of Weber's 
Protestant ethic thesis to the sociology of values is beyond dispute, the same should be said of 
Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power. This consideration also includes Bourdieu as a 
practitioner: his theses reviewed below are supported by empirical work. Bourdieu's studies 
of symbolic power also provide clues for the recognition of Weber's overlooked contribution 
to the sociology of values. 
A consistent thread in Bourdieu's work is the deconstruction of all human transactions 
as inextricably both material and symbolic. In this respect, his work builds on 
                                                                
[continued from previous page] He also failed to recognize how "worldly" interpretations came to 
accommodate Buddhism and Confucianism with an emerging trading economy. Buddhism was not antithetical 
to economic growth since it "neither condemns, nor advocates the acquisition of wealth, condemning only 
attachment to wealth" (Whelan 2006: 236) ― displaying a stance that is not at odds with the outlook that Weber 
attributed to ascetic Protestantism. The egalitarian outlook of historic Buddhism made this creed appealing to a 
merchant class striving to break away from archaic forms of domination, but also kings eager to consolidate their 
rule by relying on a doctrine condemning power struggles between competing groups (Darian 1977). Rational 
business organization ― highly developed long-distance trading networks, contracts, complex property 
arrangements, mass production, etc. ― was a no less important catalyst of the emergence of the Chinese empire. 
In this respect, rather than "downgrading the market" (Weller 2006), Confucianism played an important role. 
The same conclusion is echoed in Wallerstein (1975) with the proposition that rationality and advanced 
bureaucracy were not only present in Islamdom and China but constituted the wherewithal for holding together 
the vast empires that these civilizations comprised. As the economic surplus had to be directed toward 




phenomenological, existentialist and pragmatist perspectives that dismiss the spirit/matter 
dichotomy as empirically meaningless: consciousness is the consciousness of something 
(Husserl 1960), to be a human being is inhabiting, being "thrown" into concrete situations in 
space and time, performing specific actions (Heidegger 2008); thinking can be grasped in the 
act of this dwelling (Heidegger 2004), that is, in the context of agency, as an attempt at 
solving practical problems that the subject encounters in the course of action (Dewey 1896). 
Most significant from the sociological perspective is Mead's social behaviorism (Mead 1934) 
because it reproduces the major insights of field theory by demonstrating that consciousness 
is not a substantive entity (a "thing") but a relational phenomenon, a ("process") emerging 
from a creative engagement with the world. The sophisticated human nervous system is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of consciousness: role-taking via the 
significant symbol is activated in a social context. In other words, thinking is always related 
to doing, in the sense of representing things that get done or are doable "out there". This 
proposition is a cornerstone of the anthropological inquiry of Mauss and Durkheim, especially 
on the practices of classification (Durkheim and Mauss 1963; Durkheim 2001) that informed 
the structuralist school of Lévi-Strauss (1963) and Bourdieu's own formulation of field theory. 
Sociology, as practiced in this school "conceptualize[s] the self not as a metaphysical 
substance or entity, such as the 'soul' or 'will' […], but rather as a dialogical structure, itself 
thoroughly relational" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 974). 
Because the inquiry into symbolic power is the foundation of Bourdieusian sociology, it 
is preferable, for the purpose of this rough sketch to consider those chapters of his work ― on 
speech acts (1991), cultural consumption (1984), the logic of practice (1990), practical reason 
(1998), and economic reason (2000b) ― that lay out the principles that constitute the building 
blocks of this critique of the substantialist perspective in value research. The instrumentality 
of symbolic acts is presented with regard to three aspects: (1) the performative/ritualistic, (2) 
the corporal, and (3) the efforts at denial. 
3.3.1. Rituals 
Bourdieu's theory of language (1991) is built on a criticism of what he calls "pure 
linguistic theory". He argues that an idealist streak in Saussure's approach has continued 
influence among linguists thanks notably to Chomsky's work on universal grammar. While he 
does not dispute the relevance of formalized linguistic inquiry ― in particular, he 
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acknowledges the significance of Saussure's structuralist analysis demonstrating that meaning 
can only be grasped via the relationality of signs ―, he takes issue with what he sees as its 
implausible abstractions. Bourdieu's focus is discourses, that is, actual speech acts as they are 
produced and circulate on linguistic markets ― as opposed to "language" which he sees as a 
meaningless theoretical construction. In his view, Saussurian and Chomskyan linguistics fails 
to notice that the "set of rules" identified as intrinsic to various languages is instituted by force 
and therefore contingent on power relations. In itself, a speech act is not correct or incorrect: 
what is conventionally understood as "correct" usage is simply the correct (because corrected) 
execution of the modus operandi instituted as legitimate form of expression. Conformity 
exists and can be studied with reference to that code, not some theoretical benchmark. 
Expressions, speech acts, discourses constitute dialects whose deviations from the one 
dialect instituted as the legitimate form of expression determines their respective prices on a 
given linguistic market. The larger the deviation, the lower its social value ― that is, the 
profits accruing to the speakers of the dialect in question. The authority of elite dialects is 
inseparable from the aspect of coercion: not only in the sense of being instituted as the correct 
forms of expression, but also thanks to the huge energies invested in the correction of the 
execution, and the downgrading of other forms of expression. This, in a nutshell, is what 
constitutes symbolic violence. 
Speech acts ― in fact, all symbolic acts, including cultural consumption or consumer 
behavior overall (1984) ― are performances or rituals: this is a point where Bourdieu relies 
heavily on Austin's work (1962) on the performative aspects of language use. Describing a 
state of affairs (locution) is not the only function of speech acts: there is a specific category of 
utterances confined to ways of acting (illocutions) without descriptive value. These have to do 
with constituting a new state of affairs by performing a ritual. Illocutionary force ― on which 
the success of these rituals depends ― stems from the social relations of the actors in 
interaction. This draws attention to the issue of authority/authorization: the same utterance (in 
purely literal terms) that has as its consequence the successful execution of an act (like 
inaugurating a building) may be ineffectual if uttered by an actor lacking the required 
authorization to perform the act. Bourdieu expands on Austin's reasoning by pointing out that 
rather than being confined to particular circumstances, performative speech acts constitute the 
"default setting" of utterances, and it is purely descriptive (locutionary) language use ― 
devoid of any performative function ― that is exceptional. It follows that the primary 
function of actual language use is not to communicate but to execute actions. Being first and 
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foremost executions of ― or, in any case, attempts at executing ― acts, utterances are tools 
deployed with the purpose of acting upon the material world, modifying existing relations, 
creating new conditions, etc. 
3.3.2. Bodily hexis 
Another important aspect is that speech acts are intimately tied up in bodily 
expressions, written forms being no exception. Linguistic habitus is bodily hexis: since 
"(l)anguage is a body technique in which one's whole relation to the social world, and one's 
whole socially informed relation to the world are expressed", (Bourdieu 1991: 86). Rather 
than merely involving posture and movements, linguistic practices are posture and 
movements. The materiality of symbolic expressions involves not only accent (its most 
obvious manifestation), but also bearing, gait, and all manners of mostly unconscious bodily 
performance expressing one's relation to the physicality of life. Bourdieu argues that bodily 
hexis is not mere externalization of "thought", as implied in substantialist approaches to non-
verbal communication. In addition to conveying meaning, it is itself meaning in the full sense, 
as follows from the performativity postulate. The most straightforward association between 
language use and bodily hexis concerns the relationship to the mouth and the things that can 
be done with it: the way people speak, particularly their accent is intimately related to the way 
they eat. 
Related to bodily hexis is the more comprehensive Bourdieusian concept of habitus: a 
set of durable dispositions that constitute a generative principle of action and perception 
(Bourdieu 1990). Habitus is a historical, therefore conditioned product, yet showing 
remarkable stability and, in consequence, predictability. Although acquired during the course 
of socialization, it is "immune" to willful manipulation: being largely unconscious, it has 
become "second nature". Being embedded in the field, habitus reflects the properties of the 
field relative to the specific position occupied by the actor. This is to say that mental 
structures and field structure are isomorphic. Being a space of struggle, the field evolves 
constantly thanks to the dynamics of the opposition between orthodox and heterodox habitus, 
corresponding to a tension between the dominants and their challengers. However, 
heterodoxy requires the recognition of the principles of domination, a job of deconstruction 
which varies in difficulty proportional to the effectiveness of symbolic violence. Accordingly, 
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the majority of the dominated will subscribe to allodoxia, a code of conduct built on the 
misapprehension of the real stakes. This bestows stability on the field. 
A fundamental aspect of the relation between bodily hexis, habitus and field is how 
people relate to interest. Interest is understood as the profit realized from the execution of 
action: it is both a material referent and a symbolic profit motive. Given the importance of 
bodily hexis in one's relation to the world, interest in the material sense is tied to the 
satisfaction of physical needs, bodily pleasure, sensory stimulation. All actors strive toward 
interest defined as a material thing ― but this striving is not identical with what neoclassical 
economics assumes to be a profit motive. The latter defines the profit motive with reference to 
a universal concept of utility. Interest, as bound up with habitus, is not compatible with such a 
definition, because its realization entails different symbolic profits. 
3.3.3. Denial 
Actors invest energies proportional to their social status into disguising the materiality 
of their acts. A major contribution of Distinction (1984) is the demonstration that the 
judgment of taste, by articulating these different symbolic profits in schemes of appreciation 
and consumption, reproduce one's relation to the world. Taste and linguistic habitus are 
"operational" equivalents ― in fact, linguistic habitus is objectified taste ― in that they 
express how actors relate to the materiality of their actions and of their own existence. Highly 
formalized utterances, evident especially in the use of superfluous phraseology (an excess of 
adverbs in particular) fulfill the same role as any sophisticated set of eating utensils: creating 
a distance between the materiality of the act (eating, gaining favors, competing for power, 
committing atrocities, etc.) and the person executing the act. As with language use, taste 
articulates the distance taken from the things of the material world: the refinement of the 
elites contrasts with the open enjoyment or sensuality of the popular sectors. The degree to 
which schemes of appreciation and acts of consumption are formalized is proportional to the 
effort invested in denial.  
In statistical formalization, the opposition between embracement and denial of material 
interest is captured by the composition of capital in correspondence analyses of taste (1984: 
262, 340): at one end, it is economic capital (embracement); at the other, cultural capital 
(denial) that is dominant. Moreover, this dimension accounts for most of the variation of taste, 
which means that the related opposition is the chief discriminating dimension among the 
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cultural practices of the different classes. Regardless of the total volume of capital (which 
varies considerably across the class structure), similar positions along this axis correspond to 
similar relations to material interest. 
Taste is always distaste: opting for any object or practice implies rejection of ― and 
repulsion toward ― other objects and practices seen as inimical to the posture involved in the 
preferred act of consumption/practice. In the case of the elites, the sociological function of the 
"disgust at the facile" is the expression of one's distance from all objects, acts and, equally 
important, groups of people deemed to represent the vulgarity of the flesh, the "surrender to 
immediate sensation" (1984: 486). Among the popular classes, the rejection of the highly 
formalized mannerisms of the legitimate culture develops from a profound unease related to 
the difficulties at their decoding, combined with a suspicion of hypocrisy on behalf of its 
representatives. In both instances, taste and distaste are visceral: actors relate to objects and 
practices in ways that seem natural (with a referent in physical reality) and exclude 
accommodation with what is being rejected.117 
The apparently gratuitous, spiritual pleasures associated with the consumption of 
legitimate culture fulfill a profoundly instrumental role: "'(e)mpirical' interest enters into the 
composition of the most disinterested pleasures of pure taste, because the principle of the 
pleasure derived from these refined games for refined players lies, in the last analysis, in the 
denied experience of a social relationship of membership and exclusion" (1984: 499, 
emphasis added). In other words: the denial of material interest through various seemingly 
disinterested practices exercises its disciplining power precisely because the principles of 
denial are invisible. The symbolical component of highly distinctive cultural practices has a 
physical imperative in maintaining and reproducing the existing social order. 
Transactions in precapitalist118 ― but also, to a large extent, in modern capitalist ― 
economies are based on the denial (repression) of economic interests: the material stakes of 
                     
117 In his outline of these ideal types, Bourdieu draws heavily on the aesthetic theory formulated in Kant's 
Critique of Judgment (1952). What Kant regards as the universal standards of beauty are, in empirical terms, the 
efforts invested in the rejection of the objects, thoughts, practices representing "impure desires". Purity means 
detachment from, elevation above material interest: one's humanity is proportional to the distance taken from the 
impurity of the matter. Objects of consumption and practices are admitted to the legitimate culture to the extent 
that they can be turned to the service of denial of material interest: of the material interest in the act of 
consuming/doing them, and of the consumer/practitioner. 
118 Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power originate in the ethnological surveys that he had conducted in 
Kabylia (2000a) in the 1960s. 
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the transaction, including the obligations of the participants are not explicitly defined. This 
requires equivocal strategies and behaviors, which will disguise the contradictions between 
the objective and subjective truth of the transaction. The success of denial depends on the 
orchestration of habitus (in plural) of all involved around the shared miscrecognition of the 
stakes. An extreme example is the exchange of gifts whose function is to create obligations 
(proportional to the value of the gift) ― a deeply economic rationale, but whose objective 
truth is suppressed by the acts of denial identified in the temporal interval between the gift 
and the countergift, as well as the collective representations surrounding the exchange. 
Bourdieu's last major study (2000b) finds the same archaic logic at work in late capitalist 
residential real estate markets where most individual buyers are "duped" by the concerted 
effort of government policies, marketing professionals, peer pressure and their own quest for 
social status into financing schemes where they are unaware of the real stakes and their own 
prospects.119 
The logic of transactions in a capitalist economy are supposed to constitute the opposite 
of archaic economies built on symbolic alchemy: the material stakes are overtly declared; the 
obligations of the participants explicitly and unequivocally defined; the subjective truth of the 
transaction corresponds with the objective truth ― properties that are consonant with the 
standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. What therefore Bourdieu's study of markets, 
as well as other major empirical studies in economic sociology (e.g., Akerlof 1982; Uzzi 
1997; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Richard 2003; Gintis 2005) indicate is not simply the 
systematic violation of these assumptions but also the persistence of archaic organizing 
principles in modern capitalism. 
To sum up, the significance of Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power lies in the most 
consistent translation of relational theories of practice into research with specific regard to 
the symbolic and material forms of agency. Most relevant to this discussion is his empirical 
elaboration on the anthropology of Durkheim and Mauss. Mauss's detailed studies of corporal 
techniques (Mauss 1936), magical rituals (Hubert and Mauss 1902) and the exchange of gifts 
(Mauss 1923) explain the apparently most banal instrumental acts with reference to a whole 
system of collectively organized representations ― insights that are paramount in Bourdieu's 
approach to the study of practical reason. The same can be said of Bourdieu's adoption of the 
                     
119 Written in the late 1990s, this study lays out, with eerie prescience, all the major ingredients of the late 




core argument in Durkheim's sociology of religion (Durkheim 2001), which links the 
emergence of collective and individual conscience to the dissociation of the profane from the 
sacred in the religious ritual ― an early sociological proposition that cognition is relational. 
Moreover, by identifying the profane with the activities (and also time and space) related to 
material reproduction, and the sacred with the collective effort at representing an opposition 
to, a detachment from those activities ― and by positing that sacred versus profane constitute 
the definitive categorization ―, Durkheim's theory of religion defines mental operations with 
reference to instrumental action. 120  Bourdieu's studies on the transfiguration of material 
interests via speech acts, consumption ― and more generally, any ritual ― captures this same 
mental operation whose sociological function is the production of salvation. Bourdieu's merit 
is the empirical validation of this logic of practice beyond the boundaries of religion ― but 
the theory was spelled out in Durkheim's work. 
3.4. Values as vocabularies to navigate fields 
At this point, it is important not to lose sight of the interest of couching a critique of 
substantialist reason in value research in Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power. An 
appreciation in line with substantialist thinking would gather that what Bourdieu is talking 
about is how representations (a) "arise" out of or (b) "get translated into" into objective 
relations ― or (a+b) "both". The first would be the materialist, the second the idealist 
interpretation. Both (a) and (b) ― or considering (a+b) as a further option, all three ― miss 
the point because these are substantialist approaches to a phenomenon that is relational. 
Bourdieu's field theory implies no causal sequence between the material and symbolic aspects 
(or variables) of agency. Indicative is (almost) always imperative,121 symbolic profit is always 
material profit ― otherwise it would be unthinkable ―, reason is never "pure" (disinterested) 
but always practical (interested). As in the pragmatist philosophical tradition, "cultural" is 
                     
120 "The man who has submitted himself to its prescribed interdictions is not the same afterwards as he 
was before. Before, he was an ordinary being who, for this reason, had to keep at a distance from the religious 
forces. Afterwards, he is on a more equal footing with them; he has approached the sacred by the very act of 
leaving the profane; he has purified and sanctified himself by the very act of detaching himself from the base and 
trivial matters that debased his nature." (Durkheim 2001: 309) 
121  Strictly formalized ("mathematical") language use restricted to transmitting information being the 
exception (Bourdieu 1991). 
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never dissociated from "structural", mental representation always stems from agency, and 
symbolic practices are always, simultaneously instrumental practices, physical in their 
origins as well as their consequences. This perspective recalls Mills' caution: 
 
"Motives are of no value apart from the delimited social situations for which they are 
the appropriate vocabularies. […] Rather than interpreting actions and language as 
external manifestations of subjective and deeper lying elements in individuals, the 
research task is the locating of particular types of action within typal frames of 
normative actions and socially situated clusters of motive." (Mills 1940: 913, emphasis 
added) 
 
This brings us back to Weber's Protestant ethic thesis. We have left this discussion by 
arguing that it is not the idealist/culturalist theory that is suggested by its dominant 
interpretation. Having outlined the substantialist paradigm in value research in opposition to 
field theory, the question of how to locate the PE thesis within this frame of reference has to 
be addressed. In light of the preceding discussion, the argument presented in the full PE series 
leaves little doubt. Even after a reconstruction of the PE thesis, it is striking how close this 
formulation comes to Bourdieu's concept of field and habitus. Weber not only used 
"adequacy" (Adäquanz), a synonym for correspondence, but emphasized the correspondence 
between ascetic Protestantism and capitalism. The development of spiritual forms is therefore 
constrained by the objective conditions of the existing social order. The thesis of elective 
affinity can not only be "accommodated with", but is a sociological formulation of the 
emergence postulate, and is thus compatible with the methodological holism of the 
Durkheimian tradition. 122 Materiality and symbolism are intertwined, as in the field theory 
perspective on culture. 
Accordingly, it is difficult not to suggest that Weber's PE thesis is a sociological 
precursor of field theory ― an influence that Bourdieu had made explicit.123 It is thanks to 
                     
122  Notice that the methodological individualist criticism of this perspective ascribes a substantialist 
approach to this tradition by overlooking that "it is not the influence of a macro-property itself, but of that which 
gives rise to the macro-property, viz., the new relatedness of the parts'" (Schröder: 447, emphasis added) that 
influences the behavior of the parts. 
123  "[M]y reading of Max Weber - who, far from opposing Marx, as is generally thought, with a 
spiritualist theory of history, in fact carries the materialist mode of thought into areas which Marxist 
materialism effectively abandons to spiritualism - helped me greatly in arriving at this kind of generalized 
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this convergence that the work of Weber deserves to be integrated in the criticism of 
substantialist reason.124 It is only owing to its most influential interpretations ― but despite 
Weber's extreme care in grappling with the complexity of the subject ― that his PE thesis 
would end up canonized as a substantialist inquiry. Absent its substantialist misappropriation, 
the PE thesis would have probably long been integrated into field theory. 
By claiming that "cultural values have an enduring and autonomous influence on 
society" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 48, emphasis added) Inglehart disregards the actual 
legacy of the PE thesis, as well as Mills' warning that "[t]o simplify these vocabularies of 
motive into a socially abstracted terminology is to destroy the legitimate use of motive in the 
explanation of social actions" (Mills 1940: 913). Careful reading of Inglehart's writings 
suggests that this indifference is reflexive rather than willful, as his definitions of culture at 
times include references to the materiality of representations: "beliefs, values, knowledge, and 
skills that have been internalized by the people of a given society, complementing their 
external systems of coercion and exchange" (1997: 15, emphasis in the original). However, 
the implications of this latter, sensible formulation remain unpacked as Inglehart's inquiry has 
not departed from the norm-based, self-actionist, and the variable-centered, inter-actionist 
subclasses of substantialist thinking. The attribution of generative capacities to specific 
cultural values is in line with the former, the postulate of cultural shifts triggered by rising 
affluence with the latter variant. 
None of these accounts grasps how values are embedded in the socio-economic context. 
Social contexts are fields where structure and agency, material ("economic") and symbolic 
("cultural") are bound together in ways irreducible to a "dominant effect" or causality.125 
                                                                
materialism; this will be a paradox only to those who have an over-simple view of Weber's thought, owing to the 
combined effect of the rarity of translations, the one-sidedness of the early French and American interpretations, 
and the perfunctory anathemas pronounced by 'Marxist' orthodoxy." (Bourdieu 1990: 17, emphasis added) 
124  Parsons' action-system requisite (AGIL) model relies on insights similar to the Weberian 
understanding of elective affinity in the sense that none of the four subsystems is purely spiritual or 
instrumental/material (Alexander 1987). In addition to Parsons's difficult prose, it is probably unfamiliarity with 
the PE essays in their entirety that can partly explain why the Weberian roots of AGIL are not recognized on 
their merits (that is, in the sense discussed in this chapter). Treviño claims that "it is precisely elective affinity 
requisite analysis that is now needed to fine-tune Parsons's AGIL model and make it more consonant with 
Weber's approach to social action" (2005: 341). 
125 In a study combining conceptual analysis with and empirical study regarding the culture-economy 
dialectic, Brons points out that "(t)here are no (objectively limited) counterparts of 'culture' and 'economy' in 
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Bourdieu's studies on symbolic power indicate that values ― like mental representations in 
general ― are part of habitus. Applied to our case study, this means that values should be 
treated as integral to agency, ("in situ"), and not as a priori referential standards or superposed 
justifications. In this respect, Schwartz's definition of values as "normative emphases that 
underlie and justify the functioning of social institutions" (2011: 314, emphasis added) ― 
where the terms "underlie" and "justify" capture, in accordance with the concepts of elective 
affinity and habitus, both their materiality and symbolism, as well as their transsituational 
character ―, is compatible with the relational approach taken in this study. 126  The 
reengagement with Weber's PE thesis suggests a promising perspective in the sociology of 
values, provided it is in accordance with the approach outlined with reference to the concept 
of elective affinity ― which is to say that to apply Weber's actual insights from the PE thesis 
to value research, one should consult Bourdieu. 
The empirical analyses presented in Chapters 1 and 2 as part of a critique of Inglehart's 
theses have highlighted possible strategies. Nonetheless, as their focus is the ecological, not 
the individual level (reflecting the limitations of cross-cultural comparisons due to construct 
incongruence), they provide little if any clues as to the embeddedness of values in agency. A 
relational sociology of values will have to tackle that latter issue ― probably by abandoning 
cross-cultural comparisons since, at the current stage, these are difficult to carry out at the 
individual level. With this limitation in mind, I conclude by highlighting a direction that 
attempts to link the study of values at the individual level with a field analysis of symbolic 
forms. 
3.4.1. Construct incongruence reformulated as signal of field effect 
In Chapter 1, we have seen how ignoring the structural variance of cultural values has 
led Inglehart to construct summary indicators that in a significant number of nations do not 
measure the same phenomenon. The field theoretical perspective helps reformulate the 
problems related to structural equivalence by expounding implications that are of secondary 
interest ― or sidestepped altogether ― in the current literature. The rationale for addressing 
these concerns again is not simply to restate the same problem in field analytical terminology: 
                                                                
reality" (2005: 339) and that "[e]mpirical research that insufficiently takes this into account can only produce 
trivial results" (ibid.: 338). 
126 Notwithstanding, Schwartz's work focuses first and foremost on internal construct consistency and not 
on how values are embedded in agency. 
 
126 
there is more to the imperative of structural invariance than the issues discussed so far. I 
illustrate this with reference to an important limitation of the value constructs proposed in this 
study as alternatives to Inglehart's scales. 
Since the cultural emphases that latent constructs purport to capture are relational, the 
researcher has to fine-tune the method of inquiry to account for this flexibility. The insights 
from field analysis suggest that even constructs whose structural invariance has been 
established ― including the measures of religiosity and authoritarianism proposed in this 
study ― may be of limited empirical relevance. This is because while it can be demonstrated 
that what they do capture has reasonably invariant meaning across the subsets (nations) 
studied, this invariant structure might still not account fully for the underlying phenomenon. 
Compared with Inglehart's secular-traditional and self-expression-survival scales, my 
alternative constructs differ not only in content but also in being restricted to nations where 
they express the same value oppositions. 
With regard to authoritarianism, we have to recognize that there are aspects of 
authoritarianism that are certainly not captured by the measure introduced in Chapter 1 ― 
especially in the case of the economically most developed countries. This is because of the 
"changing face" of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism, defined in Chapter 1 as uncritical 
reliance on/acceptance of coercion (regardless of source, medium, beliefs or actual practices) 
includes ― following the logic of domination that constitutes the gist of Bourdieu's 
theoretical legacy ― the ascription of immutable substances to groups of people with the 
purpose of defining them in terms of intrinsic worth that ranges from backward (vulgar) to 
sophisticated (spiritual). 
My indicator of authoritarianism seems to fit a traditional formulation (rejection of 
outgroups, oppressive gender roles, restraints on the freedom of speech, resentment of 
political subversion) ― but this does not mean that those who, by these standards, qualify as 
libertarian are indeed non-authoritarian in contexts where authoritarianism has other carriers. 
Noting that the elites have traditionally constituted the avant-garde of ethical innovation, 
Bourdieu finds evidence in surveys that the higher classes have a tendency to reject the 
"aristocratic stiffness" of "older" elites in favor of a relaxed and increasingly liberal stance in 
matters related to domestic morality (especially gender roles). Yet he also warns that these 
signs should not be read as evidence of a shift to lesser actual authoritarianism because a 
"new mode of domination, based on 'velvet glove' methods, at school, in church or in 
industry" (Bourdieu 1984: 311) is being adopted: a progression toward even more 
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euphemisms with an increasingly sophisticated ― and, by implication, less visible ― 
immunization of elite privileges as a consequence. The elites may gradually shift to liberal or 
libertarian positions in matters that are becoming secondary or insignificant to the exercise of 
power because the levers of social control have also shifted ― from more "tangible" to less 
visible means of coercion. However, they will retain the authoritarian outlook in matters 
perceived as central to the social order and remain intolerant of what they see as challenges to 
their domination. 127  Foucault's seminal work (1975) on the increasing sophistication of 
surveillance techniques in modern societies is of valuable guidance ― because fully 
compatible with the relational perspective. Bourdieu's studies on the evolution of the 
linguistic market and his anatomy of cultural consumption give a comprehensive account of 
these processes with regard to symbolic dominance.128 
Three of the four items composing the authoritarianism scale in this study tap the "old 
school" variant of authoritarianism, and are therefore inadequate for measuring the more 
sophisticated variant that Bourdieu describes.129 This means that the shift toward libertarian 
values in Western societies (where the newer variant is likely to be more significant, even if 
restricted to the higher strata) might be less pronounced than is measured by that indicator. 
Studies involving more detailed indicators are required to capture these phenomena in their 
complexity. 
The same caution is in order regarding the definition of materialism ― one of the most 
controversial aspects of Inglehart's approach to value measurement. The criticism reviewed in 
Chapter 1 has pointed out that the Postmaterialism Index conflates the authoritarian-
libertarian dimension with actual materialism, which is defined as the preference for material 
gain against other forms of "compensation". But the anthropological weaknesses of the 
                     
127 "It should scarcely be necessary to point out that if the members of the dominant class are more 
'innovating' in domestic morality but more 'conservative' in the area more widely regarded as 'political', i.e., in 
everything concerned with the economic and political order and with class relations (as shown by their answers 
on strikes, unions etc.), this is because their propensity to adopt 'innovating' or 'revolutionary' positions varies in 
inverse ratio with the degree to which the changes in question affect the basis of their privilege." (Bourdieu 
1984: 432, emphasis added) 
128  Moreover, the production of intellectual discourses, including the knowledge produced by value 
research, is part of this process. 
129 It is not unlikely that some "new school" authoritarians would even be in favor of ― or not opposed to 
― at least one of the three actions included in the set which measures acceptance or rejection of subversive 
actions (see Table 15 in Appendix 2). 
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postmaterialism thesis remain even after the core thesis has been saved from this conflation. 
The fallacy of extrapolating Maslowian needs theory to the study of values can be grasped by 
recognizing the various field effects shaping actors' relation to material gain. Owing to its 
variable-centered approach and one-sided focus on scarcity, Inglehart's postmaterialism thesis 
posits that once a threshold of relative affluence is reached (beyond which "survival is taken 
for granted" (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 26), preoccupation with "money and stuff" will 
subside: 
 
"The shift from Modernization to Postmodernization reflects the diminishing marginal 
utility of economic determinism: economic factors tend to play a decisive role under 
conditions of economic scarcity, but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society 
to an increasing degree." (Inglehart 1997: 59) 
 
One could hardly find a better illustration of the inter-actional subclass of substantialist 
thinking in value research: it is variable properties or levels of separate entities that "cause" 
things, not actors. Against this assumption, the heterodox tradition that, in many respects, is 
compatible with the field theory perspective on values takes a relational view. In addition to 
Veblen (2007), the authors referenced in connection with the criticism of neoclassical growth 
models, Polanyi,130 Galbraith, Baran and Sweezy have argued that the imperative of material 
accumulation has always included an expressive function. Therefore, far from subsiding 
among the affluent sectors (or in an overall affluent society), it merely manifests itself in 
different, more sophisticated forms ― to the point of being unrecognizable thanks to the 
energies invested in wasteful consumption and sophisticated rituals. Bourdieu's Distinction 
provides an empirical corroboration of this thesis: higher positions in the social hierarchy 
correspond to increased investment in wasteful consumption and apparently futile, 
disinterested activities, whose function is to deny one's own and repudiate others' 
materialism. 131  But this does not mean that the affluent sectors are less materialistic: 
                     
130 "[Man] does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he 
acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in 
so far as they serve this end. Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific 
economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a 
number of social interests which eventually ensure that the required step be taken." (Polanyi 2001: 48, emphasis 
added) 
131 The Veblenite influences are obvious, although seldom expounded in Bourdieu's writings. 
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obviously, such a lifestyle cannot be sustained at lower income levels. Subject to the relative 
position in the field, material interest is expressed in many different forms. 
A fine-tuning of the measurement apparatus is needed to account for this tendency to 
euphemize the same underlying drive ("maximizing pecuniary gains"). The equivalence issues 
call for an adaptation of our survey designs to the requirements of a relational analysis of 
values. Given the specificity of the local (national) contexts, what such a study will gain in 
depth will likely lose in breadth due to increased cross-cultural construct variance. The 
religiosity and authoritarianism measures presented in this study ― like any other, cross-
culturally comparable latent construct ― are inadequate in this regard. Their parsimony 
means greater comparability, but at the price of a loss in sophistication. 
3.4.2. Subjective versus objective truth 
If the preceding admonitions sound alarming, there is a further difficulty that a 
sociology of values adopting the field theory perspective will have to consider. This is a 
caution against attributing too much theoretical importance to values. From the field analysis 
perspective, the more carefully the researcher goes about detecting the structure of those 
representations that (a) fit Schwartz's practical definition of values ("normative emphases that 
underlie and justify the functioning of social institutions") and (b) capture all significant 
aspects of the specific values considered, the closer the resulting construct(s) will be not to 
"the value(s)" but to the gravitational principle around which the field (including the values) 
is organized. The following quote from Martin states this dilemma unequivocally: 
 
"[F]ield theorists assume that the field is defined by certain common primary 
motivations ― subjective representations of 'what is good to strive for' […] ― and 
organizes other ones. This conception differs from standard ideas of values (ultimate or 
penultimate conceptions of the generally desirable) in two ways […]. First of all, values 
are not general aspects of culture, but field specific. Consequently, far from being 
universal in some group, they are predictably distributed across social positions, since 
norms are simply a way of describing regularities in motivation that come from interest-
locations. Second, while the subjective representations of 'what is good to strive for' are 
generally perceived as ethical imperatives, this ethicality is secondary to the field 
structure ― the subjective experience of values as injunctions is a cognitive 
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simplification of what is otherwise a complex task of navigating a field." (Martin 2003: 
37, emphasis added) 
 
This nuanced formulation outlines a difficulty specific to field analysis. Viewpoints, 
preferences, tastes, justifications, rationalizations, etc. certainly exist and therefore can be 
measured. They might be more or less incongruent regarding their explicit content, but the 
closer the focus to their actual content, the more congruent the underlying rationale because 
these mental representations merely reflect ― even though via disparate vocabularies ― the 
same underlying principle. As the above examples with reference to authoritarianism and 
materialism illustrate, once the definition includes those aspects that are hidden from the 
actor's purview, the resulting definitions (and by implication, measures) of the values in 
question will reflect the field's organizing principle in a way that would remain hidden if the 
study kept to a less nuanced definition. That is exactly what is proposed in Distinction: 
although the judgments of taste specific to different locations in the field appear 
incommensurable from the standpoint of the actors, they are commensurable from the 
analytical perspective: they can be brought to a common benchmark by revealing the forces 
structuring the field. 
In other words: the more latent the construct, the less it taps the cognitive simplification 
(stemming from subjective experience), and the more it reveals what is being cognitively 
simplified ― that is, the gravitational principle. Regarding the outcomes, it is the logic of the 
field that matters, not the cognitive simplification.132 
                     
132 The opposite perspective, which views values are self-referential ethical imperatives obeying their 
immanent logic can be traced back to Weber's theory of value spheres (1946). Of the latter, Weber identified six 
with reference to an "ultimate" value specific to each sphere (in parenthesis): the economy (financial gain), 
politics (domination), intellectualism (truth), religion (caritas), aestheticism (beauty), erotic love (mutual 
possession). It should be stressed that the argument built around this typology departs significantly from the 
perspective developed in connection with elective affinity. Weber's typology of values spheres is not relational: 
he views the six spheres as becoming increasingly autonomous, disconnected domains, each obeying its 
immanent logic. This tendency is labeled Eigengesetzlichkeit: literally self-government by its own laws. 
Oakes (2003) argues that Weber's typology and the analysis of the processes built around it are 
inconsistent and self-contradictory on several counts. First, Weber's view of occidental modernization as driven 
toward (instrumental) rationality and intellectualization is incompatible with the thesis of increasingly 
autonomous value spheres. Second, his insistence that the value spheres evolve toward systematization and 
rationalization (the logic of intellectualism) is incompatible with the logic of immanence: either intellectualism is 
not a separate value sphere or it "rationalizes all others" (2003: 36), in which case the six spheres are not 
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I illustrate this with a study by Abrahamson (2014) on the networking habits of college 
graduates in Britain. Following the variable-centered logic, it is expected that actors invest 
whatever personal assets in status advancement, including developing rewarding personal 
networks. Accordingly, those with higher qualifications are assumed to achieve higher rates 
of upward mobility than do those with lower qualifications. However, this does not mean that 
everybody engaged in the field will adopt the same attitude with regard to career 
advancement. Abrahamson's study has found that graduates from a working class background 
are reluctant to invest in networking. The explanation is the existence of a "code of honor" in 
light of which such practices are viewed as opportunistic, antithetical to their work ethics 
which place highest value on genuine achievements and despise what is seen as "nepotism". 
This is in line with the logic of exclusion that operates in the act of consumption: the behavior 
of the upper classes is viewed as unnecessarily euphemized, hypocritically sophisticated, in 
contrast with the authenticity and spontaneity of the popular classes. In rejecting the elite's 
posture, the popular classes are complicit in their own exclusion ― regardless of how they 
live this objective reality. In doing that, they reinforce the principles of domination inscribed 
in the logic of the field which favors the elites' self-reproduction. 
This rationale is at odds with the substantialist perspective adopted by Inglehart, where 
different emphases on a value like "achievement motivation" or "work values" are modeled to 
                                                                
autonomous. Third, the suggestion that action amounts to taking a value position (a stance) is incompatible with 
the thesis that there are no (axiologically) neutral "vantage" points ― and also with the proposition that the 
principles immanent to each sphere cannot be demonstrated within the spheres. Fourth, the typology is 
inconsistent with the Weberian dichotomy of value versus instrumental rationality (1978). Instrumental 
rationality requires cost-benefit analysis: it supposes an end, a value in light of which costs and benefits will be 
weighted. Positing the existence of such ends, the corresponding action is not instrumental but value rational; on 
the other hand, in the absence of ends, cost-benefit analysis is impossible. 
The field analytic reformulation of the issues specific to value research corroborates this criticism. Like 
Weber's typology, Bourdieu's concept of symbolic profit acknowledges the existence of different rationales for 
action that reflect value conflicts, but it conceives of these as oppositions, not as implying incommensurable 
benefits. Although symbolic profits might appear as incommensurable from the standpoint of the actors, they can 
be brought to a common principle by deconstructing the subjective rationalizations that form a veil around that 
principle. If the convergence of values ― as vocabularies of action, cognitive simplifications ― on a same 
underlying gravitational principle can be demonstrated, then the theoretical dilemmas stemming from the 
contradictions within Weber's work on values will be decided in favor of his thesis on elective affinity. One then 
will not escape the irony that it is the latter, empirically relevant chapter of his work on values that much of 
current scholarship disregards in favor of its idealist interpretation. 
 
132 
"explain" various micro (e.g., support for democracy) or macro outcomes (e.g., national rates 
of per capita output growth). In the relational perspective, the importance of a value like 
individual achievement is, in itself meaningless: what matters is not what actors declare in 
responses to survey questions ― or what latent clusters their responses reveal ― but how 
they regulate their own conduct in the field of careers in relation to not only values, but other 
constituents of the field. Regardless of whether or not the working-class graduates in 
Abrahamson's study have adopted the values of "achievement motivation", this tells nothing 
about how they actually navigate the field ― or their career outcomes. It can be that those 
members of the popular classes that are in possession of the degrees required for certain 
career paths will achieve less occupational mobility precisely because they have more 
successfully internalized the official ideology of achievement (that the elites have learnt to 
treat with "qualifications"), in light of which they will view the various opportunistic tricks 
required for improving one's career prospects as repellent. (The thesis of Distinction suggests 
that they will.) An apparent endorsement of an "official" value like individual achievement 
may therefore conceal a variety of actuated strategies, simultaneously instrumental and 
symbolic ― and thus may not in itself explain outcomes that depend on the forces organizing 
the field.133 What the possession of the degrees and the internalization of the official ideology 
do not explain ― stalled careers ― will be explained with reference to the relations between 
these and other attributes, as well as to the location in the field. 
This example highlights two linkages with Weber's typology of action. The first 
concerns Weber's definition of action: a subclass of conducts in which "the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior" (1978: 4). From field theorists' careful 
distinction between objective and subjective logics of action, it follows that conduct will 
contribute to the stability of the field insofar as the subjective meaning attached to behavior 
stems from a misapprehension of the gravitational principle in the case of the dominated. The 
gravitational principle will pull the dominant and the dominated to adopt different postures 
with regard to "individual achievement". The dominants will tacitly realize ― although not 
admit openly ― that this "value" is much less important to one's career prospects than its 
ideological consecration suggests, while the dominated will identify with it to such a degree 
                     
133 Abrahamson's findings recall the famous study by Marsh (1963) which found that differences in rates 
of social mobility between industrial and preindustrial societies stem not from a stronger emphasis on 
"achievement values" in the case of the former, but from sheer occupational demand: the expanding industrial 
and service sectors "suck in" an increasing portion of the workforce regardless of their values. 
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that they will end up blocking their avenues of upward mobility as a result. Since this 
alignment requires the misapprehension of the gravitational principle on behalf of both the 
dominated and the dominants, the "valuation" or subjective truth ― the cognitive 
simplification ― is less important than the gravitational force, the objective truth. 
The second linkage is the proposition that passive conduct ranks at the same level of 
significance as active conduct. If accompanied with subjective meaning, passive conduct is 
not inaction. In his outline of sociological concepts, Weber (ibid.) had pointed out that three 
subclasses of passive conduct: omission, acquiescence, and permission constitute a subtype of 
action in their own right. He even took care to note that utility ― that is, "economic" 
serviceability ― can be derived from passive, as well as active conduct.134 Abrahamson's 
study shows that the adoption of the official values of achievement can result in passive 
conduct, that is, refraining from networking in the case of those members of the working class 
whose graduate degrees "in principle" open up avenues of upward mobility. From the point of 
view of the dominant sectors, much of the utility derived from the conduct of the dominated 
stems from passive conduct (especially omission and acquiescence) because it constitutes a 
particularly efficient ― energy saving ― mode of alignment with the gravitational principle. 
Given the importance of inertia in the constitution of fields, field analysis therefore 
approaches passive and active conduct as equally important "dependent" variables ― 
although their status as dependent variables is construed differently than in the General Linear 
Model. 
3.5. Conclusion 
A field analysis of religiosity, authoritarianism and materialism at the level of individual 
behavior will relate these values to the organizing principles of the field of class relations ― 
the broadest field structuring agency and the subfields defined with reference to the 
possession of specific assets/capitals. Bourdieu's empirical accounts of symbolic power show 
that in addition to the amount of (economic) capital possessed, the symbolic relation to 
material interest ― ranging from embracement to denial ― are keys to this principle. 
                     
134 Defining utility with reference to "services", Weber notes that "[t]he fact that only active conduct, and 




Likewise, if values as cognitive simplifications are indeed secondary to the "task of 
navigating the field", then it is legitimate to suppose that religiosity, authoritarianism and 
materialism ― and, moreover, all "normative emphases" ― can be related to the same 
underlying principle. After all, with reference to the epistemological tradition in which field 
analysis is embedded, it can be argued these three values all express the distance actors take 
from the open expression of material interest. In the case of religiosity, the ultimate value (the 
sacred, in the Durkheimian sense) is defined in opposition to worldly, that is, material 
concerns. Authoritarianism and its opposite value, libertarianism, relate to, in the final 
analysis, approval or rejection of coercion ― regardless of "format" or "medium" but always 
with reference to legitimizing (un)equal access to assets. Materialism, as defined in the above 
sense, is the most straightforward manifestation of this opposition. Bourdieu's studies suggest 
that high-brow taste, sophisticated linguistic practices and the most frequent manifestations of 
economic habitus are oriented toward the denial/concealment of material interest: 
 
"The struggle between the dominant fractions and the dominated fractions […] tends, in 
its ideological retranslation […] to be organized by oppositions that are almost 
superimposable on those which the dominant vision sets up between the dominant class 
and the dominated classes: on the one hand, freedom, disinterestedness, the 'purity' of 
sublimated tastes, salvation in the hereafter; on the other, necessity, self-interest, base 
material satisfactions, salvation in this world" (Bourdieu 1984: 254, emphasis added). 
 
In other words: salvation in the field theory perspective is the cognitive effort to define 
a situation and oneself in opposition to material concerns. 135  Accordingly, shifts from a 
religious to a secular outlook as measured by our current apparatus can be shown to be of 
secondary importance if associated with shifts from authoritarian to libertarian or from 
materialist to non-materialist positions. (As well as with shifts in any other value dimensions 
reflecting the same underlying principle.) Denial and rejections of worldly concerns do not 
                     
135 The roots of this synthetic approach can be traced back to Durkheim: although he had not formulated a 
theory of "values", his elaboration on the concept of anomy (1991, 2014) and the collective "tempering" of 
individual "passions" is compatible with the central argument in his sociology of religion (2001). 
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disappear with the decline of conventional forms of religion: they are merely manifested via 
different cognitive simplifications.136 
Like with any inquiry into any subject, the metathesis of this thesis revolves around the 
definition of the subject. Beneath the arguments presented in this study lies the deeper and 
more important question: what are values? Obviously, a work of this scope cannot purport to 
formulate a definition. Nonetheless, if the field analytical view of values as cognitive 
simplifications required to navigating a field of force is correct, then we might propose that all 
values stem from the same underlying principle. Furthermore, if values can be shown to stem 
from the logic of the aesthetic distinctions structuring the field of class relations, then this will 
mean that values are no more than euphemizations of the way actors relate to material 
interest. In this perspective, the challenge to researchers will be to identify the appropriate 
level of analysis where these euphemizations are sufficiently disparate to conceal ― from the 
standpoint of the individual actor ― the gravitational principle, but at the same time 
transsituational enough to form stable orientations. This thesis has merely outlined the 
approach required to address these issues.  
                     
136  The oppositions captured by Schwartz's two higher-order values: self-transcendence versus self-
enhancement, and openness to change versus conservation (Figure 7, p. 35) can also be accommodated within 
this framework. This is most evident with regard to the opposition between self-transcendence and self-
enhancement and their respective lower-level values: universalism and benevolence versus achievement, power 
and hedonism. In the case of conservation versus openness to change, the spiritual versus materialism opposition 
is present, albeit in their combinations at both poles. At the openness to change pole, the lower-level value 
constituting the transition to self-enhancement: hedonism is closer to the materialism "meta-value"; while the 
other lower-level value: self-direction, to its opposite, self-transcendence. (Stimulation falls in between these 






The issues with Inglehart's two theses reviewed in this thesis boil down to a 
methodological apparatus developed in agreement with the substantialist perspective. This 
study has argued that value research needs a departure from this paradigm. Abandoning the 
culture-economy dichotomy as empirically irrelevant, the challenge faced in the sociology of 
values is a reorientation on the actor-field dialectic. Ignoring this relationality has led to 
misconceptions about the "origins" and "consequences" of values. 
The relevant chapters in Weber's and Bourdieu's work suggest that the field analytical 
approach emphasizing the inextricability of values from objective (material) conditions is 
firmly anchored in the classical sociological tradition. However, given the influence of the 
variable-centered paradigm, which came to dominate the social sciences through much of the 
20th century, this tradition ― including pragmatist, institutional, and heterodox currents ― 
has been of limited influence in value research. This might also explain the low level of 
sociological engagement with the field. 
Overall, the merits of Inglehart's work, including the two theses dissected in this study, 
overweight their weaknesses. Were it not for his output, cross-cultural research would have 
probably followed a different trajectory starting with the mid-1970s. His theory of value 
change and his empirical studies have sparked debates that still contribute to the development 
of survey technology, quantitative methods, and theorizing. In particular, research into 
construct invariance has gained momentum after 2000 when the proliferation of data collected 
by the major global representative surveys and a growing number of related publications had 
brought these issues to light. If the study of values in the 21st century stands a good chance of 
overcoming "the balkanized nature of research" (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004), it will be in large 
part thanks to the apparatus developed by and in engagement with Inglehart. 
Nevertheless, a major challenge for the work ahead is related to the proliferation of 
data. In this respect, it is crucial that practitioners of cross-cultural research (or in any other 
field) be aware of the limitations of the variable-centered approach. In retrospect, Inglehart's 
studies from the 1970s on had most of the ingredients of a scientific enterprise organized 
around what today is called Big Data. Most of the issues with his work discussed in this study 
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stem from the related focus on entities and their properties. Not if anything was wrong with 
Big Data: "the coming crisis of empirical sociology" (Savage and Burrows 2007) is probably 
less a matter of accessing the growing body of social data produced and stored out of the 
reach of academic researchers than of handling what is already available of this bewildering 
mass. Given this unprecedented abundance, the substantialist temptation is almost 
insurmountable: there is no shortage of indicators for any research idea, no matter how well 
formulated ― and vice versa: any variable, especially if available cross-culturally and 
longitudinally, appears to promise unexplored avenues. Inglehart's more recent work has not 
departed from the variable-centered perspective, and some of his students whose output is 
gaining comparable influence (e.g., Welzel) have ventured further in this direction. 
One should ask the question: were Durkheim to study suicide today, would he have 
gained a deeper insight into the forces driving individuals to kill themselves by running 
dozens of multilevel regressions and a plethora of cross-country comparisons using 
individual-level data on a scale he could not have dreamed of in the 1890s? If he adopted the 
variable-centered approach, the answer to this question would echo Lieberson's remark, 
quoted earlier: "regretfully, probably not". Against this, Durkheim had followed, relying on 
the scarce aggregate statistics of the time, the rules of trade regarding the construction of the 
object that still constitute the best practice in sociology. 
The influence of substantialist reason in value research is here to stay, since, in the 
words of Wacquant, "(t)his linguistic proclivity to favor substance at the expense of relations 
is buttressed by the fact that sociologists are always competing with other specialists in the 
representation of the social world, and especially with politicians and media experts who have 
a vested interest in such commonsense thinking" (1992: 15). Understandably, these 
competitive pressures have only been growing with the transition to Big Data. After all, 
punditry now has access to, and is increasingly able to collect "social" data on its own. As a 
result, the solicitation of academic researchers by the intellectual doxa of the day is likely to 
reach new levels. The variable-centered approach has much to offer in terms of attractive, 
apparently actionable explanations, often backed up by accessible outputs. Relational 
sociology has no comparable products on offer, and moreover, has to delineate its inquiry 





Appendix 1: Endnotes on the method 
A1.1. Correspondence analysis 
A1.1.1. Standardization in MCA 
The technique developed by Bry, Robette and Roueff regresses the scores resulting 
from MCA on the structural variable (e.g., age, income, region, country) whose effect should 
be eliminated. A principal component analysis is then performed on the residuals of the 
dependent variables. Like in MCA, the number of components to extract is equal to the 
number of dimensions studied. Finally, projecting the categories used in the initial MCA on 
the cloud of individual scores as supplementary variables, we get a cloud of modalities 
"cleared" of the structural effects. The usual coefficients to interpret the supplementary 
variables (e.g., test value, η2) help interpret the resulting structure. Like with Leung and 
Bond’s method, the resulting scores produce zero means and standard deviations of one. In 
contrast, since MCA requires categorical variables, within-subject standardization cannot be 
performed ― but is not necessary, given the reduction of the number of modalities into 
semantically opposed categories. 
A1.1.2. Rotation in MCA 
Rotation in multiple correspondence analysis has been proposed by a number of authors 
(Kiers 1991; Adachi 2004; van de Velden and Kiers 2005) but, until recently, has not been 
implemented in statistical software. The first available software are CAR (Correspondence 
Analysis with Rotation) for MATLAB, developed by Lorenzo-Seva, van de Velden, and 
Kiers (2009), and PCAmixdata, a package for R by Chavent, Kuentz, and Saracco (2010, 
2011). The rotated solutions presented in this section were obtained with these two packages. 
The exploratory analyses were performed using CAR, based on the "cross-cultural" 
contingency table (the Burt table). CAR also calculated the contribution of modalities to the 
 
139 
axes. PCAmixdata provided the coordinates at the individual level for the retained rotated 
solutions. 
A1.1.3. Structuring factor and eta-square (η2) 
The categorical variable used as structuring factor (generation, in the analysis presented 
in Chapter 1) partitions the cloud of individuals into subclouds according to the categories 
along the dimensions. The variance of the mean points of the clouds is the between variance 
of the partition. The average variance of the subclouds defines the within variance. Eta-
square, the correlation ratio is obtained by the following formula: 
=  
 
    [2] 
A1.2. Structural equivalence 
A1.2.1. Tucker's phi coefficient 
The Tucker's phi congruence coefficient is calculated using the following formula: 
= ∑
∑
      [3] 
where x and y are the loadings after target rotation of one to the other. 
A1.2.2. Welzel's secular and emancipative values 
While Welzel (2013) did perform a test of dimensional uniformity of his "secular" and 
"emancipative" values (using the Kayser-Meyer-Olkin measure), its accuracy is far from the 
procedure presented in this study. First, instead of comparing country surveys, he compared 
"Western" and "Non-Western" samples, which almost guarantees that much of the country-
specific effects will be cancelled out. If scores from only those two blocks were compared, the 
approach would be justified. But like in Inglehart’s major monographs, Welzel’s focus is 
country differences of individual values. Second, country specific variations were eliminated 
in the individual data before testing for construct uniformity. Applied to our study, a similar 
procedure would compare the specific country solutions after the within-country 
standardization needed to obtain the universal dimensions presented in the previous section, 
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and the result would be converging structures in all countries. Van de Vijver and Poortinga 
(2002) specifically advise against such standardization: it is precisely those country patterns 
that tests of structural equivalence should explore. 
A1.2.3. Remarks on cross-cultural comparability of constructs 
The current construct comparability criteria applied at the individual level prevents 
important work. Complex individual-level variables like those explored in this study will not 
pass all of these three tests in the majority of country surveys. The 2008 study by Davidov, 
Schmidt, and Schwartz (ibid.) is exceptional in that it has established metric equivalence for a 
seven-construct variant of Schwartz's basic values typology in 20 countries ― but even these 
constructs had failed to achieve scalar equivalence. More recent research into construct 
validity (e.g., Cieciuch and Schwartz 2012; Saris, Knoppen, and Schwartz 2012; Cieciuch et 
al. 2014) has sought new methods involving less stringent criteria to assess equivalence at the 
individual level. While these might open up avenues for future work on cross-cultural 
comparisons of individual values, their implementation would exceed the scope of this study. 
For this reason, the analysis presented below is confined to the ecological level where 






A1.3.1. Variables used in the models 
Per capita GDP 
Gross domestic product divided by midyear population at 
purchasing power parity (PPP). Data are in constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Economic growth 
Growth rate of per capita real GDP (PPP). 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Investment 
Average of the ratio of gross capital formation (formerly gross 
domestic investment): consists of outlays on additions to the fixed 
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories 
―, private plus public, to real GDP. 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Income inequality 
GINI coefficient of income inequality (%). 
Source: World Inequality Database, United Nations 
University―World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (2008). 
Primary/Secondary education 
The number of students enrolled in primary/secondary school 
grade level relative to the population of that age group. 
Source: UNESCO (2014) 
R&D expenditure 
Expenditures for research and development are current and capital 
expenditures (both public and private) on creative work 
undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including 
knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of 
knowledge for new applications. R&D covers basic research, 
applied research, and experimental development. 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Democracy 
"Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by 
subtracting the AUTOC [autocracy] score from the DEMOC 
[democracy] score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from 
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)." 
(Marshalll, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010: 17) 
Source: Polity IV Dataset, Center for Systemic Peace (M. G. 
Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002) 
Political violence 
Total summed magnitudes of all societal (civil violence, civil 
warfare, ethnic violence, ethnic warfare) and interstate 
(international violence, international warfare) violence. Each 
instance of violence ranges from 1 (sporadic or expressive 
political violence) to 10 (extermination and annihilation). 
Source: Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and 
Conflict Regions (1946-2008) database, Center for Systemic 
Peace, Monty G. Marshall. 
Physical integrity 
A measure of government respect for physical integrity rights, 
ranges from 0 (none) to 8 (full). The score is computed by adding 
the scores ranging from 0 (none), 1 (partial) and 2 (full) 
expressing respect for physical integrity with regard to 
disappearances, killings, imprisonment and torture (Cingranelli 
and Richards 2010). 
Source: The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data 
Project, 2008. 
Authoritarian regime (post 1945) 
The nation has lived under authoritarian regime(s) after 1945. 
Source: Polity IV Dataset, Center for Systemic Peace 
Former colony, 20th century 
The country was colonized during the 20th century. 
Source: United Nations. 
Former colonial power, 20th century 
The country had colonies during the 20th century. 
Source: United Nations. 
Religiosity and authoritarianism 
Country scores of the respective values obtained by 
correspondence analysis at the ecological level. 
Source: this study, analysis presented in Figure 8 and Table 5 (p. 
37). 
Autonomy vs. embeddedness, egalitarianism vs. hierarchy, 
harmony vs. mastery 
Country scores of the respective values obtained by 
multidimensional scaling at the ecological level. 
Source: Schwartz Value Survey. 
Achievement values 
"Four Item Achivement Motivation Index comprised of (Thrift + 
Determination) - (Obedience + Religious Faith)." (Granato, 
Inglehart, and Lebalng 1996a: 628) 
Source: World Values Survey (1990). 
Postmaterialism 
Mean score of Inglehart's Postmaterialism Index. 




A1.3.2. Diagnostic tests 
The Durbin-Watson procedure tests the assumption that the residuals from the 
regression are not serially correlated from one observation to the next. Serial or 
autocorrelation is evidence of model uncertainty. A value around 2 indicates non-
autocorrelation; toward 0, positive autocorrelation; and toward 4, negative autocorrelation. A 
value between 1.8 and 2.2 is generally accepted as indication of non-autocorrelation. (The 
acceptable interval depends on the number of dependent variables and the sample size, 
therefore the lower and upper bounds may vary. The tests related to the models presented in 
this section use the significance tables by (Savin and White 1977). A † indicates that the 
residuals are not serially correlated. 
The Jarque-Bera coefficient tests for the normal distribution of the residuals. A 
significant χ2 value (at two degrees of freedom) indicates normal distribution.) The White 
procedure is a test of homoskedasticity: residuals are homoskedastic if their standard 
deviation for different values of the predicted (dependent) variable is close to constant. 
(Otherwise the accuracy of the prediction would vary depending on the value of the 
dependent variable, which is an indication of bad fit.) Here, a significant χ2 (with degrees of 






Appendix 2: Additional tables and figures 
Table 14 Countries included in the individual-level analysis of universal dimensions 
Albania [2002], Algeria [2002], Argentina [1999], Austria [1999], Bangladesh [2002], Belarus [2000], 
Belgium [1999], Bosnia Federation [2001], Bulgaria [1999], Canada [2000], Chile [2000], Czech Republic 
[1999], Denmark [1999], Egypt [2000], Estonia [1999], Finland [2000], France [1999], Germany East [1999], 
Germany West [1999], Great Britain, excl. N. Ireland [1999], Greece [1999], Iceland [1999], India [2001], 
Indonesia [2001], Ireland [1999], Italy [1999], Jordan [2001], Kyrgyzstan [2003], Latvia [1999], Lithuania 
[1999], Luxembourg [1999], Macedonia [2001], Malta [1999], Mexico [2000], Moldova [2002], Montenegro 
[2001], Morocco [2001], Netherlands [1999], Nigeria [2000], Northern Ireland [1999], Peru [2001], Philippines 
[2001], Poland [1999], Portugal [1999], Puerto Rico [2001], Romania [1999], Russian Federation [1999], Serbia 
[2001], Serbian Republic of Bosnia [2001], Slovakia [1999], Slovenia [1999], South Africa [2001], Spain 
[1999], Turkey [2001], Uganda [2001], Ukraine [1999], United States [1999], Viet Nam [2001], Zimbabwe 
[2001] 




Table 15 Recoding of questions from the World Values Survey for the items used in this study 












label for modalities 
in MCA 





a038 THRIFT (saving money and things) 
Qualities that children can 
be encouraged to learn at 
home. 
Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially 
important? 
1: important 




(0, DK) no thrift 
a040 RELIGIOUS FAITH 
(1) learn faith imp. 
0, 1 
(DK=0) 





(0, DK) no unselfishness 
a125 
REJECT OUTGROUPS 
People of a different 
race* Which (if any) of these people 
would you not like to have as 
neighbors? 
 
0 to 4, depending on the number 
of groups mentioned 
 
(only items with an * are used in 
the reduced MCA model) 
(0) accept outgroups 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4 
a129 Immigrants/foreign workers* 
a130 People who have AIDS 





Which ones you personally think 
are important in a job? 
 
1: important 





good pay not 
most imp. 
3 (c011=0) 
2 (c011=1 & 
c016+c018+ 
c019>=2) 
1 (c011=1 & 
c016+c018+ 
c019<=1) 
c016 Opportunity to use initiative 





c019 Responsible job 
d019 CHILDLESS WOMAN 
A woman has to have 
children in order to be 
fulfilled? 
1: not necessary 
0: needs children 
(0) childless woman not OK 
0, 1 
(1) childless woman OK 
e003 
SAY & FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 
First choice Which one of the things would 
you say is most important? And 
the next most important? 
 
1: maintaining order in the nation 
2: give people more say 
3: fighting rising prices 
4: protecting freedom of speech 
(e003=2 or 4) say & freedom of speech most imp. 
4 ([e003=2 or 4 
& e004=2 or 
4]) 
3 ([e003=2 or 
4] & [e004<>2 
& 4]) 
2 ([e003<>2 & 
4] & [e004 =2 
or 4]) 
1 ([e003<>2 & 
4] & [e004<>2 
or 4]) 
e004 Second choice (e003<>2 & 4) 
say & freedom of 
speech not most 
imp. 
e014 
LESS EMPHASIS ON 
MONEY (and material 
possessions) 
If it were to happen, do 
you think it would be a 
good thing, a bad thing, 
or don't you mind? 
1: good thing 
2: don’t mind 
3: bad thing 
(1) less emphasis on money 3 (1) 
2 (2) 




Joining in boycotts Have you actually done, might do 
or would never do any of these 
things: 
 
1: have done 
2: might do 
3: would never do 
(if 3 or 2 for 




might do or 
have done] 



















label for modalities 
in MCA 





e114 STRONG LEADER 
Having a strong leader 
who does not have to 
bother with parliament 
and elections: would you 
say it is: 
1: very good 
2: fairly good 
3: bad 
4: very bad 
(way of governing) 





1 (4) (3, 4) 
opposed to strong 
leader 




4: special holydays 
5: other specific holy days 
6: once a year 
7: less often 
8: never, practically never 
(1, 2, 3) service: 1+/month 6 (1) 
5 (2) 
4 (3) 
3 (4, 5) 
2 (6, 7) 
1 (8) 





Independently of whether 
you go to service or not, 
would you say you are… 
1: a religious person 
2: not a religious person 
3: a convinced atheist 
4: other answer 
(2, 3, DK) not religious 
2 (1) 
1 (2, 3, DK) 
(1) religious 
f051 LIFE AFTER DEATH Do you believe in life after death? 
1: yes 
0: no 
(1) life after death 
0, 1 
(DK=0) 





Do you get comfort and 
strength from religion? 
1: yes 
0: no 
(1) comfort from religion 0, 1 
(DK=0) 
(0, DK) no comfort from religion 
f121 DIVORCE Do you think divorce can be justified? 
1 (never justifiable) to 
10 (always justifiable) 
 (1 thru 4) divorce not OK 
1 thru 10 
(DK=5) (5 thru 10, 
DK) 
not opposed to 
divorce 
Table 15 Recoding of questions from the World Values Survey for the items used in this study 
Note: Continued from previous page. All variables are recoded into binary modalities for multiple correspondence analysis. "Don't 
know" (DK) answers are used for a number of questions, as specified in the recoding rules. Variables c011, c016, c018, and c019 
(work attitudes) are combined into the item "good pay", based on results from a separate multiple correspondence analysis revealing 




Both constructs >= .95 1 construct >= .95 Both constructs < .95 
country & year REL AUT country & year REL AUT country & year REL AUT 
         Argentina 1999 .99 .97 Albania 1998 .99 .33 Algeria 2002 .91 .29 
Australia 1995 .99 .98 Albania 2002 .99 .75 Argentina 1984 .92 .90 
Austria 1990 .99 .97 Argentina 1991 .99 .89 Bangladesh 1996 .82 .88 
Austria 1999 .99 .98 Argentina 1995 .98 .94 Bangladesh 2002 .80 .65 
Belarus 2000 .99 .95 Armenia 1997 .99 .92 India 1995 .93 .47 
Belgium 1981 .99 .95 Azerbaijan 1997 .98 .93 Indonesia 2001 .83 .94 
Belgium 1990 .99 .96 Belarus 1990 .99 .91 Jordan 2001 .48 .75 
Bosnia Fed. 1998 .99 .99 Belarus 1996 .99 .90 Morocco 2001 .36 .53 
Bulgaria 1990 .99 .99 Belgium 1999 .99 .65 Nigeria 2000 .93 .41 
Bulgaria 1997 .99 .96 Bosnia Fed. 2001 .99 .25 Philippines 1996 .88 .78 
Bulgaria 1999 .99 .98 Brazil 1991 .98 .93 Venezuela 1996 .93 .88 
Canada 1982 .99 .99 Brazil 1997 .95 .91    
Canada 1990 .99 .96 Chile 1990 .99 .94 
Table 16 Congruence of the 
religiosity and 
authoritarianism constructs at 
the individual level 
Note: Figures are Tucker’s Phi factor 
congruence coefficients. Data are 
from the World Values Survey, 
waves 1 to 4 (1981-2004, 162 
surveys in 74 countries for the 
pooled-between solution). 
Standardization methods are not 
used. Orthogonal rotation of axes. 
REL refers to religiosity, AUT to 
authoritarianism. A good agreement 
is indicated by an index of .95 or 
higher. 
 
Canada 2000 1.00 .96 Chile 1996 .99 .82 
Croatia 1999 1.00 .98 Chile 2000 .99 .64 
Czech 1991 1.00 .98 Croatia 1996 .99 .92 
Czech 1999 1.00 .99 Czech 1998 1.00 .93 
Denmark 1981 .98 .97 Denmark 1990 .99 .86 
Finland 1990 .98 .96 Denmark 1999 .99 .82 
Finland 1996 .99 .97 Dominican R. 1996 .97 .83 
Finland 2000 .98 .97 Estonia 1996 .97 .91 
France 1990 1.00 .97 Estonia 1999 .98 .86 
France 1999 .99 .97 France 1981 .98 .91 
Germany E. 1990 .98 .99 Georgia 1996 .97 .73 
Germany W. 1981 .98 .96 Germany E. 1997 .99 .93 
Germany W. 1990 .99 .98 Germany E. 1999 .99 .82 
Germany W. 1997 .99 .98 Greece 1999 .97 .82 
Germany W. 1999 .99 .99 Hungary 1991 .99 .79 
Iceland 1984 .95 .98 Hungary 1998 .99 .89 
Iceland 1990 .97 .97 India 1990 .95 .76 
Iceland 1999 .96 .98 India 2001 .97 .91 
Ireland 1981 .98 .99 Ireland 1990 .98 .93 
Italy 1981 .99 .99 Ireland 1999 1.00 .91 
Italy 1990 .99 .99 Latvia 1996 .98 .16 
Italy 1999 .99 .97 Latvia 1999 .99 .84 
Japan 1981 .97 .96 Lithuania 1997 1.00 .92 
Japan 1990 .96 .95 Lithuania 1999 .99 .69 
Kyrgyzstan 2003 .98 .96 Macedonia 1998 .99 .14 
Latvia 1990 .98 .96 Macedonia 2001 .96 .92 
Luxembourg 1999 .97 .95 Malta 1983 .96 .67 
Mexico 1990 .99 .99 Malta 1991 .96 .78 
Mexico 2000 .98 .99 Malta 1999 .95 .79 
Netherlands 1981 .99 .98 Mexico 1996 .99 .51 
Netherlands 1990 1.00 .99 Moldova 1996 .95 .44 
Netherlands 1999 1.00 .97 Moldova 2002 .98 .54 
New Zealand 1998 .99 .98 Montenegro 1996 .99 .70 
Norway 1982 .99 .95 Montenegro 2001 .99 .94 
Norway 1990 .99 .96 Nigeria 1990 .98 .93 
Norway 1996 .99 .96 N. Ireland 1981 .96 .51 
Portugal 1990 .99 .98 N. Ireland 1990 .99 .91 
Portugal 1999 .99 .96 N. Ireland 1999 .99 .92 
Puerto Rico 1995 .98 .98 Peru 1996 .97 .90 
Romania 1999 .98 .95 Peru 2001 .97 .94 
Russia 1995 .98 .95 Philippines 2001 .95 .80 
Serbia 1996 1.00 .98 Poland 1990 .99 .88 
Serbia 2001 .99 .97 Poland 1999 .99 .92 
Slovakia 1999 .98 .96 Puerto Rico 2001 .96 .93 
Slovenia 1995 .99 .96 Romania 1998 .99 .79 
Slovenia 1999 .99 .98 Russia 1990 .99 .88 
Spain 1981 .98 .99 Russia 1999 .99 .90 
Spain 1990 .99 .97 Serbian R. Bosnia 1998 .98 .57 
Spain 1995 .98 .96 Serbian R. Bosnia 2001 .99 .86 
Spain 1999 .99 .98 Slovakia 1991 .99 .93 
Spain 2000 .99 .97 Slovakia 1998 .99 .91 
Sweden 1982 .99 .96 Slovenia 1992 1.00 .79 
Sweden 1990 .99 .98 South Africa 1996 .99 .79 
Switzerland 1996 .99 .96 South Africa 2001 1.00 .63 
Taiwan 1994 .96 .95 Sweden 1996 .99 .93 
Turkey 1990 .98 .95 Turkey 1996 .98 .91 
UK 1981 .98 .96 Turkey 2001 .98 .90 
UK 1990 1.00 .99 Uganda 2001 .98 .73 
Ukraine 1996 .99 .98 UK 1999 .99 .84 
Ukraine 1999 .99 .96 Uruguay 1996 .99 .92 
US 1990 .99 .97 Vietnam 2001 .99 .55 
US 1995 1.00 .97 Zimbabwe 2001 .98 .87 
US 1999 .98 .96   
    
 
147 
country & year REL AUT No.of fits country & year REL AUT 
No.of 
fits country & year REL AUT 
No.of 
fits 
            Argentina 1995 0,98 0,92 2 Serbia 2001 0,99 0,97 2 Bangladesh 2002 0,82 0,64 0 
Argentina 1999 0,99 0,98 2 Slovakia 1991 0,99 0,94 2 India 1995 0,93 0,53 0 
Armenia 1997 0,99 0,92 2 Slovakia 1998 0,99 0,91 2 Japan 1981 0,94 0,77 0 
Australia 1995 0,98 0,98 2 Slovakia 1999 0,99 0,95 2 Jordan 2001 0,61 0,32 0 
Austria 1990 0,99 0,98 2 Slovenia 1995 0,99 0,97 2 Moldova 1996 0,94 0,44 0 
Austria 1999 0,99 0,98 2 Slovenia 1999 0,99 0,99 2 Nigeria 2000 0,93 0,39 0 
Azerbaijan 1997 0,98 0,92 2 Spain 1981 0,97 0,97 2 Philippines 1996 0,85 0,68 0 
Belarus 2000 1,00 0,94 2 Spain 1990 0,99 0,98 2 Portugal 1999 0,94 0,52 0 
Belgium 1981 0,99 0,92 2 Spain 1995 0,97 0,9 2 Turkey 1996 0,93 0,89 0 
Belgium 1990 1,00 0,94 2 Spain 1999 0,99 0,98 2 Venezuela 1996 0,94 0,89 0 
BosniaFed 1998 0,99 0,99 2 Spain 2000 0,99 0,98 2     
Brazil 1991 0,98 0,91 2 Sweden 1982 1,00 0,97 2     
Brazil 1997 0,95 0,90 2 Sweden 1990 0,99 0,99 2 
Table 17 Congruence of the 
religiosity and authoritarianism 
constructs at the ecological level 
Note: Figures are Tucker’s Phi factor 
congruence coefficients. Data are from 
the World Values Survey, waves 1 to 4 
(1981-2004, 162 surveys in 74 countries 
for the pooled-between solution). 
Standardization methods are not used. 
Orthogonal rotation of axes. REL refers 
to religiosity, AUT to authoritarianism. 
A good agreement is indicated by an 
index of .95 or higher for REL, and 0.9 
or higher for AUT. 
 
Bulgaria 1990 0,99 0,99 2 Sweden 1996 0,99 0,94 2 
Bulgaria 1997 0,99 0,93 2 Switzerland 1996 0,99 0,96 2 
Bulgaria 1999 0,99 0,94 2 Taiwan 1994 0,96 0,95 2 
Canada 1982 0,99 0,98 2 Turkey 1990 0,98 0,97 2 
Canada 1990 0,99 0,96 2 UK 1981 0,98 0,93 2 
Canada 2000 0,99 0,94 2 UK 1990 1,00 0,96 2 
Chile 1990 0,99 0,94 2 Ukraine 1996 0,99 0,98 2 
Croatia 1996 0,99 0,92 2 Ukraine 1999 0,99 0,95 2 
Croatia 1999 0,99 0,91 2 Uruguay 1996 0,99 0,93 2 
Czech 1991 1,00 0,98 2 US 1990 0,99 0,98 2 
Czech 1998 1,00 0,90 2 US 1995 0,99 0,97 2 
Czech 1999 1,00 0,99 2 US 1999 0,99 0,98 2 
Estonia 1996 0,97 0,91 2 Albania 1998 0,99 0,34 1 
Finland 1990 0,98 0,95 2 Albania 2002 0,99 0,71 1 
Finland 1996 0,99 0,98 2 Argentina 1991 0,98 0,81 1 
Finland 2000 0,98 0,95 2 Belarus 1990 0,99 0,86 1 
France 1981 0,98 0,90 2 Belarus 1996 0,99 0,87 1 
France 1990 1,00 0,97 2 Belgium 1999 0,99 0,73 1 
France 1999 0,99 0,98 2 BosniaFed 2001 0,99 0,28 1 
GermanyE 1990 0,99 0,99 2 Chile 1996 0,99 0,78 1 
GermanyE 1997 0,99 0,90 2 Chile 2000 0,99 0,63 1 
GermanyW 1981 0,98 0,95 2 Denmark 1981 0,98 0,88 1 
GermanyW 1990 0,99 0,98 2 Denmark 1990 0,99 0,86 1 
GermanyW 1997 0,99 0,99 2 Denmark 1999 0,99 0,83 1 
GermanyW 1999 0,99 0,95 2 DominicanR 1996 0,97 0,77 1 
Iceland 1990 0,97 0,97 2 Estonia 1999 0,98 0,77 1 
Iceland 1999 0,95 0,98 2 Georgia 1996 0,98 0,69 1 
India 2001 0,97 0,93 2 GermanyE 1999 0,99 0,8 1 
Ireland 1981 0,97 0,98 2 Greece 1999 0,97 0,81 1 
Ireland 1990 0,98 0,94 2 Hungary 1991 0,99 0,82 1 
Ireland 1999 1,00 0,92 2 Hungary 1998 0,99 0,89 1 
Italy 1981 0,98 0,92 2 Iceland 1984 0,91 0,9 1 
Italy 1990 0,99 0,98 2 India 1990 0,96 0,78 1 
Italy 1999 0,99 0,98 2 Indonesia 2001 0,83 0,94 1 
Japan 1990 0,96 0,95 2 Latvia 1996 0,98 0,16 1 
Kyrgyzstan 2003 0,98 0,96 2 Latvia 1999 0,99 0,84 1 
Latvia 1990 0,95 0,97 2 Macedonia 1998 0,99 0,16 1 
Lithuania 1997 1,00 0,94 2 Malta 1983 0,96 0,67 1 
Lithuania 1999 1,00 0,94 2 Malta 1991 0,96 0,78 1 
Luxembourg 1999 0,98 0,91 2 Malta 1999 0,97 0,84 1 
Macedonia 2001 0,96 0,93 2 Mexico 1996 0,99 0,48 1 
Mexico 1990 0,99 0,99 2 Moldova 2002 0,98 0,49 1 
Mexico 2000 0,98 0,98 2 Montenegro 1996 0,98 0,64 1 
Montenegro 2001 0,99 0,93 2 Morocco 2001 0,95 0,86 1 
Netherlands 1981 0,99 0,99 2 NIreland 1981 0,96 0,46 1 
Netherlands 1990 1,00 0,99 2 Philippines 2001 0,95 0,72 1 
Netherlands 1999 1,00 0,98 2 Poland 1990 0,99 0,86 1 
NewZealand 1998 0,99 0,97 2 Poland 1999 0,99 0,85 1 
Nigeria 1990 0,97 0,92 2 Romania 1998 0,99 0,78 1 
NIreland 1990 0,99 0,92 2 Russia 1990 0,99 0,87 1 
NIreland 1999 0,99 0,90 2 SerbianRepBosnia 1998 0,97 0,62 1 
Norway 1982 0,99 0,95 2 SerbianRepBosnia 2001 0,99 0,87 1 
Norway 1990 0,99 0,97 2 Slovenia 1992 1,00 0,76 1 
Norway 1996 0,99 0,97 2 SouthAfrica 1996 0,99 0,65 1 
Peru 1996 0,97 0,91 2 SouthAfrica 2001 0,99 0,47 1 
Peru 2001 0,97 0,95 2 Turkey 2001 0,96 0,89 1 
Portugal 1990 0,99 0,97 2 Uganda 2001 0,97 0,64 1 
PuertoRico 1995 0,98 0,99 2 UK 1999 0,99 0,86 1 
PuertoRico 2001 0,97 0,94 2 VietNam 2001 0,99 0,47 1 
Romania 1999 0,98 0,94 2 Zimbabwe 2001 0,98 0,45 1 
Russia 1995 0,98 0,95 2 Algeria 2002 0,92 0,2 0 
Russia 1999 0,99 0,9 2 Argentina 1984 0,89 0,74 0 





Table 18 Congruence of Inglehart's secular-traditional and self-expression-survival constructs at the ecological 
level 
Note: Figures are Tucker’s Phi factor congruence coefficients. All available country surveys are listed for the first three waves of the 
World Values Survey (102 surveys in 64 countries from 1981 through 1998). SRT refers to “Secular/Rational vs. Traditional”, SES 
to “Self-Expression vs. Survival” values. Surveys where both constructs are structurally equivalent (Tucker’s Phi >= 0.9) are 
marked in bold. 
 
country & year SRT SES No.of fits 
    Iceland 1984 0.99 0.99 2 
US 1995 0.99 0.98 2 
US 1990 0.99 0.97 2 
Croatia 1996 0.98 0.97 2 
Denmark 1981 0.98 0.97 2 
Sweden 1982 0.98 0.97 2 
Ireland 1990 0.99 0.96 2 
Italy 1981 0.99 0.96 2 
Norway 1982 0.99 0.96 2 
Spain 1990 0.99 0.96 2 
GermanyW 1981 0.98 0.96 2 
Argentina 1995 0.99 0.94 2 
Canada 1982 0.99 0.94 2 
Finland 1996 0.99 0.94 2 
Belarus 1996 0.97 0.95 2 
Finland 1990 0.98 0.94 2 
France 1981 0.98 0.94 2 
Ireland 1981 0.98 0.94 2 
Slovenia 1995 0.98 0.94 2 
Poland 1990 0.96 0.95 2 
Sweden 1990 0.98 0.93 2 
Portugal 1990 0.99 0.92 2 
Switzerland 1989 0.97 0.93 2 
GermanyW 1990 0.98 0.92 2 
Czech 1991 0.99 0.91 2 
Italy 1990 0.99 0.91 2 
Brazil 1991 0.98 0.91 2 
Japan 1981 0.99 0.90 2 
Czech 1998 0.97 0.91 2 
Spain 1981 0.97 0.91 2 
France 1990 0.98 0.90 2 
Slovakia 1991 0.98 0.89 1 
Spain 1995 0.99 0.88 1 
Brazil 1997 0.98 0.88 1 
PuertoRico 1995 0.96 0.89 1 
Argentina 1984 0.98 0.87 1 
Australia 1995 0.99 0.86 1 
SouthAfrica 1990 0.99 0.86 1 
India 1990 0.96 0.88 1 
DominicanR 1996 0.98 0.86 1 
Austria 1990 0.99 0.85 1 
Hungary 1998 0.95 0.88 1 
NewZealand 1998 0.96 0.87 1 
Slovakia 1998 0.96 0.87 1 
Taiwan 1994 0.98 0.85 1 
GermanyE 1997 0.99 0.84 1 
Belgium 1981 1.00 0.83 1 
Belgium 1990 1.00 0.83 1 
Peru 1996 0.96 0.86 1 
Argentina 1991 0.98 0.84 1 
UK 1981 0.99 0.83 1 
 
 
country & year SRT SES No.of fits 
    Uruguay 1996 0.99 0.83 1 
Malta 1991 0.94 0.87 1 
Lithuania 1997 0.96 0.85 1 
SouthAfrica 1996 0.97 0.84 1 
Turkey 1990 0.97 0.84 1 
Bulgaria 1997 0.91 0.89 1 
Ukraine 1996 0.92 0.86 1 
Russia 1995 0.92 0.85 1 
Colombia 1998 0.95 0.82 1 
Serbia 1996 0.96 0.81 1 
Norway 1996 0.98 0.78 1 
NIreland 1990 0.98 0.78 1 
Hungary 1991 0.95 0.79 1 
Japan 1990 0.98 0.76 1 
GermanyW 1997 0.99 0.74 1 
Latvia 1996 0.90 0.81 1 
Slovenia 1992 0.97 0.69 1 
Venezuela 1996 0.96 0.67 1 
Norway 1990 0.97 0.64 1 
Armenia 1997 0.96 0.64 1 
Mexico 1996 0.96 0.64 1 
Netherlands 1981 0.98 0.62 1 
Chile 1990 0.99 0.61 1 
Netherlands 1990 0.96 0.62 1 
Romania 1998 0.98 0.60 1 
Japan 1995 0.93 0.60 1 
Switzerland 1996 0.99 0.55 1 
GermanyE 1990 0.99 0.53 1 
Belarus 1990 0.93 0.56 1 
Nigeria 1995 0.90 0.56 1 
UK 1990 1.00 0.50 1 
Mexico 1990 0.97 0.48 1 
Moldova 1996 0.92 0.47 1 
Canada 1990 0.98 0.43 1 
Montenegro 1996 0.95 0.42 1 
Bulgaria 1990 0.92 0.42 1 
NIreland 1981 0.99 0.33 1 
BosniaFed 1998 0.93 0.34 1 
Russia 1990 0.90 0.32 1 
Iceland 1990 0.96 0.28 1 
Chile 1996 0.98 0.26 1 
Nigeria 1990 0.94 0.23 1 
Sweden 1996 0.94 0.21 1 
Georgia 1996 0.95 0.13 1 
Macedonia 1998 0.92 0.05 1 
India 1995 0.94 0.02 1 
Estonia 1996 0.87 0.88 0 
Philippines 1996 0.88 0.78 0 
Albania 1998 0.71 0.37 0 
Azerbaijan 1997 0.88 0.25 0 






Figure 14 Global map of 64 societies based on an ecological reanalysis of Inglehart and Baker’s 10 variables 
Note: Same database as used in Inglehart and Baker, 2000 and for Figure 10. The scores shown are from the latest available survey 
for each country from the period covered by waves 2 and 3 (1990-1991 and 1995-1998) of the World Values Survey. Principal 
component analysis with orthogonal rotation of axes; standardization methods are not used. Not included in the map are countries 
where any of the 10 variables are missing. (1) Bold, underscored fonts represent countries whose scores satisfy the criteria of 
construct equivalence (similar loadings) for both the secular-rational and the self-expression-survival value constructs. (2) small 
fonts indicate countries where construct equivalence is achieved by either constructs. (3) Crossed out italics indicate countries for 



















































































































Prince Edward Island 
Nova Scotia 










Table 19 Regional divisions of Canada 
Note: Table 19 and Table 20 show the regional divisions used in the analysis presented in Figure 11. 
Northeast 








































































Table 21 Countries included in regression models of growth and per capita GDP 
 Growth Per capita GDP 
 Partial Expanded Partial Expanded Argentina x x   Armenia x  x  Australia x x x x 
Austria x x x x 
Azerbaijan x  x  Belarus x  x  Belgium x x x x 
Bolivia  x  x Bosnia & Herzegovina     Brazil x x x x 
Bulgaria x x x x 
Cameroon  x   Canada x x x x 
Chile x x x x 
China  x  x Colombia  x  x Costa Rica  x  x Croatia x x x x 
Cyprus    x Czech x x x x 
Denmark  x  x Egypt  x  x Estonia x x x x 
Ethiopia  x  x Fiji     Finland x x x x 
France x x x x 
Georgia  x  x Germany x x x x 
Ghana  x  x Greece  x  x Hong Kong     Hungary  x  x Iceland     India x x x x 
Indonesia  x  x Iran    x Ireland x x x x 
Israel  x  x Italy x x x x 
Japan x x x x 
Jordan  x  x Korea (Rep.)  x  x Kyrgyzstan x  x  Latvia x x x x 
Lithuania x  x  Luxembourg     Macedonia x x x x 
Malaysia  x  x Mexico x x x x 
Montenegro   x  Namibia    x Nepal  x  x Netherlands x x x x 
New Zealand x x x x 
Nigeria x x x x 
Norway x x x x 
Oman     Pakistan  x  x Peru x x x x 
Philippines  x  x Poland  x  x Portugal x x x x 
Puerto Rico     Romania x x x x 
Russia x x x x 
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Current research into values is dominated by a variable-centered paradigm that defines 
its inquiry as a study of substances and their impacts on each other. This is a more or less 
inevitable outcome of the field's progression toward Big Data, where emergent qualities are 
disregarded in favor of a focus on the abundance of indicators and their "interactions". To 
illustrate the issues with this paradigm, I deconstruct Ronald Inglehart's thesis of 
postmaterialist value shift and his model of culturally induced economic growth. This critique 
takes the field analytical perspective, a relational approach to the study of social facts that 
originates in the pragmatist philosophical tradition and related currents in classical sociology. 
The engagement with Inglehart's thesis on value change includes a cross-cultural 
reanalysis of data collected within the scope of the World Values Survey. The study applies 
the multivariate technique of choice in field analysis, multiple correspondence analysis, which 
yields more consistent latent constructs than the linear techniques used as benchmarks ― and 
in Inglehart's studies. Keeping to these dimensions, national values and trajectories of value 
change challenge Inglehart's account on several counts. 
The review of Inglehart's proposed update to the endogenous model of economic 
growth points out inconsistencies with the historical record of public investment in 
technological innovation and state intervention in general, especially with regard to the 
economically most developed countries. Incorporating a model using the constructs presented 
in the first part, this study questions Inglehart's proposition that values have an independent 
effect on growth. 
The implications of the two empirical chapters are discussed with reference to Weber's 
concept of elective affinity and Bourdieu's studies of symbolic power. The empirical 
irrelevance of the culture-economy dichotomy (or symbolic versus material forms of agency) 
is discussed in connection with the field analytical reformulation of the challenges ahead in 






A társadalmi értékek kutatását jelenleg a változó-centrikus paradigma uralja, amely 
vizsgálatának középpontjában szubsztanciák (entitások) és azok egymásra gyakorolt hatásai 
(pontosabb volna úgy fogalmazni: "ütközései") állnak. Az emergens minőségek ezzel a 
szemlélettel összefüggő hanyagolása többé-kevésbé elkerülhetetlen fejlemény a Big Datának 
köszönhetően egyre nagyobb mennyiségben rendelkezésre álló mutatókra és kapcsolataikra 
fókuszáló kutatási programok térnyerésével. A dolgozat ennek a paradigmának a 
hiányosságait mutatja be Ronald Inglehart posztmaterialista értékváltás-tézisének, valamint 
kulturalista gazdasági növekedés-modelljének kritikáján keresztül. Munkámban a 
pragmatikus filozófiai hagyományra, illetve az azzal rokon klasszikus szociológiai 
áramlatokra visszavezethető mezőelemzés szemléletmódját alkalmazom. 
Inglehart értékváltás-tézisének vizsgálatához a World Values Survey-ből használok 
adatokat. A mezőelemzésben gyakran alkalmazott módszerrel, többszörös korreszpondencia-
elemzéssel a viszonyításként használt lineáris módszerek ― köztük Inglehart vizsgálatainak 
― eredményeivel összevetve koherensebb értékdimenziók tárhatók fel. Az egyes országok 
pozíciói, illetve azok változásai ezeknek a dimenzióknak a terében számos ponton 
megkérdőjelezik Inglehart diagnózisait. 
Az Inglehart által egy, a kultúrát operacionalizáló változóval bővített endogén 
növekedés-modell figyelmen kívül hagyja a gazdasági növekedésben alapvető, különösen a 
technológiai innováción keresztül érvényesülő állami beavatkozást. Ezeknek a folyamatoknak 
a jelentősége a nemzetgazdaságok méretével egyenesen arányos. Inglehart modellje azt 
sugallja, hogy a gazdasági növekedés egyik gyökere kulturális értékekben keresendő. Az első 
részben bemutatott komplex értékváltozókat használó modellel kiegészített kritika 
megkérdőjelezi ezt az állítást. 
A két empirikus fejezet tanulságait Weber elektív affinitás-fogalma és Bourdieu 
szimbolikus hatalommal foglalkozó munkáinak segítségével értelmezem. A "kultúra" és 
"gazdaság" (továbbá a cselekvés anyagi/instrumentális, illetve szimbolikus vonatkozásai) 
elválasztásának empirikus értelmetlenségét az értékszociológia előtt álló kihívások 
mezőelméleti újraértelmezésén keresztül tárgyalom. 
